On January 25, the Rand Company issued a short-ish examine of the battle in Ukraine, titled “Avoiding a Lengthy Warfare: U.S. Coverage and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Battle.” The Rand Company was initially based as a think-tank that would supply “Analysis & Improvement” (R-and-D) recommendation to the U.S. army and it nonetheless stays strongly, although not wholly, centered on army evaluation. Thus, this newest examine made some waves, particularly since its non-hawkish tenor stood in distinction to that of a prolonged (354-page) report {that a} gaggle of Rand consultants launched in 2019 that had recognized “Offering deadly help to Ukraine” as a doubtlessly high-benefit method of “Overextending and Unbalancing Russia.”
Extra concerning the inner Rand politics of this newest examine on Ukraine, later on this essay. For now, let me clarify why the examine has attracted such consideration right here in DC. That’s primarily as a result of the authors, political scientists Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe, boldly asserted that occasionally the pursuits of the USA are distinct from these of the federal government of Ukraine. Who would have thought that!!! However for a U.S. political elite that has been drenched in anti-Russianism for the previous seven years, and in pro-Ukrainian boosterism ever since final February 24, it is a deeply stunning assertion.
The principal area by which Charap and Priebe choose that U.S. pursuits could diverge from these of Ukraine is the matter of whether or not the USA shares (and whether or not it ought to share) the Ukrainians’ desired aim of regaining all of the Ukrainian terrain at the moment underneath Russian management.
Their examine is a fast and simple learn and builds on appreciable work that every of the co-authors has carried out on the Ukraine battle each earlier than and since final February 24. Within the examine, they look at what they describe as “5 key dimensions that outline various warfare trajectories” for Ukraine, outlined thus:
- doable Russian use of nuclear weapons
- doable escalation to a Russia-NATO battle
- territorial management
- period
- type of warfare termination.
The primary two of these matters are non-controversial amongst most members of the political elite right here in the USA. Nearly no-one right here desires to see both a visit over the edge of nuclear-weapons use or a direct battle between NATO and Russia. It’s within the latter three domains that Charap & Priebe are aiming to crank just a little wider open the “Overton window” of the discourse that’s thought of acceptable throughout the ranks of elite opinion-formers in Washington and New York.
Rand is well-known for its use of Powerpoint-friendly, very primary graphics, and this publication isn’t any exception. So let me simply use the block tables that Charap and Priebe use to sum up their important arguments on the problems of territorial management and the size of the warfare. I assume the tables ought to all be labeled © Rand Company. Additionally, click on on any one in all them to enlarge it. Right here they’re:
That’s basic cost-benefit evaluation! Discover that in each these dimensions of the warfare, C&P establish no “Extremely important advantages” to the USA for the situation in query, whereas they do establish a number of sorts of “Extremely important prices.”
Additionally observe in Desk 3 that they appear to have purchased into the trope that “Russia has already been considerably weakened by the warfare,” utilizing that to argue that “the USA would solely see average advantages from additional weakening its adversary.” My view, against this, is that whereas Russia has certainly suffered non-trivial losses from the warfare, these have reached nowhere near being debilitating. But when we have a look at a broad, multi-dimensional definition of the worldwide stability between the USA and Russia, then we see that the USA has additionally suffered losses on account of the battle which are important and persevering with, and which will effectively develop in influence over time. These prices embody (however will not be restricted to) the next:
- uncooked prices of the US-NATO arms transfers to Ukraine;
- the weak spot revealed in US international mushy energy by Washington’s failure to increase its anti-Russian coalition in any significant method into the International South; and (relatedly)
- the truth that the shock that Washington’s financial measures in opposition to Russia inflicted on the world financial system has led many important economies around the globe to strengthen monetary and supply-chain linkages which are unbiased of U.S. management.
