John Maynard Keynes as soon as wrote, “The issue lies, not within the new concepts, however in escaping from the outdated ones”: an apt depiction of the present discourse and debate of what the world will seem like now that the New Strategic Arms Discount Treaty (START) treaty has expired. The passing of New START marks the tip of treaties formally limiting strategic nuclear weapons between the USA and Russia. Whereas there are nonetheless a number of multilateral agreements — just like the Outer Area, Seabed, and Moon treaties — together with offers on missile launch notifications, for all intents and functions conventional arms management between the USA and Russia is finished.
The query is what now?
Some assume that, with out binding arms management, a brand new arms race is probably going. This view means that U.S., Russian, and Chinese language nuclear arsenals primarily pose a three-body downside, whereby nuclear pressure buildups are inevitable as one actor reacts to the choices of one other. Others like Heather Williams posit the other: “The tip of New START doesn’t augur the beginning of an arms race.”
This isn’t uncharted territory, nevertheless it would possibly as nicely be, since most professionals working these issues have solely identified a time when there was bilateral arms management with Russia. Within the protection analytical neighborhood, foretelling arms races is extra artwork than science and infrequently suffers from if-should issues (the conflation of prediction with desire). To place it one other method, predictions rely partly on whether or not you see the issue by means of the lens of disarmament, deterrence, or pursuing nuclear primacy. This is the reason for some the tip of New START is a tragedy, and for others it gives the USA new alternatives.
But whereas many mourn the passing of the principle pillar of arms management with Russia, it’s not clear why we’re destined to bear witness to a brand new arms race. Moscow will tread seemingly with care (on this situation, if not with others), specializing in sustaining its standing as a nuclear peer to the USA, and making certain it has sufficient hedge within the occasion the USA achieves technological breakthroughs in missile protection or counterforce capabilities. That’s not a radical shift, however extra of the identical. On paper, Russia seems advantaged as a result of it’s forward in nuclear modernization in comparison with the USA. Frankly, in comparison with Russia and China, the USA is behind. Nonetheless, Russia is in poor health positioned to maintain an arms race when contemplating its protection industrial constraints, the state of its financial system, and the looming prices of reconstituting its typical forces after the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict.
Moscow continues to carry a bonus in non-strategic nuclear weapons and the range of supply programs it has out there for theater nuclear employment, which had been by no means lined by the New START treaty. New START did nothing to restrict this a part of the pressure. Continued Russian funding in nuclear weapons meant for theater employment, together with China’s, had spurred conversations in the USA on the necessity for larger pressure variety to cope with the current asymmetry in forces. Beneath Secretary of State for Arms Management Thomas DiNanno emphasised this very downside at the newest convention on disarmament in Geneva, saying that Russia “modernized and expanded these nuclear forces,” which constituted “an insupportable drawback” for the USA since most of our deployed nuclear weapons had been topic to New START and a big a part of Russia’s arsenal wasn’t.
Though the typical knowledge holds that Russia has an preliminary benefit in nuclear modernization and warhead manufacturing, and will due to this fact rapidly construct up its nuclear forces, the fact is that Russia is just not meaningfully advantaged post-New START. As DiNanno not too long ago said, America “retains non-deployed nuclear capability that can be utilized to deal with the rising safety setting.” No matter bluster might come from Moscow, Russia will search to keep away from an costly quantitative arms race. The Russian army can add warheads to at present deployed missiles, however it’ll wrestle to develop the precise variety of deployed launchers. Present Russian applications to interchange current heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles are far not on time. New ballistic missile submarine manufacturing is gradual, though comparably quick to new heavy bomber manufacturing, which is close to nonexistent. In the meantime Russia’s novel nuclear weapon programs like Poseidon, Avangard, and Burevestnik, can be deployed in small portions and don’t alter the present dynamic within the strategic nuclear stability.
In brief, Russia has low-cost methods of sustaining deployed warhead parity and has already spent billions on a hedge in opposition to missile protection programs the USA has not but developed. Because of this important shifts in Russian nuclear forces are unlikely sooner or later. The Russian constraint on technique of supply is rather more related for U.S. counterforce issues, for the reason that variety of warheads Russia uploads doesn’t change the variety of launchers the USA should maintain in danger. This can be why Moscow has proposed a moratorium on quantitative pressure enlargement even after the treaty expires for a minimum of one yr. Russian President Vladimir Putin has recurrently praised the treaty, and provided to keep up New START quantitative limits.
