Earlier this yr, a Russian Su-57 fighter jet roared throughout Indian skies, capturing consideration on the Aero India exhibition. The Kremlin’s aspirations for the showcase have been clear: Moscow supplied to promote its fifth-generation fighter jet to New Delhi the subsequent day.
That is nothing new. Protection ties between the 2 international locations return many years. For the Biden administration, these ties have been each an irritant and a puzzle: an irritant as a result of India’s purchases undercut U.S. sanctions after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and a puzzle as a result of whilst Moscow drew right into a “no limits” friendship with Beijing and New Delhi took an apparent Westward-tilt, Russia by no means deserted India to attain factors with China. Russia may have exacerbated India’s navy vulnerabilities at a time of significant border tensions with China. It by no means did.
Quick ahead to the current: The Trump administration now negotiates immediately with Russia over Ukraine and a bunch of different points and has softened its stance to the purpose of leaving Russia off its tariff goal listing. Clearly, weaning India off Russian arms purchases will likely be a lesser precedence for the USA, even when the White Home will undoubtedly search extra protection offers of its personal with New Delhi. Does this imply that Russo-Indian protection ties are poised for takeoff, or will India proceed to steer the connection into “managed decline?”
Neither.
As a substitute, Russo-Indian protection ties are headed for a way forward for managed equilibrium. It is because the connection is dictated primarily by the pursuits of those two international locations themselves, which frequently lie past Washington’s affect. At its core, the connection is resilient and sturdy. Foundational Russian and Indian pursuits set its ground and ceiling. The ground explains why India won’t abandon Russia for the USA, in addition to why Russia won’t promote India out for China. The ceiling explains why sure sorts of bilateral protection cooperation are prone to be dominated out, even when a near-term uptick in protection ties is believable.
The extra U.S. policymakers respect each the ground and the ceiling of Russo-Indian protection ties, the higher they are going to be at anticipating the doubtless trajectory of this geopolitical pairing that’s solely prone to change into extra essential within the many years to come back.
The Present Baseline in Russo-Indian Arms Ties
Moscow and New Delhi’s navy relationship is primarily outlined by arms gross sales, and to a lesser extent, by co-production preparations. Over the previous twenty years, India bought $60 billion of Russian arms, amounting to 65 p.c of its complete weapons imports. Over that very same interval, Indian purchases declined in relative phrases because it diversified its suppliers. Russia stays India’s largest single arms provider, however over the previous 5 years, the USA, France, and Israel collectively supplied India with 55 p.c of its complete weapons imports.
But, Russian programs should not only a Chilly Struggle legacy for India. Over the previous decade, India’s navy, military, and air drive have made main investments in Russian-built platforms and munitions that play very important roles in defending towards existential threats and are virtually sure to be in service for many years to come back.
For its navy, India has agreed to buy 4 stealth frigates from Russia, two as imports and two to be constructed by India’s Goa Shipyard Restricted with Russian assist. India commissioned the primary Russian frigate in December 2024, with the second anticipated in 2025. India will construct the final two between 2026 and 2027. India expects so as to add a Russian nuclear-powered assault submarine by 2028, underneath a ten-year lease of the INS Chakra III. And India’s indigenously constructed ballistic missile submarines, which it sees as a vital piece of its nuclear deterrent, reportedly additionally required in depth Russian know-how and technical help.
To defend its skies, India took supply of three extremely succesful Russian-made S-400 air protection squadrons in 2023 and expects two extra by 2025. India’s air drive presently operates 259 Russian-designed Su-30 MKIs, and in 2024, New Delhi awarded Hindustan Aeronautics Restricted a contract to provide twelve extra.
On land, India’s major tank fleet is comprised of two,400 Russian-made T-72 tanks. In 2025, New Delhi and Moscow agreed to a $248 million contract for brand new 1,000 horsepower engines to spice up mobility and lethality. Indian troops more and more use the Russian AK-203 assault rifle, inbuilt India by means of a joint-production deal. By July 2024, that deal delivered 35,000 new assault rifles to the Indian Military.
One in all India’s most succesful missile programs, the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, is the product of a three way partnership with Russia. India equips its Su-30 MKI fighter jets with BrahMos missiles and deploys them alongside the disputed border with China. The missile is one in all India’s few arms export success tales. In 2022, the Philippines signed a $375 million contract, with the primary supply going down in 2024. Gross sales to Vietnam and Indonesia are additionally within the works.