Their part on the “Kind [or modality] of warfare termination” is a welcome, however very unsophisticated, try to handle the essential political subject concerned in any armed battle. Slightly mechanistically they observe that wars will be ended both via the “absolute victory” of 1 or the opposite warring social gathering, or by negotiating both a last peace settlement or a battle-zone-wide armistice. Relating to the potential of an absolute victory—which they observe is outlined in social-science literature as, “completely eradicating the (interstate) risk posed by its adversary”—they write that Russia has most likely given up its preliminary aim of effecting regime change in Kyiv and additionally, equally realistically, that an absolute Ukrainian victory is unlikely. Puncturing the fever desires of warmongers in Kyiv or in NATO, C& P state tersely (p.13) that, “it’s fanciful to think about that Ukraine may destroy Russia’s capability to wage warfare.”
Then, turning to the 2 completely different, kind of distinct types of negotiated settlement, they observe (p.15) that, “different issues being equal, U.S. pursuits are higher served by a political settlement that may carry a extra sturdy peace than an armistice.” They usually very well add, “Moreover, a political settlement may very well be a primary step towards addressing broader regional points and lowering the prospect of a Russia-NATO disaster sooner or later. “
However they conclude this part thus:
Nevertheless, the extent of hostility as of December 2022 between Russia and Ukraine, and between Russia and the West, make[s] a political settlement appear a lot much less possible than an armistice.
Their examine then has a bit on “Impediments to Ending the Battle” that addresses a vital query however supplies a typically unsatisfactory set of solutions. They attribute war-prolongation, on this case and on the whole, nearly solely to an data drawback: particularly, that the decisionmakers on both facet are unsure concerning the potential advantages of peace or the potential price of constant the warfare. That’s, actually, almost at all times one consider battle prolongation. However I spent the primary years of my profession as a journalist and analyst dwelling in, reporting on, and really carefully documenting the preliminary six years of Lebanon’s prolonged civil warfare. From that have, and from the quite a few research I’ve manufactured from a wide range of conflicts and conflict-termination efforts since then, I’ve to conclude that there are two different essential drivers of battle prolongation. One I’d outline roughly as “the passions of warfare”– passions which are actually robust sufficient (and possibly most particularly so inside a democracy) to considerably obliterate any rational evaluation of prices, advantages, and some great benefits of exploring each doable avenue for peace. The opposite could be the concrete financial and different pursuits of sectors of society that profit massively from the prolongation of warfare. These could be primarily the profiteers within the military-industrial complicated, but additionally embody cynical politicians, journalists (whose careers will be catapulted very excessive, as mine was, by the chance to “cowl” a warfare), and different opinion-formers. C&P’s examine makes no point out of both of these two essential components.
One different irritating shortcoming of their paper is that it utterly ignores the potential contributions to war-terminating diplomacy that may be performed by all kinds of actors apart from the USA. I assume these authors obtained their skilled formation throughout an period when it was the USA that was the principal driver of all the massive shifts in worldwide diplomacy—generally with the help of the United Nations, as in some phases of the wars of the Yugoslavia breakup and in Afghanistan; and often-times with out, as within the circumstances of Kosovo, the invasion of Iraq, and quite a few different US-led invasions or regime-change operations around the globe? And that was additionally an period by which the USA was the only or principal actor on the diplomatic stage on such points as Arab-Israeli peacemaking…
However this time round, as I famous in this evaluation that I penned on February 24 itself, the worldwide order is now not one over which Washington workouts unilateral dominance And in these circumstances it’s completely each doable and fascinating for sensible analysts in the USA and different NATO international locations to be exploring what position the leaders of different (most definitely non-NATO) G-20 international locations may have the ability to play in mediating an armistice in Ukraine that might work for all of the events concerned—and past that, may work for a world group that has suffered tremendously and in many various methods from the outbreak and continuation of the battle.
… Effectively, C&P’s examine has many analytical shortcomings. However nonetheless, it’s a welcome addition to a “mainstream discourse” right here in the USA that has seen think-tank leaders, most (however thank G-d not all) politicians, and all of the excessive pooh-bahs of the punditocracy lining as much as cheerlead for the warfare in opposition to Russia. And as famous above, this examine is especially welcome since it’s being issued simply 4 years after the large examine that James Dobbins et al wrote, that recognized offering deadly help to Ukraine as a doubtlessly “productive” method for the USA to “overextend and weaken” Russia. The large Dobbins examine was titled “Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Floor”. It was a fairly comprehensive-looking, full-spectrum examination of the various methods, each army and non-military, by which U.S. may overextend and weaken Russia.
