President Donald Trump’s return to the White Home has revived a well-recognized anxiousness throughout Europe and Taiwan: How dependable is america when its companions’ core pursuits are at stake? Trump’s governing fashion is marked by transactional diplomacy, hostility towards multilateral establishments, tariff-driven financial statecraft, and a willingness to publicly berate allies. Taken individually, none of those options is unprecedented. Collectively, they create a story setting that China is studying learn how to exploit.
Beijing’s alternative doesn’t lie merely in Trump’s abrasive fashion or his penchant for scary allies. It lies within the uncertainty this habits generates about American intentions, priorities, and endurance. Throughout allied capitals, Trump’s conduct has reopened questions that many had hoped had been settled: whether or not U.S. commitments are conditional, whether or not alliances are valued intrinsically or instrumentally, and whether or not Washington nonetheless views long-term strategic competitors with China as a shared undertaking fairly than a negotiable alternative. Current U.S. actions — together with Trump’s intervention in Venezuela and his renewed curiosity in Greenland — have solely sharpened allied considerations about American volatility and strategic unpredictability.
China has moved to reap the benefits of this second not primarily via dramatic coverage concessions or overt diplomatic strain, however via narrative weaponization. Through the use of Trump’s personal phrases, insurance policies, and governing fashion as proof in plain sight, Beijing reinforces allied doubts about Washington whereas presenting itself — in contrast — as predictable, pragmatic, and open for enterprise. This technique doesn’t require China to invent new tales. It really works exactly as a result of most of the narratives that profit Beijing originate inside U.S. and Western debates themselves. The RAND Company’s choice to withdraw a latest report that advocated for “Stabilizing the U.S.-China Rivalry” and ongoing hypothesis about European or Canadian overtures towards China amid Trump-related uncertainty are instances in level. Trump’s willingness to hyperlink tariff aid to political alignment — together with pressuring companions to harden their stance towards China in alternate for financial concessions — has additional bolstered perceptions of conditionality and transactionalism in U.S. alliance commitments.
Beijing doesn’t merely stand by to profit passively from this permissive narrative setting. Chinese language diplomats, state-endorsed suppose tanks, and official media retailers have actively curated and repackaged Trump-era alerts to resonate with particular international audiences. Relatively than inventing new claims, they selectively amplify Trump’s personal statements on commerce, alliances, and dealmaking — in addition to Western debates questioning the sturdiness of U.S. commitments — to counsel that alignment with Washington carries rising financial and political prices. This vindicates what Beijing has been saying all alongside: Partnership with China is the one appropriate strategic alternative. This strategy permits China to operationalize narratives that originate elsewhere to declare solidarity with all international locations — together with U.S. allies — subjected to coercive U.S. insurance policies whereas sustaining believable deniability about direct interference.
One notably potent strand of this setting is the notion that Trump is profit-driven and deal-prone, and that U.S.-China competitors might due to this fact be negotiable fairly than structural. However this “deal narrative” doesn’t stand alone. It interacts with broader perceptions of volatility, punitive remedy of allies, values erosion, and selective U.S. disengagement — particularly in Europe’s case, the place considerations about Ukraine and Russia loom massive. The cumulative impact isn’t alliance collapse, however drift, hesitation, and inside division — precisely the strategic area China seeks to broaden.
Narrative Weaponization as Wedge Technique
China’s purpose is to not flip Europe or Taiwan into pro-China alignment. Its nearer-term goal is subtler: to weaken the alignment between its rivals’ allies and Washington by decoupling China coverage from alliance commitments. In follow, this implies reconciling the concept companions can cooperate with america on chosen safety points — protection spending, intelligence sharing, or Ukraine — with conserving China insulated from securitization and preserving it as a privileged financial and political accomplice.
