With the numerous Israeli and U.S. army assaults towards Iran in 2025 and early 2026, analysts have mentioned and debated Iran’s means to replenish its missile and drone arsenal. Since 2024, Iran has burned by 1000’s of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way assault drones in its retaliatory assaults towards Israel, U.S. army bases, and different targets within the area. As well as, air and missile strikes destroyed many extra Iranian missiles and drones together with their launchers. Importantly, Israeli and U.S. assaults in 2024, 2025, and particularly 2026 cumulatively triggered extreme injury to Iran’s missile and drone business in addition to its bigger protection research-industrial base. Thus, Iran’s means to replenish its arsenal of operational missiles and drones has change into an necessary subject for policymakers, intelligence analysts, army planners, and out of doors specialists.
For the reason that Israeli and U.S. militaries halted their assaults on Iran’s missile and drone industries in April 2026, there have been conflicting claims concerning the standing of Iran’s means to supply new techniques. As an example, many American and Israeli officers have claimed that Iran can not produce missiles and drones. Nevertheless, Iran’s speedy restoration after the spring 2026 battle reportedly shocked some Israeli officers and raised considerations that Iran could return to producing tons of of missiles per thirty days. For his or her half, Iranian officers have claimed that, regardless of the assaults, Iran has continued to supply and enhance missiles and drones. That is probably bluster for deterrence functions and, if something, displays Iran’s meeting of missiles from completed elements, moderately than the reconstitution of its industries and provide chains.
So, what’s the state of Iran’s missile and drone business? What are Iran’s choices for replenishing its arsenal and rebuilding its manufacturing capabilities? What challenges does Iran face in replenishing and rebuilding? Within the shorter time period, Iran can conceivably assemble new ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones — maybe tons of and even 1000’s — from its prewar stockpiles of completed elements. In the long term, Iran might want to rebuild its severely broken missile and drone industries to supply new techniques and, importantly, to make enhancements to present techniques and to develop new ones.
Affect of Israeli and U.S. Strikes on Iran’s Missile and Drone Industries
Israeli and U.S. assaults focused the manufacturing and provide chains of Iran’s missile and drone industries. In doing so, they focused each the core organizations that develop and produce missiles and drones, in addition to the important thing home suppliers and industries that help them. In line with U.S. officers, the objective was to “obliterate Iran’s missiles and drones and services that produce them” and to destroy its protection‑industrial base to “be certain that Iran can’t reconstitute the flexibility to venture energy outdoors their borders.”
In line with my evolving evaluation, the strikes from 2024 to 2026 focused greater than 40 ballistic missile business websites, virtually 20 cruise missile business websites, and greater than 20 drone business websites — plus dozens of different protection research-industrial websites that help Iran’s missile and drone manufacturing. In doing so, Israeli and U.S. army forces targeted on important “bottleneck” parts of Iran’s missile and drone industries, together with websites necessary to steerage and management, propulsion, warheads, airframes, launchers, and the ultimate meeting of missiles and drones. Israel and america additionally focused parts of Iran’s protection analysis institution, together with key universities that help the design and growth of those techniques. Moreover, they struck twin‑use industrial services producing strategic supplies corresponding to carbon fiber, metal, and aluminum.
The Israeli and U.S. campaigns severely degraded Iran’s analysis and growth, manufacturing capability, provide chains, and lengthy‑standing pursuit of self‑sufficiency. Collectively, these parts have shaped a central pillar of Iran’s uneven deterrence and warfighting technique, enabling Tehran to make use of its missiles and drones to offset the standard army superiority of Israel and america.
