Throughout the current protests in Iran, most Gulf states quietly however actively pushed again towards calls in Washington for navy strikes. Their judgment was easy: Escalation would virtually actually destabilize the area with out producing significant political change inside Iran, whereas leaving Gulf cities, infrastructure, and populations immediately uncovered to retaliation. On the core of Gulf reluctance lies a concern of chaos relatively than a choice for regime continuity. Policymakers fear about uncontrolled Iranian collapse, together with state fragmentation, militia spillover, refugee actions, nuclear or radiation leaks, and extreme disruptions to vitality markets that will have an effect on Gulf states.
This place displays a deeper actuality and shifting regional risk perceptions. Gulf states now not see themselves as distant observers of Iran crises, however as frontline stakeholders. What occurs inside Iran now immediately shapes their very own nationwide safety. But the protests and unsure trajectories for Iran have uncovered the boundaries of Gulf hedging methods. Hedging has helped include tensions and keep away from escalation, however as a method it’s a reactive method restricted to disaster administration relatively than shaping outcomes. As uncertainty in Iran turns into structural relatively than episodic, counting on threat avoidance turns hedging right into a constraint. By focusing totally on deescalation above all else, Gulf states could reach limiting the rapid fallout, however they may even be passive as political and safety dynamics in Iran evolve in methods that may outline their very own safety atmosphere.
The not too long ago reconvened Oman-led U.S.–Iran talks showcase the urgency of deescalation and the slender window to stop additional battle. For the primary time in many years, the Gulf has a possibility to maneuver past disaster avoidance to actively form outcomes in ways in which shield its personal pursuits. Gulf states should then transfer from hedging and disaster administration towards proactively shaping Iran’s trajectory via coordinated diplomatic, financial, and safety engagement.
Strategic Autonomy
The Gulf states’ rising curiosity in strategic autonomy displays accrued doubts concerning the reliability and effectiveness of exterior safety suppliers. Overreliance on the USA has change into more and more untenable, as Gulf states have grown uncertain that Washington can handle the escalation it initiates, deter retaliation towards Gulf companions, or take duty for the aftermath of a disaster that unfolds on their doorstep. This skepticism has change into extra seen as Gulf states have been reluctant to assist navy motion towards Iran. The June 2025 12-Day Israel–Iran Struggle notably noticed an Iranian strike on Qatar. Whereas it was signaled by Tehran forward of time, it nonetheless bolstered fears that escalation can increase rapidly impacting Gulf safety. Furthermore, for the reason that 2023 Saudi-Iranian détente, the Gulf states have proven a choice for mediation, diplomacy and disaster administration.
Israel, too, is more and more seen in Gulf capitals not as a stabilizing safety associate, however as an actor whose escalation agenda dangers pulling the Gulf into conflicts whereas leaving it to soak up a lot of the ensuing prices. Nor do the varied unilateral mechanisms and new safety preparations underway — similar to Saudi Arabia–Pakistan or the United Arab Emirates–India — alleviate the Gulf’s rapid safety dilemma. Solely via constructing native, joint protection capacities will Gulf safety be higher served however that mission might be many years within the making. Classes from the occupation of a Gulf state (Kuwait) in 1990-91 weren’t absolutely absorbed as Gulf protection capabilities and integration proceed to be a piece in progress. This may be seen within the response and publicity of the Gulf states to the 2025 Iranian and Israeli assaults on Qatar and the measured Joint Protection Council statements that adopted in September and November 2025.
These circumstances reinforce the Gulf states’ long-term purpose of attaining strategic autonomy. But that goal can’t emerge via distancing alone. It requires Gulf capability to form outcomes relatively than insulate towards them. A lot of the exterior coverage debate in Washington and Tel Aviv continues to deal with Iran via a binary lens of regime survival or collapse, assuming that coercive strain will ultimately produce one of many two outcomes. For Gulf states whose publicity to this instability is actual relatively than summary, this binary is indifferent from actuality. A number of futures are believable: Iran might change into extra inward wanting and fragmented, expertise elite-led transition, or steadily adapt via pragmatic calibration, notably if Omani-led diplomacy positive aspects traction. The query for the Gulf is just not which end result emerges, however whether or not the Gulf can play any significant position in shaping it.
