The dramatic surge in U.S. navy energy within the Caribbean since August 2025 — anchored by the arrival of the united statesGerald R. Ford, the deployment of F-35s to Puerto Rico, expanded naval patrols, the buildup of some 15,000 U.S. personnel, and the announcement of a naval blockade of Venezuelan tankers carrying sanctioned oil — means that Washington is getting ready for a forceful confrontation with Venezuela. The Trump administration initially framed the deployment as a counter-narcotics surge, however the scale of the buildup far surpasses what is usually required to interdict drug boats. Furthermore, the latest seizure of a “zombie tanker,” the following blockade declaration, and President Donald Trump’s public statements as an alternative counsel the specter of coercive motion towards Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s authorities.
Understanding how Venezuela would possibly reply to U.S. navy motion requires an correct evaluation of the capabilities, readiness, and doctrinal method to exterior intervention of the Bolivarian Nationwide Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana). The nation’s authorities underneath President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) adopted that identify to honor Simón Bolivar, the Nineteenth-century liberator who fought for South American independence and whose beliefs kind the idea for contemporary Venezuelan nationalism, often known as Bolivarianism, linking the navy to his revolutionary legacy.
Whereas Venezuela styled itself as a regional navy heavyweight underneath Chávez, the Venezuelan armed forces of 2025 are an growing old, hollowed-out pressure whose most potent programs endure from poor readiness and power upkeep points. Furthermore, low morale among the many rank-and-file signifies a weak will to battle, additional undermining a navy response.
Even so, Maduro would seemingly be capable of depend on some loyalist forces, in addition to a panoply of non-state armed actors whose existence is determined by the regime staying in energy, permitting the state to mount a guerrilla-style resistance. Though the Maduro authorities now not invokes “Plan Zamora” by identify, the civil-military, national-defense, and internal-control constructions it established — particularly, territorial protection zones, militia mobilization, neighborhood surveillance networks, and concrete resistance cells — stay deeply embedded in Venezuela’s safety structure. Thus, whereas state safety forces can’t deter a U.S. navy assault in typical phrases, it retains sufficient uneven capability to make any international intervention extended, pricey, and politically fraught.
The Bolivarian Nationwide Armed Forces and Different Armed Actors: Numbers, Capabilities, and Constraints
Between 1999 and the mid-2010s, Venezuela projected a picture of regional navy energy distinct from its Latin American neighbors. Chávez’s purchases of Su-30MK2 fighters, T-72B1 tanks, S-300 and Buk air-defense batteries, BMP-3 infantry combating autos, and a collection of Russian artillery programs established an arsenal that, on paper, exceeded the capability of many regional militaries. Nevertheless, the collapse of Venezuela’s economic system, hyperinflation, sanctions, and the outmigration of almost eight million individuals for the reason that mid-2010s have sharply eroded this pressure.
In response to latest assessments, the Venezuelan navy has roughly 123,000 energetic personnel: 63,000 within the military; 25,500 within the navy; 11,500 within the air pressure; and 23,000 within the nationwide guard. These are supplemented, nevertheless, by roughly 8,000 reservists and at the least 200–300 thousand members of the Bolivarian militia (milicia bolivariana), a separate reserve civilian-military physique created by Chávez with the aim of making certain territorial protection and countering inside dissent. Members of the Bolivarian militia, who’re embedded throughout neighborhoods, state establishments, and workplaces, pledge to defend Chávez’s “Bolivarian revolution” and implement regime loyalty.
Different armed teams, lots of whom share the federal government’s ideology, would offer further help for the regime. Paramilitary colectivos, city teams ideologically dedicated to Chávez’s Twenty first-century socialism and immediately tied to the state, have usually acted on orders from Maduro, participating in repression and finishing up lethal acts of violence towards political opponents. These pro-government armed teams get pleasure from state financing in addition to close to complete impunity to function on the margins of — or totally outdoors — the regulation. Likewise, left-wing Colombian guerrilla teams which have discovered protected haven in rural elements of the nation could be prone to maintain combating exactly as a result of their existence is tied to the survival of Chavismo in energy.