There are rumors that talks are beneath method between Washington and Moscow on a deal to proceed observing the treaty limits after expiration for a minimum of one other six months, however more than likely that is additionally one other case of the Trump administration’s left hand not realizing what its proper hand is doing.
Given Russia’s constraints, and somewhat completely different pressure necessities from the USA, it’s not clear why Moscow would need an arms race. This could be why Russian Overseas Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the provide not too long ago to look at treaty limits — and to place Moscow publicly as inquisitive about arms management, even because it continues to modernize its nuclear pressure. Washington extends nuclear deterrence to a big community of allies in numerous components of the world, Russia doesn’t. Notably, China is now a rising think about U.S. nuclear technique, which traditionally had centered on deterring Russia. The present U.S. place is that future arms management should embody Russia and China, not hurt U.S. pursuits or ignore noncompliance, and Washington will negotiate from a “place of power.”
Slogans will not be technique, however the current will seemingly mark the low level of deployed nuclear arsenals, because the world witnesses a brand new interval of nuclear modernization, pressure enlargement, and presumably proliferation. Russia stands to realize nothing from these developments, and if something will discover itself reacting to them, searching for to keep up parity as cheaply as potential whereas hedging in opposition to developments that would threaten arsenal survivability.
Arms Management with Russia: What’s Lifeless Can By no means Die
Bilateral arms management with Russia had been fraying for the reason that early 2000s, and in recent times had been on life help. America withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Russian violations led to the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Vary Nuclear Forces treaty in 2019. New START was the final main arms management treaty between Russia and the USA. This left New START as the principle settlement that includes on-site inspections for verification of limits on warheads and launchers. Signed in 2010, it went into pressure on Feb. 5, 2011 with limits to be met by the identical date in 2018. Russia and the USA prolonged the treaty for 5 years in 2021. New START restricted either side to 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers; 1,550 nuclear warheads deployed on these programs, with every heavy bomber counted as one warhead; and 800 complete launchers, deployed and non-deployed, for intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
Regardless of its successes, the New START treaty had for a while been a useless man strolling. The treaty required 18 on-site inspections per yr, and a complete of 328 inspections had been performed because it was signed. The treaty additionally supplied for annual notifications, telemetric data exchanges, and a semiannual Bilateral Consultative Fee. Nonetheless, in March 2020 scheduled inspections had been suspended because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Following its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow started visibly dragging its ft on renewing inspections. In August 2022, Russia prolonged that suspension by blocking U.S. makes an attempt to conduct onsite inspections, claiming that the USA tried to do it with out prior discover. Later that yr it postponed on brief discover its participation within the Bilateral Consultative Committee as nicely. This habits ultimately led the State Division to declare in January 2023 that Russia was not complying with the phrases of the treaty.
In impact, Moscow had been on the lookout for causes to not renew onsite inspections for a number of years when Putin introduced on February 2023 that he was suspending Russia’s participation in New START. That is in some methods ironic, given the USA has traditionally had higher technique of nationwide technical intelligence and was much less depending on inspections into the state of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces (which reporting at instances suggests). In its efforts to leverage arms management as a part of a broader dialog on Ukraine and U.S. army help for Kyiv, Moscow was largely spiting itself.
That habits had been in keeping with prior Russian arms management violations or unilateral suspensions. Most not too long ago, Russia can also be on a path to violate the Outer Area Treaty by creating a nuclear anti-satellite weapon to be employed area. Over time, this has poisoned the nicely in U.S. coverage circles amongst these inquisitive about pursuing arms management with Russia.
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Does Russia Have the Benefit?
A number of the finest work on Russian nuclear weapons has been performed by Hans Kristensen, together with Matt Korda. Their annual publication on Russian nuclear weapons for 2025 estimates that Russia has 1,718 strategic warheads deployed, with 870 on intercontinental ballistic missiles, 640 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and over 200 at heavy bomber bases. They estimate that Russia “might theoretically add tons of of warheads onto its deployed supply programs, doubtlessly growing its deployed nuclear arsenal by as much as 60 %.” A few of that would take days or months, however finally this could require a number of years to do throughout the pressure. Russia additionally has a sturdy warhead manufacturing advanced, as a result of as Oleg Bukharin famous again in 2002:
manufacturing and expertise issues that restrict the lifetime of Russian warheads to 10 to fifteen years and due to stockpile administration practices that emphasize routine rebuilding of nuclear warheads, the Russian advanced additionally maintains excessive ranges of manufacturing.
