All through the 75-year historical past of NATO, no member has been attacked by Russia or the Soviet Union. Along with its nuclear umbrella, the alliance achieved typical deterrence by establishing sturdy interoperability requirements, enabling giant, distributed, and interchangeable munition stockpiles. All laser-guided weapons, no matter origin, function on a standardized laser pulse frequency. Networked weapons and sensors are guided by interoperable datalinks. Artillery shells and bullets are suitable and interchangeable with varied allied gun methods. As we speak, international U.S. and allied munition stockpiles and defense-industrial capability are at historic lows. In the meantime, the pacing risk within the Pacific has unparalleled latent industrial energy and is changing into more and more assertive.
On this safety surroundings, the place overmatch can not be assumed, deterrence requires long-range, interoperable, and interchangeable munitions to change an adversary’s calculus. Conflicts are quickly depleting current stockpiles, and the US lacks the economic capability to replenish them in ample time. Concurrently, allied protection industries require an infusion of capital, know-how, and shared goal. Co-manufacturing interchangeable weapon methods with trusted allies, notably when mixed with modern employment ideas, presents a compelling resolution. The U.S. authorities ought to seize alternatives for co-manufacturing and joint procurement of current munitions with allies to maximise deterrence. Doing so will strengthen the credibility and resilience of the worldwide defense-industrial base required to prevail in a significant battle.
Deterrence By Integration and Interchangeability
The geography of the Pacific presents a special drawback set than the first risk confronted in Europe, demanding totally different weapon functionality necessities. The framework that underpinned typical deterrence in Europe, nevertheless, can nonetheless be utilized, particularly the ideas of weapon interchangeability and interoperability. Luckily, some exist already. In the course of the Rim of the Pacific train in 2024, the U.S. Navy formally confirmed the existence of its long-range air-to-air missile, the AIM-174B, an air-launched adaptation of the Commonplace Missile (SM) 6 that was initially designed for warships. Commonplace Missile variants provide capabilities for participating air, floor, and ballistic missile targets. The SM-6 types the confirmed spine of U.S. Navy air protection, with a 40-year lineage that traces again to the SM-2. Over the previous 25 years, the U.S. Navy has fielded six variants, and has extra fashions in growth, promising longer ranges and hypersonic engagement speeds.
The revelation of the AIM-174B despatched ripples by international protection communities, notably in China, because it demonstrated a beforehand unknown interchangeable use case. The interchangeability of the SM-6 between floor strike and air interception missions led to ambiguity and unease amongst Chinese language observers about how the missiles might be employed. A Chinese language weapons journal described the reveal of the AIM-174B as a “large risk” that basically upended China’s assumptions and warfare plans. Regardless of solely just lately showing within the press, the AIM-174B was a part of the Navy F/A-18 pilots’ coaching for years, highlighting its maturity and potential for allied integration.
The SM-6 and its variants are notable for his or her interchangeability and interoperability. When weapon methods are interoperable and interchangeable, alliances develop into stronger and reinforcing to U.S. navy energy. Such collaboration extends past offering weapons by international navy gross sales or licensing — it consists of concentrating on infrastructure that completes the weapons’ kill chain and feeds into a standard working image. For instance, the US and its allies share interoperable tactical datalinks — primarily Hyperlink-16 — in addition to extremely delicate reconnaissance feeds. Interoperable datalinks enhance the variety of sensors and shooters throughout the battlespace, enhancing the mixed power’s lethality and survivability in fight.
The proliferation of interoperable tactical datalinks creates an surroundings excellent for the SM-6 household and different varieties of networked weapons. All variants can obtain updates through these datalinks, enabling dynamic concentrating on and coordination throughout totally different platforms. The SM-6 can also be built-in into the Military’s land-based Typhon mid-range functionality, complementing the Marine Corps’ littoral regiments geared up with the Naval Strike Missile. Moreover, the SM-6 may be containerized for launch from a wide range of platforms, together with unconventional vessels and wheeled autos already in use. As talked about earlier, the weapon was tailored for air-launch from U.S. Navy F/A-18s, providing a spread considerably better than that of the legendary AIM-54 Phoenix. Since Australia operates the identical mannequin of F/A-18s because the U.S. Navy, this creates a pure alternative for integration. Collectively, the interchangeability and interoperability of the SM-6 provide various employment choices whereas simplifying operational logistics.
One other notable weapon system is the Tomahawk Land Assault Missile. Japan, the Netherlands, and Australia have signed agreements to buy the Tomahawk, becoming a member of the US and the UK as operators of the missile system. In line with reviews, Germany can also be contemplating the procurement of Tomahawks because it builds its navy capability. Past increasing the person base, the addition of Tomahawks to allied inventories additionally supplies entry to the Tomahawk community, probably permitting the US and its allies to share a standard goal database that will increase journal depth for strikes, in addition to the velocity at which they are often engaged.
