America’s crippling strikes towards Iran’s nuclear program in June have created a slender window to keep away from a strategic nightmare: particularly, combating China, Russia, and Iran unexpectedly.
With Iran neutralized, strategic logic calls for that the US flip its sights on Russia subsequent. However the Alaska summit between President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin sophisticated that course. Putin has exploited the diplomatic opening to intensify Russian assaults on Ukraine, with out the prospect of extra stringent U.S. sanctions or negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv.
To cease Russia from additional weaponizing the peace course of and slowly pushing its benefit in Ukraine, the US ought to use the subsequent two years to systematically weaken Russia primarily via diplomatic measures whereas accelerating European protection autonomy — enabling America to lastly pivot towards China earlier than it faces an unwinnable two-front conflict.
Win Some, Lose None
The Alaska summit left many questions unanswered, notably concerning Trump’s shifting positions on a land-for-peace deal. It was the next Washington summit with European leaders the place Trump barely clarified U.S. coverage towards Ukraine and averted the worst fears of skeptics. He didn’t blame Ukraine for the conflict, minimize safety help, or foist a pro-Russia deal on Kyiv. As an alternative, he reiterated his quest for peace and endorsed a European-led safety assure for Ukraine whereas pushing Europe to imagine extra protection burdens.
In its quest to place Europe’s “protection home so as,” the Trump administration seeks to usher in a strategic rebalance that prompts European companions to imagine a lot of the continent’s safety tasks and meet the challenges of a deteriorating regional safety state of affairs with out direct U.S. help. Each targets are necessary as the US appears to be like to the Indo-Pacific area with rising alarm.
This method displays strategic necessity. America faces three adversaries: Iran, the persistent destabilizer, decided to develop nuclear weapons; Russia, the acute menace, invading Ukraine and threatening NATO; and China, the pacing problem, making an attempt to topple America’s worldwide management.
These competing threats highlight America’s “strategic simultaneity” drawback: How do you deter and, if crucial, defeat China and Russia concurrently with out exhausting your nation’s sources, energy, and a focus? You don’t. As an alternative, you sequence the threats.
Nice powers from Byzantium to Venice to Habsburg Austria to Edwardian Britain have all survived by mastering the artwork of sequencing. This stratagem, as strategist Wess Mitchell elucidated, entails concentrating forces and focus towards one opponent’s disruptive potential earlier than turning to discourage or defeat one other extra succesful opponent. Israel just lately demonstrated this method, methodically dismantling Iran’s “axis of resistance” one proxy at a time — first Hamas, subsequent Hizballah, then Iran itself (with America’s assist) — somewhat than combating simultaneous wars throughout a number of fronts towards many enemies.
America has a comparable alternative with its personal distinctive set of challengers, however the window is closing.
Iran Down, Two to Go
Following Israeli and U.S. strikes in June, Iran’s nuclear program is “severely broken,” set again by as much as two years. For the primary time in many years, America can shift its major focus from the Center East. Sequencing logic calls for weakening one remaining competitor earlier than risking an unwinnable two-front conflict. However which competitor?
Russia is the apparent alternative. Moscow is weaker and moved first by invading Ukraine; it must be punished first. Continued degradation of Russian navy energy via help to Ukraine would possible deter — or no less than pressure a rethink of — future aggressive gambits from Moscow or Beijing. Conversely, ought to Russia emerge from the conflict in Ukraine with territorial features and a pro-Kremlin puppet authorities in Kyiv, the worth of aggression could be validated all over the place.
The Sequencing Crucial
Since 2022, U.S. technique has sought to punish Russia by backing Ukraine. However as Russia progressively lots sufficient manpower and munitions to bend the conflict of attrition to its favor, Ukraine can not hold resisting Russia with out fixing its personal manpower, materiel, and strategic and operational constraints. As Trump acknowledged in late August, Ukraine “has a unbelievable protection, however isn’t allowed to play offense.”