Narrative weaponization is central to this effort. Relatively than counting on overt propaganda, Beijing embeds itself in present debates and anxieties: amplifying some themes, curating others, and infrequently permitting favorable narratives to flow into with out visibly authoring them. This restraint enhances credibility. Messages that seem to return from allied media, suppose tanks, or political debates are tougher to dismiss as Chinese language propaganda or affect operations.
Throughout Europe and Taiwan, three mutually reinforcing perceptions recur. First, Trump seems unstable and punitive towards allies, treating partnerships as transactional preparations topic to renegotiation. Second, Trump is extensively portrayed as prioritizing financial achieve and short-term offers over strategic consistency. Third, if Washington itself appears keen to recalibrate or compartmentalize competitors with China, then allies are inspired to query whether or not it’s smart to “over-securitize” their very own relationship with Beijing.
China doesn’t must push these arguments aggressively. Their plausibility derives from observable U.S. habits and from Western debates which might be typically essential of Trump’s strategy. Beijing’s position is regularly restricted to echoing allied frustrations, drawing out implications in personal or semiofficial settings, and positioning itself because the beneficiary of restraint fairly than the creator of discord.
The Deal Narrative as an Amplifier, not a Basis
Inside this broader narrative ecosystem, the concept Trump might search a profit-driven understanding with China has gained explicit traction. Commentators in america, Europe, and Taiwan have speculated that Trump might desire a looser lodging with Beijing — one which delivers financial positive factors and avoids navy confrontation — over sustained strategic competitors. Such arguments are sometimes framed as critiques of Trump fairly than endorsements of Chinese language coverage.
China didn’t create this narrative, nor does it truly essentially imagine it. Chinese language officers and analysts have in reality expressed skepticism about Trump’s reliability as a negotiating accomplice. Furthermore, Beijing has not signaled a willingness to make the sorts of concessions {that a} real grand discount would require. But the narrative creates a wedge alternative. By highlighting Trump’s unconventional diplomacy, China permits doubts about U.S. intentions to persist.
This impact is bolstered when selective strands of U.S. strategic discourse — requires stabilization, restraint, and direct U.S.-China channels of communication to raised handle crises and keep away from accidents — are reframed as proof that competitors itself could also be waning. In Washington, such arguments often intention to raised handle rivalry and keep away from pointless escalation. In Beijing’s retelling, they counsel that america could also be ready to compartmentalize or soften competitors, strengthening allied incentives to hedge.
The end result isn’t that allies instantly imagine a U.S.–China discount is imminent, however that uncertainty turns into normalized. And uncertainty, fairly than persuasion, is China’s best wedge.
Europe: Seduction, Strategic Uncertainty, and Financial Safety
In Europe, China’s wedge technique is primarily seduction-oriented and elite-facing. Beijing presents itself as a secure, pragmatic accomplice at a time when Trump’s United States seems hostile to the European Union, skeptical of multilateralism, and keen to make use of financial coercion in opposition to buddies in addition to rivals.
Chinese language messaging resonates with ongoing European debates about strategic autonomy, competitiveness, and the way forward for globalization. It emphasizes financial alternative, warns in opposition to self-inflicted injury via confrontation, and tacitly reinforces the concept Europe ought to keep away from binding itself too tightly to a U.S.-China coverage that will itself be unstable or transactional.
At first look, this narrative might seem overstated. Not like throughout Trump’s first time period, there was no renewed risk to withdraw america from NATO, and strain on European allies has targeted extra narrowly on burden sharing than on alliance exit. However China’s wedge technique doesn’t hinge on formal alliance rupture. It feeds as a substitute on uncertainty about how U.S. commitments translate throughout points — notably when alliance solidarity on NATO coexists with transactionalism on commerce, ambiguity on Ukraine, and a willingness to problem allied sovereignty, as seen over Greenland. From Beijing’s perspective, this sort of compartmentalized reassurance nonetheless generates exploitable doubt concerning the reliability and scope of U.S. management.