A brand new variant of the Tomahawk, referred to as the Maritime Strike Tomahawk, is being launched with the potential to strike each land and maritime targets. This model will present a much-needed counterweight to the Folks’s Liberation Military Navy’s long-range floor strike capabilities with out the expense of clean-sheet designs. Furthermore, as with the land-launched SM-6, the Military’s Typhon battery also can launch Tomahawks, making the system a viable choice for homeland and territorial waters protection for island nations comparable to New Zealand.
Credible Deterrence By way of Ahead Presence and Distributed Manufacturing
Deterring typical battle requires shows of credible functionality. For instance, take into account the deployment of the Terminal Excessive Altitude Space Protection system to South Korea in 2017, which was met with anger by China and a flurry of diplomatic maneuvering. A functionality can’t deter a rustic if it’s not deployed inside an space the place it may be efficient. Displaying a functionality requires a reputable presence. Moreover, a weapon’s functionality lacks credibility if its stockpiles are restricted or positioned removed from the purpose of use.
This precept is clear within the Chinese language media’s reactions to the general public revelation of the AIM-174B. Whereas some appreciated the capabilities that the AIM-174B might carry, others expressed skepticism about its viability. Unfavorable opinions centered on SM-6 manufacturing limitations. These reactions recommend that for the deterrent worth of the SM-6 or any weapon to be maximized, it wants to beat its manufacturing constraints and be broadly distributed within the Pacific theater. Throughout U.S. wargames, the placement and amount of weapons obtain as a lot scrutiny from commanders because the places and numbers of the platforms that may use them. As Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower famously noticed, “You’ll not discover it tough to show that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been gained or misplaced primarily due to logistics.” In all contexts, distributed manufacturing with allies supplies varied logistical choices and eliminates single factors of failure.
Chinese language navy commentators additionally centered on the idea of expeditionary land-based weapon methods. Unfavorable opinions focused on sustainment facets, however notably not on participating the weapon system itself in warfare. This possible means that China understands the issue in concentrating on land-based cellular methods, comparable to Typhon and Marine Corps Naval Strike Missile batteries, as evidenced by the Russo-Ukrainian warfare. Moreover, a lot of China’s anti-access weapon methods concentrate on capital platforms, comparable to warships, plane bases, and help plane, reasonably than vans carrying missile launchers. China acknowledges it’s simpler to interdict the logistics that maintain such forces, and its analysts know that the U.S. Navy will possible must expose itself to ship replenishment. Nonetheless, the latest Balikatan train, which featured the primary deployment of Marine Corps Naval Strike Missiles to the Philippines, drew adverse consideration from China, indicating that the ideas and deployments of those capabilities are regarding to them. Sustainment publicity threat may be considerably mitigated if domestically produced stockpiles exist already in theater.
A Case for Allied Interoperability and Co-Manufacturing
Co-manufacturing partnerships are invaluable, evidenced by the Russo-Ukrainian warfare, which considerably depleted U.S. stockpiles of 155mm artillery shells. Australia and South Korea, which additionally manufacture 155-milliimeter shells, helped replenish U.S. stockpiles. Equally, conflicts within the Center East depleted U.S. stockpiles of Commonplace Missiles, Tomahawks, and different munitions, representing years of commercial output and elevating fears that depleted weapon stockpiles undermines U.S. readiness for battle within the Indo-Pacific. Had allies comparable to Japan additionally been producing these munitions, expenditures could be much less impactful and extra rapidly changed. The variety of munitions expended in opposition to the Houthis alone demonstrates that the US will want allied assist in a warfare with a peer.
Australia and Japan are within the means of buying the SM-6, with Japan discussing the potential for a co-production settlement. Co-manufacturing preparations function a method of scaling manufacturing, burden sharing, and attaining geographic distribution. Alternatives exist to increase upon current cooperative growth and manufacturing agreements, such because the World Battle II-era Nationwide Know-how and Industrial Base or AUKUS, by together with extra allies. For instance, Australia and the UK joined the Nationwide Know-how and Industrial Base in 2017, with New Zealand becoming a member of in 2023.
Paradoxically, Japan and Norway are allies which have collectively developed and manufactured missiles with the US however are usually not occasion to both framework. That is regardless of the US and Japan’s joint growth and co-production of the SM-3 Block IIA for ballistic missile protection, with Japan contributing rocket motors, boosters, and nostril cones to each U.S. and Japanese meeting traces. Moreover, Japan and the US are growing a glide section interceptor beneath the Glide Part Interceptor Cooperative Growth Undertaking Association. In a parallel growth, Norway is establishing manufacturing crops in Virginia and Australia to satisfy the surging demand for its Naval Strike Missiles.
