On January 25, the Rand Company issued a short-ish examine of the battle in Ukraine, titled “Avoiding a Lengthy Battle: U.S. Coverage and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Battle.” The Rand Company was initially based as a think-tank that would supply “Analysis & Growth” (R-and-D) recommendation to the U.S. army and it nonetheless stays strongly, although not wholly, targeted on army evaluation. Thus, this newest examine made some waves, particularly since its non-hawkish tenor stood in distinction to that of a prolonged (354-page) report {that a} gaggle of Rand specialists launched in 2019 that had recognized “Offering deadly help to Ukraine” as a doubtlessly high-benefit manner of “Overextending and Unbalancing Russia.”
Extra concerning the inner Rand politics of this newest examine on Ukraine, later on this essay. For now, let me clarify why the examine has attracted such consideration right here in DC. That’s primarily as a result of the authors, political scientists Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe, boldly asserted that once in a while the pursuits of the US are distinct from these of the federal government of Ukraine. Who would have thought that!!! However for a U.S. political elite that has been drenched in anti-Russianism for the previous seven years, and in pro-Ukrainian boosterism ever since final February 24, it is a deeply surprising assertion.
The principal area wherein Charap and Priebe choose that U.S. pursuits could diverge from these of Ukraine is the matter of whether or not the US shares (and whether or not it ought to share) the Ukrainians’ desired objective of regaining all of the Ukrainian terrain presently underneath Russian management.
Their examine is a fast and straightforward learn and builds on appreciable work that every of the co-authors has finished on the Ukraine battle each earlier than and since final February 24. Within the examine, they look at what they describe as “5 key dimensions that outline various struggle trajectories” for Ukraine, outlined thus:
- doable Russian use of nuclear weapons
- doable escalation to a Russia-NATO battle
- territorial management
- period
- type of struggle termination.
The primary two of these subjects are non-controversial amongst most members of the political elite right here in the US. Nearly no-one right here desires to see both a visit over the brink of nuclear-weapons use or a direct battle between NATO and Russia. It’s within the latter three domains that Charap & Priebe are aiming to crank slightly wider open the “Overton window” of the discourse that’s thought of acceptable throughout the ranks of elite opinion-formers in Washington and New York.
Rand is well-known for its use of Powerpoint-friendly, very primary graphics, and this publication is not any exception. So let me simply use the block tables that Charap and Priebe use to sum up their primary arguments on the problems of territorial management and the size of the struggle. I suppose the tables ought to all be labeled © Rand Company. Additionally, click on on any certainly one of them to enlarge it. Right here they’re:
That’s basic cost-benefit evaluation! Discover that in each these dimensions of the struggle, C&P establish no “Extremely vital advantages” to the US for the situation in query, whereas they do establish a number of varieties of “Extremely vital prices.”
Additionally notice in Desk 3 that they appear to have purchased into the trope that “Russia has already been considerably weakened by the struggle,” utilizing that to argue that “the US would solely see reasonable advantages from additional weakening its adversary.” My view, against this, is that whereas Russia has certainly suffered non-trivial losses from the struggle, these have reached nowhere near being debilitating. But when we have a look at a broad, multi-dimensional definition of the worldwide stability between the US and Russia, then we see that the US has additionally suffered losses on account of the battle which are vital and persevering with, and that will properly develop in influence over time. These prices embody (however are usually not restricted to) the next:
- uncooked prices of the US-NATO arms transfers to Ukraine;
- the weak point revealed in US international delicate energy by Washington’s failure to increase its anti-Russian coalition in any significant manner into the International South; and (relatedly)
- the truth that the shock that Washington’s financial measures in opposition to Russia inflicted on the world financial system has led many vital economies around the globe to strengthen monetary and supply-chain linkages which are unbiased of U.S. management.
