What if america isn’t ending wars, simply interrupting them?
Since returning to the White Home, President Donald Trump — who has repeatedly described himself as a “President of Peace” — has intervened to halt conflicts throughout a number of disaster theaters. From Gaza and the Israel–Iran confrontation to Ukraine, the India–Pakistan battle, and Southeast Asia’s Thailand–Cambodia border, U.S. diplomatic stress helped impose ceasefires, halt escalation, and stabilize entrance strains. On the identical time, america performed a whole bunch of air and missile strikes throughout the Center East, Africa, Latin America, and past, underscoring a putting paradox on the coronary heart of Trump-era statecraft: a presidency that claims to finish wars whereas relying closely on coercive power to handle them. In every of those theaters, violence was paused, not resolved. Ceasefires held briefly — political settlements didn’t.
This sample raises a central puzzle. Why has U.S.-led disaster diplomacy confirmed more and more efficient at stopping wars within the quick time period, but persistently incapable of ending them? The reply lies not in diplomatic incompetence or inadequate stress, however within the altering goals and limits of American statecraft itself. Ceasefires are not handled primarily as bridges to political settlement. They perform as an alternative as devices of escalation administration — mechanisms to include threat, restrict spillover, and restore short-term stability with out confronting underlying long-term political contradictions.
Classical battle decision assumes that halting violence creates house for negotiation, legitimacy-building, and compromise. However lots of as we speak’s conflicts lack mutually acceptable end-states. Core points — territory, sovereignty, regime survival, identification, and regional safety hierarchies — stay essentially zero-sum. In such environments, even overwhelming exterior stress can compel restraint with out producing consent. Ceasefires emerge as tactical pauses imposed beneath duress, not political agreements rooted in shared incentives.
This distinction issues. As Johan Galtung famously argued, unfavourable peace — the absence of energetic preventing — may be imposed externally via leverage, coercion, and disaster mediation. In contrast, constructive peace — the reconfiguration of political, safety, and financial relationships that makes renewed violence unattractive — requires legitimacy, consent, and structural change. The hole between the 2 has widened. America has develop into more and more able to imposing the previous whereas remaining unable, or unwilling, to provide the latter.
Trump-era diplomacy illustrates these tensions with uncommon readability. In circumstances starting from Gaza, Israel–Iran, India–Pakistan, Thailand–Cambodia, and Russia–Ukraine, Washington has relied on diplomatic stress, army signaling, financial threats, and disaster bargaining to impose pauses in violence. These interventions diminished fast hurt and lowered escalation dangers, however they persistently averted the deeper political work of reconciliation and settlement.
The end result was not warfare termination however a mannequin of disaster administration by which ceasefires substituted for political settlement. By prioritizing escalation management over resolving the underlying bargaining failures that drive battle, this strategy suppressed violence with out remodeling the political circumstances mandatory for sturdy peace. The circumstances that observe present why claims of warfare ending beneath this self-styled “President of Peace” have confirmed troublesome to maintain.
If U.S.-led disaster diplomacy has develop into adept at imposing unfavourable peace, the unresolved query is whether or not — and the way — it could possibly transfer past managing wars. Linking ceasefires to political pathways, making use of leverage early on, and investing in political capability might all assist allow the circumstances required for constructive peace.
Gaza: Ceasefire as Containment, Not Complete Settlement
Israel’s warfare on Gaza since October 2023 illustrates the boundaries of externally imposed restraint absent political transformation. Successive pauses in preventing — brokered beneath intense worldwide stress — briefly diminished civilian hurt and prevented regional spillovers, but failed to change the strategic logic driving the warfare. Ceasefires functioned as devices of containment relatively than steps towards settlement.
For Israel, army operations in Gaza had been framed as essential to reassert deterrence, degrade Hamas’s operational capability, and restore credibility after the failure to stop the Oct. 7 shock assault. Israeli army officers cited the concentrating on of senior Hamas figures comparable to Yahya Sinwar, sustained strikes on Hamas’s tunnel infrastructure, and operations in opposition to affiliated networks past Gaza — together with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthi targets in Yemen — as proof of restored deterrence.