Nevertheless, regardless of its dimension, the Venezuelan navy’s {hardware} is severely degraded. Upkeep on the Su-30 fleet is inconsistent: Not less than three of Venezuela’s 24 plane have crashed, and spare elements for his or her Russian engines and avionics are scarce. The military’s T-72 tanks, BMP-3 autos, Msta-S howitzers, and Smerch rocket launchers likewise endure from low operational readiness, constrained by gas shortages, restricted coaching, and years of cannibalization. The navy, in the meantime, has just one useful frigate and one Sort-209 submarine, and though a number of corvettes exist on paper they’re flippantly armed and lack trendy air-defense programs.
Regardless of this, the Venezuelan armed forces retain a numerically vital air-defense community, together with roughly a dozen S-300 batteries, a number of Buk and Pechora programs, and a large distribution of Igla-S man-portable air-defense programs. Mixed with Venezuela’s rugged terrain and densely populated city facilities, these programs give Caracas some capability to complicate U.S. air operations, significantly within the first hours of a battle.
Politically, the Venezuelan armed forces stay tightly sure to the Maduro authorities partially because of greater than twenty years of coup-proofing measures like politicized promotions, purges of perceived disloyal officers, and illicit enrichment, from gold mining to narcotrafficking. Venezuelan Minister of Protection Vladimir Padrino López has held his place (and different posts) for greater than 11 years, reflecting how his future is equally tied to that of Maduro. The irony is that this top-heavy, over-politicized construction with deliberate jurisdictional overlap and redundancy produces elite management that has managed to climate a number of crises, but has weakened operational effectiveness, tactical initiative, and capability for sustained typical operations by its emphasis on loyalty over competence and overlapping chains of command.
How the Venezuelan Army May Reply to U.S. Airstrikes
A U.S. air marketing campaign would seemingly start by placing Venezuela’s air defenses, airbases, command-and-control amenities, and key logistics nodes. The Venezuelan armed forces look like effectively conscious of this sequencing and have ready accordingly.
Venezuela’s air-defense technique relies upon closely on dispersal, concealment, mobility, and the usage of decoys. S-300 and Buk programs, whereas formidable in idea, are maintained erratically and lack the dense integration and radar redundancy typical of peer air-defense networks. Nonetheless, Venezuelan air protection may pose significant dangers in the course of the first hours or maybe days, particularly across the main city and strategic facilities of Caracas, Maracay, and Puerto La Cruz. Cell Igla-S groups scattered throughout city terrain would add to the complexity of focusing on, significantly towards low-flying plane or helicopters. Nevertheless, the readiness and technical high quality of Venezuela’s air-defense community is just too low to outlive a sustained bombing marketing campaign. As soon as mounted radars and command nodes are destroyed, the usefulness of remaining programs would decline considerably.
Venezuela’s most credible high-end navy choice in an air marketing campaign is the Su-30MK2 fighter, a number of of which carry Kh-31 anti-ship missiles, in accordance with just lately launched Venezuelan air pressure movies. Whereas the fleet is small and restricted by upkeep points, these plane may theoretically try opportunistic strikes towards U.S. naval vessels, significantly if the USA disperses its property. On the similar time, such assaults would seemingly be the efficient equal of suicide missions: U.S. airborne warning and management programs, F-35s, and Aegis-equipped destroyers give the USA overwhelming benefits in detection, focusing on, and interception.
Whereas the Venezuelan armed forces can’t defend its airspace for lengthy, it might probably nonetheless impose time prices, financial prices, and danger early in a battle, rising the political and operational worth of U.S. coercion. After the seemingly neutralization of most air defenses, the Venezuelan navy would shift to uneven survival techniques by relocating management into hardened or underground amenities; mobilizing militias, paramilitary teams, and Nationwide Guard items for inside management; and getting ready for occupation and insurgency situations.
How Venezuela May Counter U.S. Covert Operations
Venezuela’s skill to counter U.S. covert operations rests much less on technical sophistication than on early detection. The regime has constructed a dense counter-intelligence ecosystem centered on the Basic Directorate of Army Counterintelligence (Dirección Basic de Contrainteligencia Militar), the Bolivarian Nationwide Intelligence Service (Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional), intelligence parts inside the Nationwide Guard, and longstanding Cuban intelligence advisors. Whereas Venezuela lacks superior alerts intelligence, it compensates by intensive human intelligence networks embedded in state establishments, safety forces, and society.