Gulf Leverage and its Underuse
If hedging and strategic autonomy present no fast fixes, the central query turns into whether or not the Gulf possesses significant leverage over Iran’s trajectory. Gulf considering is constrained by the assumption that they possess restricted leverage over Iran’s trajectory. Whereas such leverage is restricted, it may be vital when deployed collectively and successfully. On the identical time, Gulf leverage shouldn’t be overstated. Sanctions regimes, Iran’s home political financial system, and the centrality of safety establishments in decision-making restrict the extent to which exterior financial or diplomatic engagement can alter Iran’s core strategic posture or inside political steadiness. Gulf instruments are due to this fact unlikely to form regime survival, ideological orientation, or main safety selections. Their influence lies as an alternative in shaping incentives on the margins. The worth of such leverage is gradual and oblique, however in a context of extended uncertainty even marginal affect can accumulate strategic significance. The problem is much less about missing instruments than about reaching an settlement on when and methods to use them and the way a lot threat publicity the Gulf states are ready to simply accept.
Financial and infrastructural leverage stays vital. Commerce, transit entry, ports, and airspace all influence Iran’s regional connectivity. Power interdependence together with electrical energy provision, refining capability and delivery creates extra channels of leverage. Funding flows present additional engagement alternative even below sanctions constraints.
Equally necessary has been the Gulf states’ diplomatic capital. Collectively and individually Gulf states have vital mediation entry and affect in Washington that’s being extra regularly deployed not only for Iran but additionally for Gaza, Russia–Ukraine, Venezuela and past. And regional mechanisms similar to safety preparations, disaster communication channels, coordinated refugee and humanitarian planning permits Gulf states to handle spillover.
The United Arab Emirates is Iran’s second buying and selling associate after China at $28.2 billion in 2024 and Qatar is a associate to the South Pars/North Dome discipline which gives over 70 % of Iran’s fuel. Saudi diplomacy, alongside Qatar and Oman, spared Iran an inevitable showdown with the USA final January. Taken collectively, the Gulf states have varied financial and diplomatic instruments at their disposal that may affect Iran and influence its strategic calculus, if channeled collectively and persistently.
Whereas none of those instruments can decide Iran’s evolution on their very own, they provide incentives to cut back volatility and form the context round which Iranian actors will function. To date, they continue to be largely underused as a result of the Gulf states have sought to keep away from friction with the USA, restrict their publicity to threat, and due to intra-Gulf divergences.
Transferring Ahead
A extra credible Gulf technique towards Iran due to this fact requires operationalized situation planning that strikes past the binary of regime survival versus collapse and hyperlinks believable trajectories to particular diplomatic, financial and safety instruments. Additionally understanding {that a} disaster is on the horizon, the Gulf states can agree on purple traces, burden sharing, communication channels, and humanitarian responses earlier than a disaster unfolds.
To reach at lasting outcomes, a viable technique has to begin with an aligned weltanschauung that interprets into an built-in coverage toolkit and actions. The Gulf states have to first decide what they stand for and aspire to in addition to the naked minimal of regime preservation and uninterrupted financial returns. Since these two goals are predicated on home calm that in flip calls for a steady neighborhood, sustaining each and adopting different objectives necessitates an aligned worldview. This doesn’t at present exist.
Intra-Gulf disputes, whether or not the continued Saudi-Emirati one or the earlier battle with Qatar, reinforce the Gulf states’ differing routes to arriving at regime survival and cozy monetary returns. The bets on political Islam, nonstate actors, or the present state system haven’t — at the least so far — yielded recreation altering returns to any of the Gulf states. Consolidating their method and even coming to phrases with their variations and methods of operation will go a good distance in nurturing streamlined Gulf situation planning for what’s to return in Iran. The Gulf is just not there but. Arriving at a typical method towards Iran is a much-needed prerequisite for his or her leverage to matter and situation planning to succeed. Although divergences are frequent, the Gulf states have a tendency to return collectively at instances of crises. An unstable Iran, regardless of the situation it finds itself in, qualifies as one such disaster. With out at the least minimal convergence on acceptable threat thresholds towards Iran, situation planning might be an ineffective mental train. Such purposeful convergence wouldn’t get rid of intra-Gulf competitors, however it might permit for operational situation planning with out requiring full strategic alignment.