Tactical pauses had been tolerated by Israel to handle humanitarian stress and worldwide scrutiny, however they didn’t sign a willingness to revisit the underlying political query of Gaza’s governance or Palestinian statehood. For Hamas, survival itself constituted strategic success. Ceasefires allowed regrouping, preserved management buildings, and bolstered its declare to relevance as a resistance actor, even amid devastating losses.
U.S. diplomacy proved efficient in managing escalation however restricted in scope. Washington leveraged army assist, diplomatic cowl, and regional relationships — together with via frameworks such because the administration’s 20-point Gaza peace plan — to constrain Israel’s operations at crucial moments and forestall the battle from triggering a wider regional warfare. But it averted articulating or imposing a political finish state and declined to make use of its leverage to drive battle decision past the fast pause. The emphasis remained on timing, sequencing, and de-escalation, whereas the “day after” — Gaza’s political standing, safety preparations, and reconstruction governance — was intentionally deferred.
The end result was a cycle of suspended violence with out altered incentives. Humanitarian pauses diminished fast struggling for Gaza’s civilians however didn’t generate political momentum for a reputable settlement. Short-term ceasefires lacked enforcement mechanisms, post-conflict frameworks, or credible pathways towards a sturdy safety and governance association. Every pause due to this fact contained the seeds of its personal collapse.
Israel–Iran: Escalation Management With out Strategic Decision
The Israel–Iran confrontation illustrates the widening hole between escalation management and political decision in modern U.S. diplomacy. In the course of the 12-day warfare, Washington moved past disaster administration to direct participation, conducting coordinated strikes in opposition to Iranian nuclear amenities whereas concurrently working to stop the battle from widening right into a regional warfare. The ensuing pause mirrored efficient escalation management — however not strategic settlement.
U.S. army motion marked a transparent inflection level. Strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, carried out in coordination with Israeli operations, demonstrated Washington’s willingness to make use of power to implement pink strains and form the battle’s higher limits. These assaults reassured regional companions and imposed tangible prices on Iran’s nuclear program, but they had been intentionally calibrated to keep away from regime-threatening escalation. Power was used to punish and deter, to not compel political transformation.
Iran’s response bolstered this logic of managed confrontation. Tehran absorbed U.S. and Israeli strikes whereas preserving strategic ambiguity over its nuclear capabilities and retaliated via fastidiously calibrated actions, together with an assault on the Al Udeid U.S. airbase in Qatar. Prior notification to Washington signaled an intent to revive deterrence with out widening the warfare. For Iran, endurance and ambiguity — not escalation dominance — outlined success.
Crucially, the post-conflict diplomacy reinforces this sample. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s engagement with Trump in Florida in December, his fifth go to to america in 2025 — the place Iran reportedly topped the agenda — alerts that the confrontation stays unresolved. Fairly than consolidating a political settlement or reimposing sturdy nuclear constraints, U.S. diplomacy has prioritized threat administration and calibrated stress — reflecting an strategy that comprises crises with out resolving them.
India–Pakistan: Punitive Deterrence, Exterior Claims, and Unresolved Struggle Circumstances
The India–Pakistan disaster following the April 2025 Pahalgam terror assault illustrates the widening hole between disaster interruption and battle decision. After the assault, India launched Operation Sindoor, a restricted however forceful marketing campaign of precision strikes in opposition to terrorist infrastructure recognized by India in Pakistan and Pakistani-administered Kashmir. In response to Indian officers, the operation concluded as soon as its restricted army goals — deterrence signaling and escalation management, nonetheless dangerous — had been assessed to have been achieved. Combating stopped, however the operational and political circumstances that made renewed warfare probably stay intact.
Trump repeatedly claimed credit score for ending the battle, portraying U.S. intervention as decisive mediation. But this narrative obscures the precise dynamics on the bottom. Washington’s function was confined to disaster communication and restraint signaling, to not structuring a ceasefire framework or brokering political compromise. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made clear that the cessation adopted bilateral military-to-military contact after Pakistan’s army chief approached his Indian counterpart.