U.S. missile manufacturing capability constraints are attributed to bottlenecks in rocket motor manufacturing and the supply of uncommon earth provides from China. To handle these constraints, current agreements with allies must be expanded to ascertain different sources of provide for very important elements of the SM-6, Tomahawk, and different essential weapons. Within the close to time period, Japan’s present manufacturing of SM-3 rocket motors and boosters must be expanded to incorporate SM-6 specs. This growth permits different agreements, such because the AUKUS settlement with Lockheed Martin to construct rocket motors for varied missiles as a part of the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance enterprise, extra time to construct capability from scratch.
To additional mitigate the danger of provide chain disruptions for uncooked supplies and important elements, the US must also take into account incorporating testing and adopting viable substitutes into the growth of current weapon agreements. As an example, Japan collectively developed seeker know-how for the SM-3 and manufactures superior missile seekers. The US ought to look at whether or not allied indigenous designs may be built-in with its weapon methods. If not, it ought to take into account broadening licensed manufacturing agreements to incorporate these elements, supplied the required infrastructure exists, as in Japan’s instance. Various suppliers must also be recognized for uncommon earths, that are important to electronics and gyroscopes. The US ought to accomplice with allies comparable to Australia and Canada on uncommon earth tasks, extending past home initiatives, to safe these essential provides.
Give attention to Munitions, Not Capital Platforms
Many U.S. allies discover themselves in related predicaments relating to finances constraints and the event of capital platforms comparable to ships and plane. For instance, New Zealand just lately raised its protection finances to $8 billion (NZ$12 billion). To match, America’s latest Arleigh Burke destroyers price between $2.1 billion and $2.5 billion every, with a mean induction fee of 1.5 destroyers per yr from a mature manufacturing line. In distinction, the SM-6 prices between $4 million and $8 million, which means that the identical finances might procure over 1,000 missiles as an alternative. As we speak, the US alone can produce as much as 125 SM-6 missiles yearly.
Regardless of will increase in protection budgets from Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and different nations, developing and deploying capital property nonetheless takes years. Compared, manufacturing and deploying munitions is way sooner, particularly for weapons that may be built-in with current methods in a rustic’s stock. In 2022, Proceedings printed David Alman’s essay titled “Don’t Purchase Warships (But).” Alman argued that to deal with fast dangers stemming from the U.S.’s lagging shipbuilding functionality, the US ought to prioritize procuring extra munitions that may be mounted on different platforms able to delivering them, comparable to submarines, land-launch methods, and plane. A Heritage Basis commentary agreed, stating that the U.S. Navy’s drawback is just not the variety of ships or plane however the variety of munitions it could actually provide to them. Because the analyses acknowledge, with any weapon system, a platform is the supply technique and the munition is what finally produces the impact. Because the Heritage Basis piece famous, “You may be one of the best shot on the earth, however your experience gained’t rely for a lot should you run out of bullets.” This reasoning applies equally to U.S. allies aiming to modernize their navy within the close to to mid-term, the place balancing the variety of bows versus arrows is important as longer-lead tasks come to fruition.
Points
For many years, U.S. weapons cooperation was hindered by self-imposed restrictions and politics. Strict interpretations of the Missile Know-how Management Regime prevented shut cooperation on weapons, even with trusted allies. Concurrently, Worldwide Site visitors in Arms Rules approval critiques for know-how switch introduced one other avenue for frustration, because the presumed place is one in all denial. Luckily, coverage shifts have occurred, dramatically altering the protection panorama by dropping limitations. In January 2025, new steering was issued to permit case-by-case flexibility within the approval of assorted missile, drone, and house methods for the Missile Know-how Management Regime. AUKUS Pillar II exempts taking part members from Worldwide Site visitors in Arms Rules approvals for “navy and dual-use” items, permitting for the free movement of supplies and help on the velocity of enterprise.
Companion nation politics additionally come into play. For instance, Article IX of Japan’s structure was strictly interpreted as stopping the export of arms exterior the nation. Over time, Japan has reinterpreted its structure. First, as was the case with the co-development of the SM-3 again in 1999, permitting co-produced weapons to be exported again to the US, and later advanced right into a extra liberal viewpoint, one which helps regional peace and stability. Beneath the present interpretation, with China’s aggressiveness serving because the catalyst, Japan is trying to export its Mogami-class frigate and related know-how to Australia, in addition to older destroyers to the Philippines within the identify of regional stability. From a political standpoint, headwinds are abating.