Their part on the “Kind [or modality] of struggle termination” is a welcome, however very unsophisticated, try to handle the essential political situation concerned in any armed battle. A bit mechanistically they notice that wars may be ended both by the “absolute victory” of 1 or the opposite warring social gathering, or by negotiating both a ultimate peace settlement or a battle-zone-wide armistice. Concerning the opportunity of an absolute victory—which they notice is outlined in social-science literature as, “completely eradicating the (interstate) risk posed by its adversary”—they write that Russia has most likely given up its preliminary objective of effecting regime change in Kyiv and additionally, equally realistically, that an absolute Ukrainian victory is unlikely. Puncturing the fever goals of warmongers in Kyiv or in NATO, C& P state tersely (p.13) that, “it’s fanciful to think about that Ukraine may destroy Russia’s skill to wage struggle.”
Then, turning to the 2 completely different, roughly distinct types of negotiated settlement, they notice (p.15) that, “different issues being equal, U.S. pursuits are higher served by a political settlement that may deliver a extra sturdy peace than an armistice.” And so they very well add, “Moreover, a political settlement could possibly be a primary step towards addressing broader regional points and lowering the possibility of a Russia-NATO disaster sooner or later. “
However they conclude this part thus:
Nonetheless, the extent of hostility as of December 2022 between Russia and Ukraine, and between Russia and the West, make[s] a political settlement appear a lot much less possible than an armistice.
Their examine then has a piece on “Impediments to Ending the Battle” that addresses a vital query however gives a typically unsatisfactory set of solutions. They attribute war-prolongation, on this case and usually, virtually solely to an info drawback: particularly, that the decisionmakers on both aspect are unsure concerning the potential advantages of peace or the potential value of constant the struggle. That’s, actually, practically at all times one think about battle prolongation. However I spent the primary years of my profession as a journalist and analyst residing in, reporting on, and really intently documenting the preliminary six years of Lebanon’s prolonged civil struggle. From that have, and from the quite a few research I’ve fabricated from a wide range of conflicts and conflict-termination efforts since then, I’ve to conclude that there are two different crucial drivers of battle prolongation. One I might outline roughly as “the passions of struggle”– passions which are actually robust sufficient (and possibly most particularly so inside a democracy) to considerably obliterate any rational evaluation of prices, advantages, and the benefits of exploring every doable avenue for peace. The opposite can be the concrete financial and different pursuits of sectors of society that profit vastly from the prolongation of struggle. These can be primarily the profiteers within the military-industrial advanced, but additionally embody cynical politicians, journalists (whose careers may be catapulted very excessive, as mine was, by the chance to “cowl” a struggle), and different opinion-formers. C&P’s examine makes no point out of both of these two essential components.
One different irritating shortcoming of their paper is that it utterly ignores the potential contributions to war-terminating diplomacy that may be performed by all kinds of actors apart from the US. I suppose these authors bought their skilled formation throughout an period when it was the US that was the principal driver of all the large shifts in worldwide diplomacy—generally with the assist of the United Nations, as in some levels of the wars of the Yugoslavia breakup and in Afghanistan; and often-times with out, as within the instances of Kosovo, the invasion of Iraq, and quite a few different US-led invasions or regime-change operations around the globe? And that was additionally an period wherein the US was the only real or principal actor on the diplomatic stage on such points as Arab-Israeli peacemaking…
However this time round, as I famous in this evaluation that I penned on February 24 itself, the worldwide order is not one over which Washington workouts unilateral dominance And in these circumstances it’s completely each doable and fascinating for sensible analysts in the US and different NATO international locations to be exploring what function the leaders of different (more than likely non-NATO) G-20 international locations would possibly have the ability to play in mediating an armistice in Ukraine that might work for all of the events concerned—and past that, may work for a world group that has suffered drastically and in many alternative methods from the outbreak and continuation of the battle.
… Properly, C&P’s examine has many analytical shortcomings. However nonetheless, it’s a welcome addition to a “mainstream discourse” right here in the US that has seen think-tank leaders, most (however thank G-d not all) politicians, and all of the excessive pooh-bahs of the punditocracy lining as much as cheerlead for the struggle in opposition to Russia. And as famous above, this examine is especially welcome since it’s being issued simply 4 years after the huge examine that James Dobbins et al wrote, that recognized offering deadly help to Ukraine as a doubtlessly “productive” manner for the US to “overextend and weaken” Russia. The massive Dobbins examine was titled “Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Floor”. It was a fairly comprehensive-looking, full-spectrum examination of the numerous methods, each army and non-military, wherein U.S. may overextend and weaken Russia.