An vital impact of that is the revival of intra-Western competitors over financial and commerce ties to China. If European companies and policymakers concern that Washington might recalibrate its China coverage or safe favorable financial preparations, strain mounts to behave first: soften de-risking measures, pursue selective offers, and resist a security-centered framing of E.U.–China relations. This dynamic has precedent. Throughout Trump’s first time period, the prospect of a U.S.–China commerce deal helped mobilize assist for the E.U.–China Complete Settlement on Funding, fueled by the logic that “if Washington can deal, so ought to Europe.”
In the present day, that reflex is resurfacing whilst European consciousness of China-related dangers has deepened. Europe’s financial safety agenda relies on a shared political understanding that elements of the financial relationship with China have to be assessed via a safety lens. Narratives that solid U.S. dedication as unsure or conditional make this framing tougher to maintain, empowering constituencies that argue for a return to “enterprise as typical.” These strikes should not remoted or symbolic. They’re designed to bolster intra-European disagreement over whether or not or how China needs to be handled primarily as a strategic danger or as an indispensable financial accomplice, complicating efforts to maintain a shared security-centered strategy to E.U.–China relations.
Europe’s vulnerability is compounded by lingering instincts that cooperation can overcome competitors and that guidelines and establishments can handle rivalry. Trump’s assaults on the European Union and on multilateralism paradoxically deepen this vulnerability, making Beijing’s self-presentation as a defender of openness and stability resonate extra strongly — even when China’s personal practices stay coercive. In Europe, this has taken the type of sustained elite-level signaling fairly than mass propaganda. Senior Chinese language diplomats and official interlocutors have repeatedly expressed sympathy for European frustrations with Washington, contrasting U.S. tariffs, conditionality, and political strain with China’s purported steadiness as an financial accomplice. In parallel, Beijing has considerably ratcheted up its coercive financial instruments — seen within the two rounds of uncommon earth export controls, introduced in April 2025 and October 2025 — whereas concurrently utilizing selective gestures — such because the suspension of the second spherical of uncommon earth export controls till November 2026, the calibrated suspension of sanctions on European lawmakers, and renewed diplomatic outreach to key member states — to bolster the message that improved political ties with China would ship tangible advantages. On this context, Trump’s rhetoric on Greenland has been learn in Europe not as an remoted provocation, however as additional proof of a willingness to deal with allied sovereignty instrumentally.
Issues about Ukraine and Russia additional intensify this dynamic. Perceptions that Trump could also be keen to compromise European safety pursuits to stabilize relations with Moscow reinforce doubts about whether or not america will persistently “have Europe’s again.” For Beijing, this broader belief deficit is efficacious wedge ammunition: If Washington is seen as transactional not solely on commerce with China but in addition on Europe’s most urgent safety disaster, the case for strategic restraint towards China weakens additional.
Taiwan: Coercive Narratives and Abandonment Fears
In Taiwan, China’s wedge technique is extra coercive and society-facing. The goal is public confidence that america will defend Taiwan and that the Democratic Progressive Celebration’s alignment technique is sustainable. Even when U.S. deterrence messaging is powerful on paper, Taiwanese public debate is formed by anxiousness gaps between official reassurance and perceived U.S. volatility and transactionalism.
In Taiwan, Chinese language exercise has been extra direct and coercive, as seen from the launch in December 2025 of its most in depth battle video games round Taiwan (Justice Mission 2025) so far. China has additionally reinvigorated its concerted marketing campaign to strain international governments to simply accept Beijing’s declare that China’s sovereignty over Taiwan is ironclad — reasserting its interpretation of historical past, worldwide regulation, and the historic bilateral agreements in place between China and different international locations (together with america and its allies) in several diplomatic contexts. Celebration-state media, official Taiwan-facing establishments, and affiliated commentators have actively amplified Trump’s most transactional statements, pairing them with selective references to U.S. strategic debates or insurance policies, to counsel that the U.S. strategy towards Taiwan is essentially mercantilist. In accordance with Taiwanese officers and specialists, messages suggesting that america would subordinate Taiwan’s pursuits in broader U.S.–China lodging is routinely bolstered in personal exchanges, the place Chinese language interlocutors explicitly body U.S. unreliability as a purpose to query the sustainability of shut alignment with Washington.