The danger of compromise is a priority for weapons cooperation and manufacturing. For instance, in 2007, Japan launched an investigation into leaked knowledge in regards to the AEGIS weapon system. In 2025, the US positioned South Korea on a watchlist as a result of mishandling of delicate lab knowledge. As a part of agreements comparable to AUKUS, allies have to be licensed to deal with U.S. secrets and techniques, which is a prolonged course of. As soon as licensed, cooperation ought to proceed freely and with out obstacles. To assist with certification, the US ought to provide related help to allies because it does with U.S. protection contractors in cyber protection and bodily safety that had been instituted after high-profile breaches. Even when an ally can’t meet strict necessities, restricted partnerships ought to nonetheless be thought-about if a element they produce can be utilized with out risking the general system.
Considerations about U.S. budgets and their affect on allied co-manufacturing portions can largely be mitigated. Multi-year procurement preparations present a secure basis for sustained manufacturing, even when U.S. budgets fluctuate. Such preparations create binding commitments with cancellation penalties, making certain stability throughout finances cycles whereas lowering unit prices. Moreover, co-production might make the most of a consortium mannequin that allocates a share of slots to U.S. orders for contingency — if unused, these slots could be used to meet different orders. The success of allied orders must be the first concern of allied co-production initiatives, permitting home U.S. provides to concentrate on U.S. authorities orders. By reserving a better share of manufacturing capability for allies like Australia and Japan, U.S. finances fluctuations would develop into a comparatively minor disruption to general co-production efforts.
Conclusion
The present U.S. administration has positioned a precedence on allies committing extra to their protection. Problematically, some allies’ protection apparatuses have atrophied to the purpose the place it’s difficult to construct manufacturing capability for his or her current navy methods as a result of bureaucratic impediments or the lack of industrial bases. Counting on direct procurements from the U.S. protection trade can also be not a viable resolution, because it struggles to fill home demand. For instance, the present U.S. administration is reviewing AUKUS and the choice to produce Australia with Virginia-class submarines. The Workplace of the Beneath Secretary of Protection for Coverage said that utilizing U.S. shipyards to meet Australian orders might undermine the U.S. Navy’s place by delaying its personal orders, regardless of Australia already committing funds to the mission. These issues lengthen to munitions as effectively, with the Protection Division halting arms shipments to Ukraine due to worries about dwindling missile stockpiles.
As China turns into extra assertive and its financial and industrial-military strengths develop, the US and its allies ought to determine methods to compete with a Chinese language economic system that focuses on large-scale industrial output. By 2030, China is predicted to have a battle power of round 435 ships, complemented by 1000’s of missiles. With U.S. Pacific allies feeling threatened by China’s navy growth and assertiveness, it might be unwise to neglect deepening protection ties by failing to increase licensing agreements and manufacturing partnerships. Such “offers” may be a approach to offset commerce imbalances with allies, an acute strain level for the present U.S. administration, by paying licensing or royalty charges to U.S. corporations. Moreover, these partnerships present a vector for allies to allocate protection funding to revitalize their industries.
Deterrence is achieved by deploying credible capabilities and fostering sturdy alliances. The first technique is to stop China from attaining an overmatch within the close to to mid-term. The very best method is to display credible and proliferated stockpiles of interchangeable and interoperable munitions such because the SM-6 and the Tomahawk. To attain this purpose, precedence must be given to leveraging current allied manufacturing frameworks and capabilities within the close to time period, whereas constructing new capability within the mid- to long run. By way of co-manufacturing and integration, the US can set up a distributed, resilient deterrent that magnifies the collective energy of like-minded nations in preserving regional safety.
Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine serves because the built-in fires director for the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan, the place he often works with U.S. allies on operational planning and protection integration. Earlier than this function, he held advisory positions centered on joint fires and unmanned methods on the Naval Aviation Warfighting Growth Middle. A profession naval aviator, he has accomplished fight deployments with strike-fighter squadrons and Naval Particular Warfare items.
Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch is an F/A-18 weapons methods officer at the moment assigned to Strike Fighter Wing Pacific. He beforehand served as a fellow with the Halsey Alfa Superior Analysis Group on the U.S. Naval Battle Faculty, the place he performed operational wargaming and iterative marketing campaign evaluation centered on maritime denial, fleet design, and entry challenges within the Indo-Pacific, exploring how rising applied sciences, allied integration, and power posture can form aggressive outcomes in contested maritime environments.
The views expressed on this article are these of the writer and never these of the U.S. Navy, the Protection Division, or any a part of the U.S. authorities.
Picture: Henry Villarama through DVIDS