Sturdy and Resilient Ties
Each India and Russia have clear pursuits in preserving bilateral protection ties. Their lengthy historical past of cooperation engenders familiarity and belief. All through the Chilly Struggle, the Soviet Union supplied political, financial, and navy help to India. Throughout the Sixties, Soviet arms accounted for about 70 p.c of Indian weapons imports. In 1971, the 2 international locations additional strengthened their ties by signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Historic reminiscence and well-worn institutional ties are essential foundations for the up to date Russo-Indian relationship.
India’s quick safety issues additionally maintain it tethered to Russia. New Delhi faces a perpetually hostile Pakistan and an more and more threatening China. India’s border tensions with China spiked in 2020, when forces clashed within the Galwan Valley, killing twenty Indian and a minimum of 4 Chinese language troopers. Throughout India’s neighborhood, China’s navy presence is rising. Since 2008, China’s navy has deployed to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy missions. In 2014, China’s navy despatched its first submarines to the Indian Ocean, surfacing in Sri Lanka. A couple of years later, China established a navy base in Djibouti. Indian strategists are involved about Chinese language entry to ports all through the area, together with Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong in Bangladesh. China justifies its rising navy presence within the area by declaring: “the Indian Ocean shouldn’t be India’s ocean.”
Going through such quick issues, India doesn’t have the posh of time or assets to exchange its Russian equipment. Nor can it rely on different suppliers for probably the most delicate and technologically superior platforms, akin to nuclear submarines or missile protection programs. Furthermore, India’s leaders pursue a “multi-alignment or multi-vector” technique during which they construct and preserve various relationships in an more and more multipolar world order as a method to greatest protect India’s autonomy and extract advantages. New Delhi anticipates that Russia will stay an amazing energy in that order, so sustaining shut ties with Moscow — whereas additionally strengthening cooperation with Washington — is a precedence.
The Kremlin likewise acknowledges its pursuits in preserving its relationship with India, particularly after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Laboring underneath U.S. and European sanctions, Russia has turned to Chinese language and Indian markets. Along with India’s vastly elevated oil purchases, Indian arms imports present Russia with larger financial stability within the close to time period and a viable progress alternative for the longer term. In that respect, Russia can also be making a calculated guess on India’s rising energy and wealth. “India ought to undoubtedly be added to the listing of superpowers,” Putin mentioned, “We’re creating relations with India in all instructions. India is a good nation, now the most important when it comes to inhabitants.”
On the identical time, the Kremlin’s assist for the Indian navy displays Russia’s agency willpower to defend its autonomy even because it turns into extra depending on China. Within the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the 2 revolutionary states declared a “friendship” with “no limits.” Each international locations proceed to share an curiosity in undermining U.S. affect, however because the struggle in Ukraine grinds on, Beijing and Moscow’s relationship has change into more and more asymmetrical. Western sanctions have made Russia depending on commerce with China for financial stability. Attritional warfare additionally pressured the Russian protection industrial base to depend on Chinese language dual-use applied sciences and machine instruments. Moscow is undeniably the weaker participant within the relationship however is unlikely to be happy dwelling in Beijing’s shadow. It hopes to protect its freedom of motion and to take care of impartial relations with different world powers. With this goal in thoughts, Russia doubtless perceives its ties with India as an important different and counterbalance to China over the lengthy haul.
Lastly, the Kremlin’s present slate of arms gross sales to India doesn’t pose a severe menace to China. They don’t alter the general navy stability of energy, which stays closely tilted in China’s favor. This asymmetry is very seen alongside the contested Line of Precise Management, the place Chinese language infrastructure outpaces India’s by an estimated 25 years. This benefit permits China to station troops and deploy weapons programs extra successfully, guaranteeing fast mobilization alongside the border. Russia, subsequently, can revenue off gross sales to India, guess on its future, and symbolically defend its autonomy with out posing an actual menace to its extra essential pal in Beijing.
Associates with Limits
Regardless of the sturdy navy ties between Russia and India, there are clear limitations to their relationship, each from New Delhi’s facet and Moscow’s. India’s ceiling is basically pushed by its need to diversify its weapons sources. India’s purpose of strategic autonomy requires entry to a broad vary of navy companions in addition to a extra succesful indigenous protection trade. India, subsequently, is hesitant to tie itself too carefully to any single supply, particularly one as troubled as Russia.
The struggle in Ukraine has highlighted different dangers of over-reliance on Russian arms as nicely. Some distinguished Indian analysts voiced issues in regards to the efficiency of Russian weaponry within the battle. “How come the Patriots took down the Kinzhal missiles that have been touted as invincible? How come Russian ships have gotten such simple targets from a rustic that doesn’t have a navy? Its spy planes akin to A-50s, and fighter jets akin to Sukhois have been downed so successfully,” one Indian protection analyst famous. Furthermore, deliveries to India seem to have been delayed as a result of COVID-19 provide chain disruptions and the struggle in Ukraine. Russia delayed manufacturing and supply of its stealth frigates, nuclear-power assault submarine, S-400 regiments, and AK-203 assault rifles to India. Within the quick aftermath of the Russian invasion, fearing plodding manufacturing, India additionally backed out of offers to buy Mi-17 V5 helicopters and Kamov Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters.