Nowhere on this 354-page guide do the authors clarify why they choose that weakening Russia is a fascinating aim of U.S. coverage. Of their Preface, they describes their report in these phrases:
This report paperwork analysis and evaluation performed as a part of the RAND Company analysis undertaking Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Floor, sponsored by the Military Quadrennial Protection Overview Workplace, Workplace of the Deputy Chief of Employees G-8, Headquarters, Division of the Military. The aim of the undertaking was to look at a spread of doable means to increase Russia. By this, we imply nonviolent measures that might stress Russia’s army or financial system or the regime’s political standing at residence and overseas. The steps we posit… are conceived of as measures that might lead Russia to compete in domains or areas the place the USA has a aggressive benefit, inflicting Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or inflicting the regime to lose home and/or worldwide status and affect.
Additionally they by no means clarify why “extending deadly help to Ukraine”—or certainly, most of the different insurance policies they find yourself endorsing—needs to be described as “nonviolent measures.” However let me let that go for now, and content material myself with offering one key web page from the a lot briefer (12 pages, full-color) “digest” of the massive examine that Rand additionally launched on the similar time.
Many extra helpful block-graphs on this examine, together with on this key web page, proven, that assesses potential “Geopolitical cost-imposing measures” that Washington may use. (Click on on the picture to enlarge it.)
As you’ll see there, “Offering deadly help to Ukraine” was the primary of the six doable steps thought of. It was judged as having Excessive potential advantages and dangers, and solely Reasonable possibilities of success. Additionally, within the blurb there, they observe:
any improve in U.S. army arms and recommendation to Ukraine would have to be rigorously calibrated to extend the prices to Russia of sustaining its present dedication with out upsetting a a lot wider battle by which Russia, by purpose of proximity, would have important benefits.
The longer model of the Dobbins examine devoted seven pages of textual content to inspecting the “deadly help to Ukraine” choice. These pages included a reasonably detailed description of the battle that had arisen between Ukraine and Russia over the scenario in Ukraine’s jap (Russian-speaking) Donbas area—although notably, it made zero point out of the diplomatic course of the 2 international locations had engaged in in 2014 and 2015 that had resulted within the two Minsk agreements over the problem.
Anyway, my first query was to ask what had occurred at Rand between 2019 and 2023 to result in such a turnaround within the group’s stance on Ukraine. I assume I’d have to notice on the outset that Rand is a sprawling, very massive group whose many nooks and crannies have completely different funding streams. The 2019 examine was (p.iii),
performed throughout the RAND Arroyo Middle’s Technique, Doctrine, and Sources Program. RAND Arroyo Middle, a part of the RAND Company, is a federally funded analysis and improvement middle (FFRDC) sponsored by the U.S. Military.
The newest examine, by Charap and Priebe, against this was (p.32):
performed throughout the RAND Middle for Evaluation of U.S. Grand Technique. The middle… is an initiative of the Worldwide Safety and Protection Coverage Program of the RAND Nationwide Safety Analysis Division (NSRD)…
Preliminary funding for the Middle for Evaluation of U.S. Grand Technique was offered by a seed grant from the Stand Collectively Belief. Ongoing funding comes from RAND supporters and from foundations and philanthropists.
And that “Stand Collectively Belief”? It’s an initiative of the right-wing anti-war mogul Charles Koch, who was additionally a big founding funder of the (pro-restraint) Quincy Institute.
In order that most likely provides us a part of the rationale for the distinction between the stances of Dobbins et al, 4 years in the past, and Charap and Priebe, at present. However I’d wish to suppose that if the massive, very mainstream Rand Company is now publishing a report that’s undoubtedly (although not but almost sufficiently) pro-restraint on Ukraine, this might result in additional important widening of the Overton Window on this important subject.