A affluent area that’s snug in its pores and skin and accountable for its instruments is a 3rd goal that has been more and more reverberating throughout the area. Rising company and indigeneity are the hallmarks of an aspiring new order within the Gulf. Gulf leaders have more and more voiced this third goal up to now decade, whether or not in Gulf Cooperation Council summit declarations, the Gulf’s 2024 Imaginative and prescient for Regional Safety, or within the actions of its most bold capitals (Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Riyadh). These leaders have demonstrated greater than as soon as a willingness to form outcomes in varied components of the area (Yemen, Syria, Sudan, Egypt) and the world over, whether or not via mediation, investments, or enlisting in new partnerships (such because the Brazil–Russia–India-China–South Africa Group) or growing new connectivity roads (as within the India–Center East–Europe Financial Hall). This ambition, nonetheless, can’t be achieved if Iran’s trajectory continues to be formed via exterior confrontation relatively than regional incentives and constraints. Whereas components of rising prosperity and company are within the works within the Gulf, they’ve been on show in various levels for a while in Iran, Israel and Turkey, the three major non-Arab states within the area.
The teachings of the previous few years reinforce this logic. After the assaults on Saudi oil installations in 2019 and Abu Dhabi airport in 2022 garnered a muted response from the Trump and Biden administrations, the Gulf states discovered the exhausting method the boundaries of U.S. safety ensures. That spurred a rapprochement with Iran and Turkey and an accelerated recalibration with different safety companions, together with the United Arab Emirates’ and Bahrain’s normalization with Israel in 2020. But Israel’s more and more destabilizing habits within the area, particularly post-Oct. 7, 2023, has solid doubts in a number of Gulf capitals concerning the sturdiness and advantages of a regional safety structure reset that integrates Israel. Going native higher serves the pursuits of Gulf policymakers: growing a Gulf-centric regional order that ultimately expands throughout the area and makes an attempt to accommodate others within the course of. Looking for autonomy aligns with current Gulf coverage debates and considering in Gulf capitals, however implementing such a coverage might be tough if Arab Gulf states should not proactively influencing their rapid neighbors’ programs of motion as they’ve, for example, in Syria. That is particularly urgent when the opposite aspect of the Gulf (Iran) stays weak, unstable, or in flux alongside paths that fall outdoors the collapse-survival binary.
The implications of transferring past hedging change into clearer when translated into believable Iranian trajectories. The next situations illustrate how Gulf instruments and priorities would differ relying on Iran’s inside evolution.
Situation 1: Extended Inside Unrest, Containment, and State Fragmentation
On this situation, Iran doesn’t collapse outright, however neither does it stabilize. Protests ebb and move, the state turns into extra inward wanting, and governance grows uneven throughout areas. Energy more and more fragments amongst formal establishments, safety organs, and casual actors, whereas financial strain and sanctions deepen social pressure. Iran stays intact on paper, however weaker, extra unpredictable, and extra susceptible to inside and exterior spillovers.
The Gulf states can’t afford to be bystanders of one other U.S.-led reconfiguration of regional states. Like some did in Syria, the Gulf states ought to capitalize on a primary mover benefit catering to the situations on the bottom whereas shaping them to serve each the pursuits of the Gulf and the Iranian individuals. There’s a want to interact with the system on all fronts and foyer for sanctions reduction the place attainable, as Iraq has executed the previous few years to satisfy its electrical energy wants.
The Gulf states want to interact with the fragmented Iranian panorama even when it invitations the wrath of the USA and dangers publicity to its sanctions. Such an method would carry vital prices and shouldn’t be handled calmly. Publicity to secondary sanctions might have an effect on Gulf monetary establishments, complicate relations with Washington, and threat empowering sanctioned entities inside Iran’s financial system. Any engagement would due to this fact require cautious calibration, prioritizing sectors with humanitarian or infrastructural relevance, sustaining transparency with worldwide companions, and guaranteeing that engagement doesn’t undermine broader sanctions frameworks. The target wouldn’t be sanctions circumvention, however restricted engagement designed to handle spillover dangers and protect channels of affect below constrained situations.
Iranian state-owned enterprises and different companies have lengthy lobbied for Gulf capital. It might rework the Gulf in Iranian eyes from a transit, re-export hub (Dubai) and an indolent vitality associate (Doha) to a proactive, vital participant in inside financial issues. What makes this a attainable possibility is a shifting U.S. panorama. The Trump administration will be satisfied to exempt the Gulf states from U.S. sanctions in the event that they current a reputable unified technique towards Iran. Financial traction interprets to energy and a pathway for home stabilization. Such an method would restrict spillovers throughout the Gulf and different areas. Regional engagement amid bigger containment and inside unrest offers the Gulf states a greater standing in — and understanding of — Iran.