Moreover, assuming India continues to hunt a stronger strategic partnership with the USA, it might want to weigh any new ties to Moscow towards Washington’s doubtless response. Underneath the Biden administration, India ran the danger of antagonizing a White Home keen to place the screws to Russia and to defend Ukraine. Underneath the Trump administration, India runs a larger danger of disappointing a president who prioritizes commerce balances and is eager on promoting extra U.S.-made arms to the world. Both manner, India faces a troublesome balancing act.
Lastly, buying new Russian programs may exacerbate issues of interoperability throughout the Indian armed forces the place U.S. and European programs are additionally used, given their incompatible communications and software program protocols. Equally, Washington — already considerably cautious about sharing sure sorts of know-how and intelligence with New Delhi due to its shut ties with Moscow — will doubtless proceed to limit cooperation, particularly if India doubles down on shopping for new Russian arms.
For Russia, the ceiling of its gross sales to India is about by the Kremlin’s relationship with China. At the moment, Beijing is Moscow’s most essential strategic associate and the second-largest purchaser of Russian arms, together with superior capabilities such because the Sukhoi Su-35 fight plane and S-400 air protection programs. Over the previous 20 years, 30 p.c of all Russian arms exports went to India, whereas 20 p.c went to China. The story has remained pretty fixed, whilst China’s complete arms imports have declined whereas its home arms trade has grown. Over the previous 5 years, India’s share of complete Russian arms exports rose to 34 p.c, however China’s nonetheless amounted to 18 p.c. Though Russia’s arms trade is most reliant on Indian purchases, additionally it is depending on Chinese language purchases. India is a major purchaser, however its assets are restricted and can’t singlehandedly assist Russia’s complete protection trade. This leaves Moscow susceptible to Beijing’s stress.
Russia will subsequently doubtless stay cautious about coming into into new protection offers with India which may antagonize China. To this point, Beijing doesn’t seem to have used its appreciable leverage towards Moscow to halt arms transfers to New Delhi. However Russia and India’s agreements for superior capabilities all pre-date Beijing and Moscow’s “no limits” friendship (the frigate deal was inked in 2016, the S-400s in 2018).
China may conceivably warn Russia towards transferring extra state-of-the-art know-how. For example, the sale of fifth-generation plane to India and the collectively developed BrahMos missile to South China Sea claimants may cross a crimson line, as these strikes may restrict Chinese language ambitions throughout the Indo-Pacific. Underneath such circumstances, Russia would doubtless trim its plans for brand new offers with India, significantly avoiding massive transactions at politically delicate moments for Beijing. Totally conscious of all these dynamics, India is prone to pursue solely these offers with Russia that it anticipates gained’t run too far afoul of China. In sum, whereas Moscow will proceed to promote arms to New Delhi, either side additionally respect the restrictions of their relationship.
U.S. Coverage in a Multipolar World
Between the ground and ceiling of Russo-Indian protection ties is a vital window for continued cooperation. India can’t afford to cease buying vital items of its arsenal from Russia, however neither can it afford to intensify that dependence. Equally, Russia has sturdy incentives to show itself a dependable provider, however neither can it danger crossing a line with Beijing.
U.S. policymakers want to understand each the ground and the ceiling of Russo-Indian relations. Their ties are complicated and mirror particular bilateral dynamics. In addition they mirror the rising actuality of a multipolar world during which states needn’t be “with or towards” one another however could be “with and towards.” That Russia continues arming India is proof. In any case, Moscow is arming New Delhi towards its “no limits” pal in Beijing. China and Russia will proceed to deepen their relationship for the foreseeable future. All of the whereas, China and India will stay bitter rivals. Regardless of the obvious contradictions, this triangle is sturdy. The three powers have discovered an equilibrium.
In an more and more multipolar world, U.S. policymakers also needs to study to maintain a number of opposing concepts of their minds on the identical time. Managing such contradictions shouldn’t be solely potential — it is going to be essential.
Daniel S. Markey is a senior fellow on the International Coverage Institute, Johns Hopkins Faculty of Superior Worldwide Research. He was, till March 28, a senior advisor on the U.S. Institute of Peace.
David Brostoff was, till March 28, a South Asia analysis analyst on the U.S. Institute of Peace.
Picture: Ministry of Defence of India by way of Wikimedia Commons.