This asymmetry has continued to today: Russia’s warhead manufacturing advanced yields a larger means to supply, or reassemble warheads, whereas the USA maintains a stockpile which additionally permits importing choices.
Nonetheless, the final State Division launch on combination numbers beneath the New START treaty in September 2022 confirmed the USA at 659 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers — whereas Russia was at 540 — with 1,549 deployed warheads (once more, the precise rely is greater for the reason that treaty counted bombers as one warhead). There was larger parity in deployed and non-deployed launchers with the USA at 800 to Russia’s 759. That is the crux of the problem for Russian nuclear forces, which had been nowhere close to the 700 deployed restrict of the treaty a number of years in the past. Though Russia has invested closely in nuclear modernization, the guiding philosophy was changing Soviet missiles with modernized variants, however not essentially a one for one missile alternative. Therefore the pressure is extra fashionable, however the variety of deployed missiles and bombers has not expanded.
Ukraine’s assault in opposition to Russian airbases in 2025 eliminated an extra 9 heavy bombers from the operational fleet. At present charges of bomber manufacturing, which may at finest be known as artisanal, it’ll take Russia that a few years simply to interchange what was misplaced in 2025 and the fleet might shrink earlier than it grows in dimension. Russia’s means to add extra warheads onto the identical variety of launchers and bombers doesn’t considerably change pressure necessities for the USA. This can be why nuclear skilled Frank Miller in a current dialogue shrugged on the proposition of Russia importing warheads: “and to be completely sincere, that doesn’t hassle me one bit.”
In fact, with warhead add capability the satan is within the particulars. There are technical constraints which aren’t publicly identified, protection industrial limitations, and tradeoffs to importing like missile vary. Optimization requires a mix of masses somewhat than stacking missiles with the utmost variety of warheads potential on paper.
Russian growth of novel nuclear weapons and intermediate vary programs is regarding, however right here too Russian nuclear pressure enlargement would face tradeoffs. For instance, manufacturing of the intermediate vary ballistic missile Oreshnik will seemingly come on the expense of constructing extra RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) for road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile items since they’re made on the identical plant. Thus far Russia has produced three to 4 Oreshniks (and fired two), which seems to be a reasonably low manufacturing fee.
Russia plans to deploy the Poseidon strategic nuclear torpedo on the Belgorod and Khabarovsk submarines, however it is a boutique functionality that gives an alternate second or third strike choice for Russian forces, with out altering the army stability. As a strategic nuclear weapon, Poseidon holds in danger coastal cities on the off probability they survive a conventional second strike by ballistic missiles. Given how lengthy it takes Russia to construct submarines, it’s uncertain it’ll even construct the 4 at present deliberate Poseidon carriers. The primary bottleneck stays missile and submarine manufacturing.
A quick take a look at the Russian navy would present that it has in lively service eight Borei-class ballistic missile submarines, and 5 getting old Delta IVs that are steadily being changed. There are plans to construct a complete of 14, however this system, like all Russia’s shipbuilding applications, has been marked by delays. The Boreis (significantly the Borei-A modification) have taken seven to eight years to construct, a manufacturing fee that doesn’t bode nicely for fast pressure enlargement. Like every thing else, they too are delivered usually a minimum of yr late. At present charges Russia can be busy changing Deltas, the youngest of which is 36, nicely into the 2030s. Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat, a heavy liquid fueled intercontinental ballistic missile meant to interchange the SS-18, was scheduled to enter service in 2018, however has suffered from repeated delays, cancellations, and failed exams. Even when deployed, it’ll carry the identical variety of warheads because the R-36M2 (SS-18) it’s meant to interchange. Russia’s hypersonic increase glide car, Avangard, which is at present deployed on the SS-19 goes to remove from a few of these numbers because it was finally meant to be deployed on the RS-28 Sarmat.