America’s constraints compound this problem. Munitions transfers to Ukraine and Israel with out corresponding protection industrial overhauls have dangerously lowered U.S. stockpiles. Attributable to materials constraints on America’s energy, it should prioritize the Russian menace first via navy and diplomatic levers. Close to-term financial and diplomatic strain can present nearly instant aid, whereas a significant upheaval in European safety tasks and capabilities unfolds over the medium- and long-term.
Washington solely has, maybe, 4 years to implement the best sequencing. Years one and two ought to give attention to serving to Ukraine forestall Russian features via continued intelligence help and navy coaching, loosening the “evaluation mechanism” that restricts Ukraine’s offensive long-range strikes into Russia, establishing European protection manufacturing foundations, and imposing systematic prices on Russia’s monetary trade and power commerce, the 2 main enablers of Moscow’s conflict effort. Sufficient strain may degrade Russia’s wartime financial system by 2027, when consultants counsel Moscow could now not be able to sustaining the conflict in Ukraine.
Years three and 4 ought to fast-track European protection autonomy, releasing America to redirect its focus and forces to looming Indo-Pacific challenges. By way of all of it, Ukraine and Europe may obtain selective transfers of munitions or superior weaponry (when out there and crucial), contingent on Europe assuming better safety tasks and making tangible investments in America’s protection industrial base.
Whereas Europe may have as much as ten years to attain full protection autonomy, this phased method ensures the transition begins and Russian navy energy degrades earlier than different American menace alarm clocks begin going off as early as 2027 (i.e., China’s deliberate navy functionality to invade Taiwan or Iran’s nuclear program restart). In both contingency, European international locations shall be higher postured to discourage or defend towards Russian aggression, if crucial, for years, if crucial, alone.
Thus, America’s inescapable strategic constraints demand sequencing inside sequencing: Western diplomatic strain at present; European protection autonomy tomorrow.
Sequencing, Half 1: Slicing Russian Lifelines
Regardless of a regular slew of sanctions imposed on Russia since 2022, loopholes nonetheless enable Russia to proceed funding its conflict towards Ukraine. To shut these gaps, the US and Europe ought to goal Russia’s two war-funding pillars: its monetary trade and power commerce. European leaders have lengthy wished Trump to impose extra punitive measures towards Russia, but additionally they gas Russia’s conflict machine, undercutting their very own rhetoric. In latest weeks, Trump has pressed Europeans to stay as much as their very own calls for of America by halting oil purchases, buying U.S. weaponry, leveraging frozen belongings, and strengthening sanctions. He’s proper to take action. In 2024 alone, E.U. international locations bought $27 billion price of Russian power. Main economies like France, Germany, and Italy nonetheless resist full cutoffs, whereas the European Union eschews secondary sanctions and stays skittish about utilizing frozen Russian belongings.
Begin by sanctioning all Russian banks and their overseas subsidiaries. America ought to cooperate with the European Union, non-E.U. NATO members, and Japan to ban all transactions with Russian monetary establishments (with very short-term exemptions for European international locations winding down Russian power purchases), and Washington ought to work with allied capitals to make use of the $330 billion in frozen Russian belongings — not simply the belongings’ curiosity — to fund Ukrainian safety, together with European protection help to Ukraine.
Subsequent, the West ought to choke the stream of Russian power. Final 12 months, oil and gasoline accounted for 30 p.c of Russia’s authorities revenues, at the same time as Russia rerouted its commerce at discounted costs ($60 per barrel) to hungry importers like China and India. In the meantime, main holdouts Hungary and Slovakia proceed importing Russian oil and gasoline, undermining broader Western strain.
The European Union’s acknowledged objective of ending Russian power dependence by 2027 is inadequate for efficient sequencing. European Fee President Ursula von der Leyen’s extra bold objective to finish Russian gasoline imports by 2026 will get nearer to the mark, although phasing out each oil and gasoline imports by summer season 2026 would higher serve strategic targets. Anytime earlier would face stiff headwinds. Hungary and Slovakia lack sufficient infrastructure for importing various sources after centering many years of power coverage round Russian imports.