If the USA tried, say, covert sabotage or particular operations raids, the regime’s response would seemingly prioritize publicity and attribution over quiet disruption. Public arrests, compelled confessions, and speedy dissemination by state media could be the instruments to strip clandestine actors of secrecy. The target could be deterrence by visibility, turning covert motion right into a political occasion that raises the dangers for collaborators and collapses the boundary between international interference and home opposition. This exposure-based technique is strengthened by aggressive data operations that body alleged covert exercise as proof of U.S. aggression.
Lastly, Venezuela’s authorized and institutional atmosphere lowers the edge for disrupting covert operations. Emergency powers, anti-terrorism legal guidelines, and the routine use of navy jurisdiction over civilians would permit the regime to maneuver rapidly towards suspected networks with minimal oversight. Though the milicia and colectivos are poorly fitted to fight, they’re efficient as informants, screens, and enforcers on the neighborhood stage, extending the state’s surveillance attain. The trade-off is intelligence distortion and reputational price, however from the regime’s perspective the technique succeeds if it raises the operational, political, and ethical prices of U.S. covert motion.
How Venezuela May Reply to a Floor Invasion
A U.S. floor invasion is the least seemingly however most consequential situation. Militarily, the Venezuelan armed forces could be defeated in open battle: Its navy can’t contest sea management, its air pressure can’t contest air superiority, and its military lacks the readiness to face a contemporary mechanized pressure. Nevertheless, the top of typical resistance wouldn’t essentially imply the top of struggle.
Following the doctrine of “struggle of all of the individuals” (Guerra de Todo el Pueblo) launched in Plan Zamora, the federal government may try to show its dense cities into grinding battlegrounds and switch to guerrilla warfare techniques and what Inside Minister Diosdado Cabello has referred to as “energetic extended resistance.” The federal government would additionally implement a plan of “anarchization,” turning to the intelligence companies and ruling-party supporters to create dysfunction on the streets and make Venezuela as ungovernable as attainable for international forces.
The dense city atmosphere of Caracas, for example, would restrict the presence of tanks, create challenges for drones, and supply benefits for snipers and small-ambush groups. The nation’s various topography and huge dimension — some 12 occasions bigger than Panama — would offer additional challenges for U.S. forces. Militia members would simply mix into the civilian populations to which they belong, whereas the Venezuelan armed forces would try and keep away from giant armored engagements and as an alternative break into small items supported by militias and colectivos. Nationwide guard and intelligence items would keep political self-discipline and suppress collaborators. Whereas militias aren’t combat-effective in typical phrases, they’ll help city ambushes, intimidate civilians, present intelligence on U.S. troop actions, and sabotage provide strains.
Militarily, the USA may seize Venezuelan territory quickly. Nevertheless, politically, it may discover itself trapped in a multi-year stabilization operation resembling a hybrid of its position in post-invasion Iraq and Colombia in the course of the implementation of Plan Colombia, the place insurgency forces difficult state-building efforts. The very circumstances that degrade the Venezuelan navy’s typical operations, equivalent to financial collapse, proliferation of armed teams, and political polarization, would amplify the problem of post-invasion governance.
Weak However Harmful
The truth of a attainable U.S.-Venezuelan confrontation is that whereas Venezuela can’t win a traditional struggle, it might probably make a U.S. intervention a pricey, unsure, and politically explosive gamble. The Venezuelan navy’s typical items are growing old, top-heavy, undertrained, and poorly maintained. The navy is nearly nonfunctional, the air pressure is fragile, the military can area trendy armor however can’t maintain it, and the air-defense community is proscribed. Nevertheless, the Venezuelan authorities has constructed a dense internal-control system and an expansive militia community, and it boasts an city geography that amplifies uneven resistance. The Venezuelan navy’s operational doctrine displays this actuality: survive the primary blows, then disperse, adapt, and bleed an invader politically by guerrilla warfare. Even restricted strikes danger setting in movement penalties that U.S. forces may handle tactically, however that U.S. political leaders would possibly discover tough to rein in as soon as the battle expands past the preliminary use of pressure.
John Polga-Hecimovich is an affiliate professor of political science on the U.S. Naval Academy, the place he was beforehand the director of the Discussion board for Latin American Research. He’s the co-editor of Authoritarian Consolidation in Occasions of Disaster: Venezuela Below Nicolás Maduro (Routledge Press, 2025).
Picture: Carlos E. Perez S.L by way of Wikimedia Commons