Russia continues to check Burevestnik (NATO reporting title Skyfall), a floor launched nuclear powered cruise missile, nevertheless it too has had a really rocky growth part, and it’s unclear whether or not it may be produced in important numbers. Deploying extra novel nuclear weapons, designed as a hedge in opposition to U.S. breakthroughs in missile protection, will take sources away from increasing different components of the strategic nuclear pressure. Lots of the different Russian modernization investments went into infrastructure upgrades and to deploy extra capabilities to Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces regiments, just like the Peresvet laser to dazzle satellites.
The larger situation, which was not constrained by New START, is Russia’s numerous and somewhat fashionable arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons. America estimated Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons stock at 1,000 to 2,000 nuclear weapons, however anticipated development such that this arsenal might exceed the deployed strategic nuclear warhead rely. In some classes manufacturing of technique of supply has elevated severalfold. For instance, Russia made round 72 Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles per yr previous to the conflict, and now produces within the 500 to 600 vary yearly. Russian manufacturing of most precision guided munitions has elevated significantly since 2022, together with new variants and varieties of standoff capabilities that didn’t exist previous to the conflict. Therefore Russia’s actual pressure enlargement capability lies in theater vary nuclear weapon programs, which had been beforehand unconstrained to start with.
Unsurprisingly, Moscow might wish to lock down strategic pressure enlargement by providing a moratorium, whereas persevering with to construct out its benefit in non-strategic nuclear weapons.
America additionally has choices, as Williams lays out in a current piece. These embody importing warheads on current programs, extra ahead deployed or deployable programs in theater, and expanded modernization applications with extra B-21 bombers or ballistic missile submarines. Some like Greg Weaver argue for the USA to revert submarined ballistic missile launchers on present ballistic missile submarines, add Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles, and convert extra B-52 bombers to nuclear supply roles. All of this could take years. Whereas the USA is advantaged in each expertise and capital, U.S. nuclear modernization isn’t precisely continuing with out its personal delays and value overruns. The Columbia-class subsequent era ballistic missile submarine is going through 17 month delays. The LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile is going through each delays and main value overruns, largely tied to the necessity to construct new silos. Albeit for various causes, the U.S. Air Pressure and Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces are in a decent competitors for who can carry out worse in delivering the subsequent silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile. It’s an inauspicious begin to the a lot anticipated arms race.
Deterrence is Costly however Parity is Priceless
Aside from the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, which proceed to argue for an expanded mission, there aren’t apparent endogenous components for Russian pressure enlargement. Doctrinally, many of the evolution in current many years had been on the utility of nuclear weapons in escalation administration and restricted nuclear conflict. This mainly considerations Russia’s non-strategic nuclear arsenal and its utility in theater warfighting situations, or calibrated escalation. Russia’s strategic nuclear pressure necessities are nonetheless pegged to inflicting unacceptable harm, however a lot of the Russian army writing means that how unacceptable is outlined, and the variety of warheads required to inflict it, has been steadily revised down over time. Previously decade extra versatile and subjective criterion have additionally emerged like “assigned harm” and “deterrent harm,” although extra utilized to restricted employment situations. Russian nuclear doctrine appears extra involved with making certain its forces can have an effect on assured retaliation rather more so than the U.S. fixation on harm limitation and its related counterforce necessities.
Though what proof is on the market stays at finest incomplete, doctrinal adjustments have most likely decreased somewhat than elevated the retaliatory necessities for Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. The place Russian considerations lie is in survivability, and the pervasive worry that some mixture of a traditional and nuclear first strike might neutralize its arsenal. That is additionally most likely why Moscow appears leless involved about Chinese language nuclear pressure enlargement, which the USA has taken to calling “historic.” The possible Chinese language nuclear buildup, which might attain 1,000 deployed strategic warheads by 2030, can be thought-about a rounding error in Soviet stockpile administration in the course of the Chilly Conflict. As a result of the USA and Russia have a considerably completely different philosophy and method to nuclear pressure necessities, it’s unclear why an action-reaction mechanism will dominate future pressure modernization choices, resulting in a quantitative arms race.