Right here, proof of extra direct Chinese language amplification is stronger. Taiwanese officers and specialists report Chinese language interlocutors explicitly invoking Trump’s dealmaking instincts and suggesting that Taiwan might turn into negotiable in a broader U.S.–China lodging. These messages are paired with home political warfare geared toward portraying the governing Democratic Progressive Celebration as reckless, self-interested, and keen to sacrifice financial well-being for ideological alignment with an unreliable United States.
To make sure, Taiwan’s strategic neighborhood is extra alert to Chinese language narrative manipulation than Europe’s. Nevertheless, vulnerabilities persist in polarized media ecosystems the place abandonment tales unfold simply. These narratives are then folded into broader political-warfare efforts geared toward portraying Taiwan’s management as reckless and economically irresponsible — keen to jeopardize prosperity in alternate for political alignment with an exploitative exterior patron. These claims add gasoline to the heated debates in Taiwan surrounding the particular protection price range launched by the federal government, which was blocked by the Taiwan legislature for the sixth time in early January. The target isn’t capitulation, however to trigger political fatigue and division in Taiwan — eroding home consensus and weakening deterrence by undermining confidence in exterior assist.
Drift, Not Rupture
China’s technique doesn’t intention at dramatic alliance rupture. Extra attainable — and extra precious —outcomes embody hesitation, fragmentation, and drift. In Europe, this implies softer and extra uneven de-risking, renewed temptations to chop selective offers, and deeper intra-European divisions. In Taiwan, it means intensified political contestation and higher susceptibility to abandonment narratives. In each instances, Trump’s habits capabilities as an accelerant. By undermining confidence in U.S. reliability, it expands the area through which China can resist securitization and weaken allied alignment — typically with out taking seen motion.
Reclaiming Company
Europe and Taiwan ought to resist the temptation to react defensively to each narrative twist. Over-securitizing the narrative itself dangers amplifying anxiousness and validating Beijing’s wedge technique.
For Europe, the more practical response is to reassert company. This implies grounding China coverage in a clear-eyed evaluation of China’s monitor report, together with its coercive practices and structural financial challenges. Whereas China’s dominance on uncommon earths provides it distinctive leverage over Europe, its sluggish progress and want for exterior markets counsel that Europe can have leverage over China. Europe ought to outline the grasp body of E.U.–China relations proactively and decide to an strategy that may handle China-related alternatives and considerations in a sustainable means, fairly than internalizing narratives formed by Western anxiousness or Chinese language opportunism. On the similar time, Europe should coordinate internally to keep away from a race to Beijing that will weaken collective leverage and undermine financial safety. Strategic autonomy requires before everything coherence at residence.
For Taiwan, narrowing the anxiousness hole stays important. Clear communication concerning the U.S. relationship, mixed with a constructive nationwide narrative that transcends perpetual disaster, can scale back the efficiency of abandonment tales and strengthen resilience.
All in all, China doesn’t must manufacture narratives about Trump to profit from them. By exploiting the uncertainty generated by America’s remedy of its allies — generally amplifying, generally merely observing — Beijing can weaken alignment with Washington at minimal price. The problem for Europe and Taiwan is to not remove uncertainty, however to make sure it doesn’t dictate technique.
Olivia Cheung is a China fellow on the Centre for Safety Diplomacy and Technique at Vrije Universiteit Brussel and a lecturer at King’s School London.
Luis Simón is the director of the Centre for Safety Diplomacy and Technique at Vrije Universiteit Brussel and the director of the Brussels workplace of the Elcano Royal Institute.
Giulia Tercovich is the deputy director of the Centre for Safety Diplomacy and Technique at Vrije Universiteit Brussel.
Picture: The White Home by way of Wikimedia Commons