By way of summer season 2026, nevertheless, the European Union can speed up these transitions by growing the holdout international locations’ entry to present European liquified pure gasoline terminals and pipeline capability, expediting approval for various power infrastructure initiatives, financing pipeline investments, and providing a mix of monetary incentives and strategic strain to strain the holdouts to import elsewhere. This mix may embody the European Union prioritizing inexperienced transition funding (NextGenerationEU) disbursements for international locations that display concrete strikes towards Russian power independence, whereas linking Cohesion Funding allocations to power diversification timelines.
In July, the European Union set a new worth cap on Russia’s oil exports: 15 p.c decrease than the common market worth. The Trump administration ought to conform to the brand new worth cap, persuade remaining allies and companions to just accept it, and introduce a plan to tighten the worth cap quarterly. It ought to increase “secondary sanctions” on firms facilitating the Russian oil commerce and increase sanctioning of Russian shadow fleet tankers to match E.U. and British lists, that are almost double the scale of America’s and efficient in stifling Russia’s power commerce.
Lastly, Ukraine must be allowed to strike the power infrastructure that sustains Russia’s conflict effort. The Pentagon ought to loosen restrictions on low cost, replaceable, and long-range weapons programs just like the new Prolonged Vary Assault Munition and Military Tactical Missile System, so Ukraine can goal Russian oil refineries and key power nodes. Whereas Trump has already licensed Ukraine to obtain 3,550 Prolonged Vary Assault Munitions — with the first 10 to be delivered by October 2025 and the first batch of 840 to be delivered by October 2026 — supply can have little impression until the Pentagon lifts latest restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range U.S. and European weapons programs, notably for power infrastructure strikes. To keep up escalation management, the Pentagon may nonetheless limit long-range strikes towards purely navy targets.
These steps would minimize off Russia’s monetary oxygen and speed up the disintegration of its unsustainable conflict financial system, weakening Moscow earlier than it may possibly regroup and press the benefit in Ukraine or elsewhere.
Sequencing, Half 2: The European Protection Buildup
The Russo-Ukrainian Conflict has catalyzed Europe’s protection buildup. Germany, now the world’s fourth-largest navy spender, exempted protection and safety spending from constitutional debt guidelines, enabling billions of euros in protection investments and signaling its dedication to assuming a better a part of the European protection burden.
The protection surge has unfold continent-wide. NATO allies pledged 5 p.c of GDP for safety and protection by 2035. The European Union allotted €150 billion for joint protection procurement. Outcomes are promising: Europe’s annual ammunition manufacturing capability is projected to achieve two million rounds yearly by the top of 2025, a sixfold enhance from prewar ranges. Europe’s leaders more and more perceive that peace requires power. As German Protection Minister Boris Pistorius defined in August, Europe can solely “speak about peace and détente [with Russia] on equal phrases … [only] from a place of power … from eye stage.”
To make Europe “eye stage” with Russia, the US ought to collaborate in three areas.
First, set up a transparent division of labor, the place European allies handle most standard capabilities whereas America offers “backstop” help in its areas of comparative benefit. European powers like the UK and France would forward-deploy “reassurance forces” close to Ukraine, prepared for deployment to western Ukraine throughout a ceasefire or escalation, the place they’d study from Ukrainian forces and likewise present rear echelon help. European companions would take a better function in managing NATO–affiliated air and naval operations and patrols towards Russian grey zone actions. In the meantime, the US would supply intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance overwatch, logistics and transport, nuclear deterrence, and stand-in forces. If accomplished proper, by 2027, the Europeans ought to deal with day-to-day standard deterrence and protection whereas America performs a specialised supporting function.