Nowhere on this 354-page guide do the authors clarify why they choose that weakening Russia is a fascinating objective of U.S. coverage. Of their Preface, they describes their report in these phrases:
This report paperwork analysis and evaluation performed as a part of the RAND Company analysis venture Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Floor, sponsored by the Military Quadrennial Protection Overview Workplace, Workplace of the Deputy Chief of Employees G-8, Headquarters, Division of the Military. The aim of the venture was to look at a variety of doable means to increase Russia. By this, we imply nonviolent measures that might stress Russia’s army or financial system or the regime’s political standing at house and overseas. The steps we posit… are conceived of as measures that may lead Russia to compete in domains or areas the place the US has a aggressive benefit, inflicting Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or inflicting the regime to lose home and/or worldwide status and affect.
In addition they by no means clarify why “extending deadly help to Ukraine”—or certainly, most of the different insurance policies they find yourself endorsing—needs to be described as “nonviolent measures.” However let me let that go for now, and content material myself with offering one key web page from the a lot briefer (12 pages, full-color) “digest” of the large examine that Rand additionally launched on the similar time.
Many extra useful block-graphs on this examine, together with on this key web page, proven, that assesses potential “Geopolitical cost-imposing measures” that Washington would possibly use. (Click on on the picture to enlarge it.)
As you’ll see there, “Offering deadly help to Ukraine” was the primary of the six doable steps thought of. It was judged as having Excessive potential advantages and dangers, and solely Reasonable possibilities of success. Additionally, within the blurb there, they notice:
any enhance in U.S. army arms and recommendation to Ukraine would must be fastidiously calibrated to extend the prices to Russia of sustaining its current dedication with out frightening a a lot wider battle wherein Russia, by cause of proximity, would have vital benefits.
The longer model of the Dobbins examine devoted seven pages of textual content to inspecting the “deadly help to Ukraine” choice. These pages included a reasonably detailed description of the battle that had arisen between Ukraine and Russia over the state of affairs in Ukraine’s jap (Russian-speaking) Donbas area—although notably, it made zero point out of the diplomatic course of the 2 international locations had engaged in in 2014 and 2015 that had resulted within the two Minsk agreements over the difficulty.
Anyway, my first query was to ask what had occurred at Rand between 2019 and 2023 to result in such a turnaround within the group’s stance on Ukraine. I suppose I’d have to notice on the outset that Rand is a sprawling, very massive group whose many nooks and crannies have completely different funding streams. The 2019 examine was (p.iii),
performed throughout the RAND Arroyo Heart’s Technique, Doctrine, and Sources Program. RAND Arroyo Heart, a part of the RAND Company, is a federally funded analysis and growth middle (FFRDC) sponsored by the U.S. Military.
The newest examine, by Charap and Priebe, against this was (p.32):
performed throughout the RAND Heart for Evaluation of U.S. Grand Technique. The middle… is an initiative of the Worldwide Safety and Protection Coverage Program of the RAND Nationwide Safety Analysis Division (NSRD)…
Preliminary funding for the Heart for Evaluation of U.S. Grand Technique was supplied by a seed grant from the Stand Collectively Belief. Ongoing funding comes from RAND supporters and from foundations and philanthropists.
And that “Stand Collectively Belief”? It’s an initiative of the right-wing anti-war mogul Charles Koch, who was additionally a big founding funder of the (pro-restraint) Quincy Institute.
In order that most likely offers us a part of the rationale for the distinction between the stances of Dobbins et al, 4 years in the past, and Charap and Priebe, at present. However I’d prefer to assume that if the large, very mainstream Rand Company is now publishing a report that’s undoubtedly (although not but practically sufficiently) pro-restraint on Ukraine, this might result in additional vital widening of the Overton Window on this significant situation.