Situation 2: Elite-led Transition
On this situation, Iran doesn’t expertise mass collapse or revolutionary change, however energy shifts happen throughout the system itself. Management transitions happen via elite bargaining, succession of the Supreme Chief, or gradual sidelining of key figures, producing a rebalanced however nonetheless recognizable state. The system survives, however with new facilities of gravity, altered priorities, and inside competitors amongst political, safety, and financial elites. Change is actual, however it’s managed from inside and stays opaque to outsiders.
In such a situation, misreading inside dynamics or favoring one group over one other is feasible and might backfire. It might be mitigated by a multifaceted relationship constructing train that shields the Gulf states from unintended penalties and surprises. Falling prey to the default mode of working with one senior channel of presidency whereas sidestepping different voices, rising stars, or influential components throughout the system can backfire. A modified technique entails activating and multiplying diplomatic tracks past the official line. It might additionally entail participating with center administration, universities, assume tanks, analysis facilities, seminaries, and cultural homes. Consolidating this know the way will empower and complement Gulf policymaking, diversifying its toolkit. Widening the vary of contacts and relationships is not going to absolutely protect the Gulf from black swans or readily assure clear entry and deep know-how, however it can construct the required experience and contacts that restrict the aftershocks of management transfers. This front-facing habits must be coupled with an accelerated inside state capability constructing in Iranian research — language, tradition, politics, and economics. Investing in relationship constructing and inside sources are the perfect guarantors for a wholesome, dependable relationship.
Situation 3: Gradual Pragmatic Adaptation
On this situation, Iran slowly adjusts relatively than ruptures. Going through sustained social strain, financial constraints, and regional realities, the state incrementally recalibrates its governance type and exterior posture, maybe additionally making a cope with the USA to alleviate some sanctions strain. Repression stays, however is selectively moderated, international coverage turns into extra pragmatic, and the system seeks stability via adaptation relatively than confrontation. The regime doesn’t liberalize in a Western sense, however it evolves sufficient to cut back risk perceptions and purchase itself time.
This situation builds on what the Gulf states have been doing for the reason that Saudi-Iran détente of 2023. It is a long-term course of that may unfold in varied methods. However investing in statehood and welcoming a extra average, non-threatening angle from the Iranian regime has been a long-held demand of the Gulf states. It might entail prioritizing the connection and constructing the long-sought regional safety structure that meets Iran’s calls for for much less Western presence and the Gulf’s purpose for much less Iranian intervention. It means transferring past symbolic normalization and sluggish confidence constructing in the direction of institutionalized cooperation. Step one could be to comply with and activate joint rules in a a lot quicker tempo than that underway via the China-brokered Iran–Saudi rapprochement of 2023. It might additionally contain engaged on tangible initiatives similar to growing a joint maritime safety technique and reviving a Gulf-wide regional safety structure that goes past the Gulf-centric Imaginative and prescient for Regional Safety and the 2020 Iran-centric Hormuz Peace Endeavor.
Taken collectively, these situations mixed provide the Gulf a framework for a extra proactive coverage. Such an method would require better Gulf coordination and buy-in, if not reciprocity, from Iran. However the absence of Iranian responsiveness shouldn’t dissuade the Gulf states from pursuing what’s of their management: increasing their channels of engagement and strengthening their capability to form the regional atmosphere.
As Iran’s trajectory turns into extra unsure, it’s clear that passivity carries prices and that dynamics inside Iran could evolve in ways in which immediately have an effect on Gulf safety with out Gulf enter or leverage. Getting ready for the unsure situations on the horizon requires restricted, managed engagement right this moment.
Hedging has helped the Gulf states to handle publicity to escalation, however it doesn’t form outcomes. Transferring from disaster administration towards selective coordinated engagement doesn’t assure outcomes in Iran, however reduces threat for the Gulf. The central threat for the Gulf states is just not that Iran collapses however that it evolves with out Gulf affect. At a second of regional flux, the Gulf has a singular alternative to rely much less on avoiding threat and as an alternative develop the capability to affect the atmosphere round it.
Bader Al-Saif, Ph.D., is assistant professor of historical past at Kuwait College and affiliate fellow at Chatham Home. He specializes within the Arabian Peninsula, particularly its geopolitics, public coverage, tradition, reform dynamics, transnational developments, and gender research.
Sanam Vakil, Ph.D., is the director of the Center East and North Africa Programme at Chatham Home and the James Anderson professorial lecturer at Johns Hopkins SAIS Europe. Her experience spans Iranian and Gulf politics, regional safety dynamics, and U.S. international coverage, with a specific deal with the evolving strategic panorama of the Center East and its international connectivity.
Picture: Iranian Ministry of International Affairs