Crucially, India’s post-crisis habits underscored the absence of reconciliation. New Delhi didn’t reverse its punitive measures — it institutionalized them. The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, full closure of the Attari–Wagah crossing, cancellation of the South Asian Affiliation for Regional Cooperation Visa Exemption Scheme, expulsion of Pakistani army advisers, and discount of diplomatic workers signaled a strategic shift: Terrorism would now set off sustained systemic prices, not merely episodic retaliation. These measures hardened the disaster setting relatively than stabilizing it.
Thailand–Cambodia: Externally Brokered Pauses, Internally Unresolved Battle
The Thailand–Cambodia border battle underscores the boundaries of externally imposed ceasefires in disputes the place political and army calculations stay misaligned. Combating escalated sharply in late Might following the killing of a Cambodian soldier alongside the disputed frontier, culminating in tit-for-tat clashes and airstrikes in July. A ceasefire brokered beneath U.S. and Malaysian stress briefly halted hostilities, but it surely failed to provide sturdy stabilization.
The settlement mirrored urgency relatively than settlement. The ceasefire coincided with Trump’s regional go to, compressing diplomatic timelines and prioritizing political signaling over course of. Absent clear sequencing, enforcement mechanisms, or sustained army buy-in, the association halted preventing with out reconciling competing risk perceptions or stabilizing command and management dynamics alongside the 800-kilometer border.
By early December final yr, preventing resumed. Artillery exchanges and air strikes displaced practically a million folks and killed dozens, with either side accusing the opposite of violations. The breakdown uncovered the ceasefire’s core weak spot: It managed signs whereas leaving underlying drivers — contested colonial-era demarcations, nationalist mobilization, and reciprocal militarization — untouched.
Subsequent diplomacy has centered on stabilization relatively than settlement. Following a 72-hour ceasefire brokered after weeks of preventing, the Affiliation of Southeast Asian Nations — alongside U.S. and Chinese language mediation — has emphasised restraint and de-escalation, however discussions stay confined to tactical deconfliction. The political dispute itself stays deferred.
Ukraine–Russia: Peace Via Power, Consent With out Settlement
The U.S.-led diplomatic push on Ukraine represents essentially the most bold modern try to convert battlefield leverage into political settlement. Draft peace proposals — that includes demilitarized zones, personnel caps, safety ensures, election provisions, and contested territorial preparations — sign an effort to translate coercive stress into an enforceable finish state. But the initiative stays structurally fragile, not as a result of leverage is absent, however as a result of consent stays elusive regardless of devastating losses on either side.
For Ukraine, territorial concessions stay politically radioactive, threatening home legitimacy and regime stability. Even proposals providing enhanced army capability, long-term Western safety ensures, and expanded coaching and arms transfers confront onerous limits imposed by nationwide identification and public sacrifice. A ceasefire that formalizes territorial loss dangers being perceived as capitulation, no matter strategic compensation.
For Russia, significant compromise stays strategically unbelievable. Moscow’s battlefield posture, manpower era, and tolerance for financial pressure recommend confidence in long-term coercion. Negotiations serve tactical functions — managing relations with Washington, delaying sanctions, and shaping attribution of blame — relatively than signaling readiness to just accept an final result that secures Ukraine’s sovereignty or locks in Western alignment. Excessive-level engagements, together with the prolonged Trump–Zelensky assembly in Florida in December final yr, underscore these limits. Whereas dialogue deepened, Zelensky’s presentation of a 20-point peace plan — encompassing safety ensures, power caps, and managed territorial preparations —did little to make clear whether or not core political obstacles had narrowed. Key questions stay unresolved: the credibility of exterior safety ensures, the acceptability of territorial outcomes to Ukraine, and Russia’s willingness to consent to any settlement in need of its maximal goals. The talks bolstered the hole between the diplomatic course of and political convergence.