From a useful resource perspective, the Russian financial system isn’t any place to help an arms race. From financial stagnation, low oil costs, and regional funds crises to annual tax hikes, it’s now in a unfavorable cycle. On high of sustaining the already expanded Russian army, which is at present consuming 40 % of presidency spending, Russia is unlikely to afford a considerable nuclear pressure enlargement. Nuclear weapons are comparatively low-cost, however supply programs and the infrastructure required to help them will not be. It’s troublesome to say with a lot confidence how a lot Russia spends on nuclear weapons, associated infrastructure, and the twelfth Most important Directorate of the Ministry of Protection, which is the directorate accountable for storage, upkeep, and transport of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Julian Cooper in 2018 made a noble effort, conservatively estimating that complete spending on nuclear weapons amounted to 18 % of the Russian protection funds and nearly 16 % of complete army associated expenditure (a much wider class). Traditionally, Russia has prioritized nuclear weapons inside the protection funds, and so if push involves shove, they are going to discover the cash, however it’ll come on the expense of typical pressure modernization and rearmament.
Initially, Russia will discover itself in a reactionary function and give attention to retaining parity. Arms management was at first a political course of, even when the consultants centered on warheads, launchers, and verification regimes. It emerged within the late Sixties after the Berlin and the Cuban Missile crises. What started as a hotline settlement, ultimately led to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, Strategic Arms Discount Treaties, the Moscow Treaty, and New START. Politically, the expiration of New START is far worse for Russia’s standing and notion of its place in worldwide politics than it’s for the USA. Moscow stays standing pushed, ever looking for the popularity the Soviet Union earned in the course of the 1969-1979 interval of détente. Bilateral arms management enabled Moscow to assert that it nonetheless occupies a particular place on the worldwide enviornment and holds duty for worldwide safety alongside the USA due to stated arms management agreements — although in its habits it demonstrates the other.
Even when Russia was on no account America’s equal, these preparations remained vital not only for sensible causes, but in addition due to the standing they conferred onto an elite consistently looking for recognition. So long as bilateral arms management remained with the USA, then one thing too remained of Soviet standing. This is the reason, whether or not necessities name for it or not, Moscow will work to keep up nuclear parity with the USA — a minimum of in deployed warheads — for so long as potential. How Russia responds to adjustments in U.S. forces stays contingent on the choices the USA elects, however America can also be working inside a number of protection industrial and financial constraints. Relatively than an arms race, what we may even see is a gradual U.S. construct as much as tackle deterrence considerations posed by China’s and Russia’s nuclear arsenal, together with larger pressure diversification to redress the present imbalance in theater nuclear weapons. Russia can reply comparatively cheaply by importing warheads to current missiles, whereas persevering with to retain the sting in non-strategic nuclear weapons, and investing in novel programs that hedge in opposition to U.S. counterforce developments. This may not essentially spur extra U.S. responses as a result of it gained’t considerably alter pressure necessities for Washington. U.S. investments in theater nuclear weapons can be redressing what’s already a closely slanted asymmetry, and certain will nonetheless depart Moscow a substantial edge.
In fact, there’s a faculty of thought that assumes an arms race will ensue any time the USA does one thing with its arsenal, even whether it is to redress disparity or reply to the nuclear pressure developments of different states. These fears might show based, however adjustments to U.S. forces are unlikely to engender a significant departure from the present path of Russian pressure modernization. Industrial and financial constraints will impose limits on what Russia can pursue, and inner doctrinal discourse doesn’t recommend that Russian pressure necessities will all of the sudden develop far above the place they’ve been.
Arguably, each nations have developed from simplistic quantitative calculations on the middle of their enthusiastic about nuclear deterrence and relative benefit. In that case, this can be examined within the years to return. Admittedly, some nuclear primacy arguments nonetheless endure from extra is extra pondering, fixation on functionality gaps, and unnecessarily onerous assumptions about pressure necessities that mix Russian and Chinese language arsenals. Equally, arguments that presume an arms race is inevitable within the absence of arms management might run headlong right into a state of affairs the place there isn’t a destabilizing arms race at a time when there isn’t a arms management.
In the end, protection planners in Russia, China, and the USA must grapple with DiNanno’s query in Geneva, “How a lot deterrence is sufficient?”
Michael Kofman is the host of the Russia Contingency, a members-only Conflict on the Rocks podcast. He’s additionally a senior fellow within the Russia and Eurasia Program on the Carnegie Endowment for Worldwide Peace, the place he focuses on the Russian army, Ukrainian armed forces, and Eurasian safety points. Previous to becoming a member of Carnegie in 2023, he served as director of the Russia Research Program on the Heart for Naval Analyses.
Picture: Dmitiry Fomin by way of Wikimedia Commons
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