Second, speed up protection industrial cooperation to remodel European companions from customers to producers able to combating with out U.S. navy tools. This requires co-financing industrial capability, breaking provide bottlenecks, and overcoming workforce shortfalls from years of “managed decline.” It additionally means sharing essential protection and dual-use applied sciences — corresponding to 155mm artillery shells, long-range precision missiles, and air protection missiles — by extending AUKUS-style export management exemptions to key allies. Germany, France, and the Netherlands come to thoughts, notably for established navy tools. Lastly, combine the “patchwork of nationwide [defense] industries” right into a cohesive, standardized European protection industrial base.
Third, surge in-theater munitions manufacturing via multi-year block-buy contracts from allied governments. European capitals ought to create or increase conflict reserve stockpiles to replenish munitions inventories, sending a sustained demand sign to trade. Pacific allies may be part of European procurement consortia, lowering prices and dependence on overstretched U.S. manufacturing capability.
These steps received’t yield full European protection autonomy in a single day, however they are going to fortify Europe’s skill to discourage Russia so America can correctly pivot to the Pacific.
Calculated Dangers
This sequencing technique carries threat, notably the price of lowered American consideration within the Pacific earlier than the essential 2027 “Davidson Window.” Though China palms, like Ely Ratner, acknowledge that China will wrestle to execute a “quick, sharp invasion” by 2027, Beijing continues constructing capabilities crucial for invading Taiwan, and will speed up its timeline if it sees America targeted on Europe earlier than pivoting to the Pacific.
Pacific allies are already uneasy about America’s future dedication to the area. Australia and Japan have resisted U.S. strain to spend extra, with Japan scrapping ministerial conferences. A number of allies have raised issues about American disengagement from Asia and mentioned strategic futures much less depending on America. Sequencing may deepen these fractures, giving China openings to take advantage of via financial and commerce leverage. But, forcing Pacific allies to step up may additionally strengthen allied capabilities in the event that they put together to act extra independently.
Sequencing additionally constrains U.S. diplomatic bandwidth. Intensive give attention to European sanctions coordination and protection industrial cooperation reduces capability for Asia-Pacific coalition-building and offering the navy coaching and financing essential to strengthen Pacific allies.
Iran’s nuclear restoration timeline poses one other complication. Whereas U.S. strikes possible set again Iran’s program by as much as two years, some unbiased nuclear consultants assess six months to 1 12 months for reconstitution. If Iran achieves a breakout nuclear functionality whereas Russia stays militarily robust, sequencing fails by creating the three-front strategic nightmare it sought to keep away from.
These counterarguments, nevertheless, strengthen the case for fast execution somewhat than abandoning sequencing altogether. The above dangers are actual, however the various — ready till China and Russia concurrently prod the US to conflict — stays extra perilous. Sequencing would largely protect U.S. munitions ranges and purchase time to organize America for a Pacific struggle whereas diplomatically punishing Russia and shoring up European deterrence. Selecting to sequence, nevertheless, requires acknowledging that the timeline for sequencing is narrower than desired, with smaller margins for error than historic precedents suggest.
Seizing the Strategic Window
With Iran neutered, European safety bettering, Ukraine holding the road, and Russia weakened, the US has a uncommon alternative to debilitate the Russian menace within the near-term whereas revitalizing Europe’s safety structure to discourage Russia over the long-term, so America could lastly focus its sources and a focus on countering its nice rival this century: China.
If the US makes use of these subsequent 4 years higher than its adversaries, it’ll upend the strategic panorama. It would remodel the Western alliance from protectorate to partnership. It would multiply America’s attain via elevated allied capability and burden-sharing. And it’ll stop America from having to decide on between defending Europe and the Pacific.
Nick Danby is a analysis affiliate on the Marathon Initiative and a U.S. Navy intelligence reserve officer. He served 5 years on energetic obligation, finishing excursions within the Indo-Pacific and on the Pentagon, and later labored as a nationwide safety fellow within the U.S. Senate. He’s at present a Gates-Cambridge Scholar pursuing an MPhil in Politics on the College of Cambridge.
The views expressed on this article are these of the writer and don’t mirror the official coverage or place of the Division of Protection or the U.S. authorities.
Picture: Midjourney