A New U.S. Doctrine? Disaster Administration Over Battle Decision
The newly launched U.S. Nationwide Safety Technique codifies the logic evident throughout these circumstances. It prioritizes deterrence, speedy response, power posture, and escalation management whereas largely sidestepping pathways to political settlement. Stabilization replaces transformation — threat administration substitutes for decision. Battle is handled as a situation to be contained relatively than an issue to be solved.
Fairly than articulating finish states, the technique emphasizes stopping deterioration — holding strains, shaping adversary habits, and shopping for time. This displays an implicit evaluation that many modern conflicts are structurally irresolvable within the close to time period, given incompatible political goals and eroded legitimacy. The function of U.S. energy, due to this fact, is to stop collapse and regional spillover, to not engineer peace.
Latest diplomatic habits aligns with this posture. From Ukraine to Gaza, from South Asia to Southeast Asia, and even within the Western Hemisphere — via actions such because the kidnapping of Venezuelan chief Nicolás Maduro and seizure and subsequent return of Venezuelan vessels — Washington has proven rising capability to impose outcomes on the level of disaster, however far much less willingness to grapple with the political settlement that follows. These interventions perform much less as pathways to battle decision than as devices of coercion and threat administration.
Disaster Diplomacy Is Mandatory — However Not Adequate
Subsequently, U.S.-led disaster diplomacy has confirmed efficient at halting violence and stopping escalation, however its success has been narrowly outlined. Throughout these circumstances, ceasefires delivered at most unfavourable peace — the short-term suppression of preventing — with out producing the political settlement, legitimacy, or institutional change required for sturdy decision.
Seen on this mild, the boundaries of current diplomacy develop into clearer. In Gaza, restraint substituted for selections about postwar governance. Within the Israel–Iran confrontation, deterrence substituted for motion towards settlement. In Ukraine, leverage outpaced consent. In South and Southeast Asia, pauses held with out reconciliation. What emerged had been tactical intermissions imposed beneath exterior stress, not pathways towards constructive peace, which might require reconfigured political relationships and accepted end-states.
This sample displays not diplomatic failure a lot as doctrinal realism. Many modern conflicts lack mutually acceptable end-states, and U.S. policymakers more and more function on the idea that political transformation is neither possible nor price the fee. Disaster diplomacy, on this sense, is doing precisely what it’s designed to do: containing wars and limiting spillovers, not resolving the conflicts that produce them.
The consequence, nonetheless, is a world by which wars more and more “finish” with out ending. Ceasefires freeze violence with out resolving it, stabilizing conflicts at larger ranges of threat and leaving recurrence constructed into their foundations. Till political incentives change — and legitimacy, safety, and governance are addressed — claims of warfare termination will proceed to outpace actuality. Peace, on this framework, just isn’t achieved: it’s postponed.
From Disaster Administration to Constructive Peace
If america had been severe about transferring past unfavourable peace, it could must rethink how disaster diplomacy is used. Three shifts would matter most.
First, ceasefires would have to be explicitly linked to political pathways and a “day after” deliberate for, nonetheless imperfect — utilizing diplomatic cowl, reconstruction help, or sanctions aid to incentivize incremental steps towards governance, safety preparations, or negotiations.
Second, Washington would wish to use leverage earlier and extra visibly, signaling prematurely how army help, financial entry, and diplomatic safety will change if events impede political transition or settlement. Leverage reserved solely for stopping violence not often reshapes postwar incentives.
Third, america would wish to spend money on political capability, not simply stabilization —supporting interim governance, safety establishments, and financial frameworks able to sustaining restraint as soon as preventing stops.
Whereas none of this ensures sturdy peace, with out these shifts, U.S. diplomacy will stay efficient at halting wars whereas leaving the political circumstances that maintain them largely intact —producing pauses with out peace.
Gopi Krishna Bhamidipati is a scholar of worldwide relations and a non-resident senior fellow on the Newlines Institute for Technique and Coverage in Washington, D.C. He holds a Ph.D. from Virginia Tech and makes a speciality of Center East geopolitics and India’s overseas coverage.
Picture: The White Home through Wikimedia Commons