First, the cumulative strikes dealt a major blow to the flexibility of the Ministry of Protection and Armed Forces Logistics, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the common army (Artesh), and related organizations to conduct growth, manufacturing, and provide actions throughout Iran’s aerospace sector. The strikes severely impacted manufacturing traces for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, and, importantly, additionally degraded Iran’s means to develop new and improved missiles and drones. Thus, the strikes have considerably affected Iran’s capability to replenish its arsenal with present missile and drone sorts, in addition to its means to make technical developments and develop solely new missiles and drones. Iranian officers have highlighted efforts to extend warhead harmful energy, lengthen vary, enhance accuracy, improve maneuverability, cut back radar detection, and enhance the flexibility to defeat enemy digital warfare and air and missile defenses. The strikes have probably undermined these efforts, which Iran might want to resume to make enhancements primarily based on necessary technical and operational classes it discovered from its current wars. As well as, the destiny of Iran’s obvious program to develop an unidentified new 4,000-kilometer-range intermediate-range ballistic missile — which it utilized in an unsuccessful assault towards Diego Garcia in March 2026 — is in query. Equally, the injury has additionally impacted the Ministry of Protection and Armed Forces Logistics’ and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ bold efforts to develop house launch automobiles — a few of which might make extremely succesful long-range missiles if Tehran determined to take action.
Second, the strikes severely degraded the provision chains of home suppliers that feed elements, supplies, and manufacturing and take a look at tools to the missile and drone packages. This contains key gadgets which are “insourced” — made in-house by the core manufacturing organizations — and people which are “outsourced” to the broader community of dozens of Iranian industries, analysis facilities, and corporations. Certainly, Supreme Chief Mojtaba Khamenei just lately requested efforts and common updates on the provision chain concern from the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Pressure, which produces missiles and drones.
Third, by their cumulative affect on the event and manufacturing organizations and home provide chains, the Israeli and U.S. assaults severely undermined the self‑sufficiency of Iran’s aerospace business. For many years, Iran has sought to develop its home capabilities, enhance its self-reliance, and reduce its dependence on international suppliers, significantly on strategic, bottleneck applied sciences. Of word, Israeli and U.S. strikes focused important sectors that Iran has spent many years growing, corresponding to these concerned in producing steerage and management elements, stable rocket motors and stable propellants for ballistic missiles, turbojet and piston engines for cruise missiles and drones, explosives for warheads, and carbon fiber for composite missile airframes, to call just a few. Because of the general affect of the strikes, Iran’s dependence on international suppliers and illicit procurement networks will probably develop within the instant time period and for years to come back, with its longstanding deal with self‑sufficiency briefly given a again seat.
Iranian Choices to Replenish and Rebuild
Within the face of this intensive injury, what are Iran’s choices for replenishing its arsenal of missiles and drones and for rebuilding its manufacturing capabilities? To replenish its arsenal, Iran has three primary choices. First, it might assemble new techniques utilizing stockpiles of completed elements in underground manufacturing websites — one thing Iran is reportedly already doing — which can be performed inside underground bases of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and in an underground manufacturing web site run by the Ministry of Protection and Armed Forces Logistics.
On this approach, Iran can restock its arsenal in restricted numbers with out counting on new manufacturing from its industries and provide chains. It’s unclear what number of missiles and drones — whether or not tons of or 1000’s — Iran can construct from present stockpiles. It is usually unclear how lengthy these shares will final. In any case, assembling new missiles and drones from present stockpiles will present solely a restricted, brief‑time period repair, as these stockpiled elements will run out and Iran can’t refill them with out new manufacturing.
Second, Iran can buy full missiles and drones from international suppliers. Iran has reportedly obtained some full drones from Russia and is searching for extra superior ones. Moreover, China has reportedly agreed to offer supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. Iran might pursue ballistic missiles and different cruise missiles and drones from these two nations, or presumably from North Korea. However that is additionally solely a restricted repair, and one that doesn’t additional Iran’s conventional emphasis on self-sufficiency.
Third, and certain its longer-term choice, Iran can search to restart the event and manufacturing of latest missiles and drones utilizing newly produced elements equipped by home and international sources. Iran might want to rebuild its home organizations and provide chains and can probably pursue each home and international pathways to take action.
As a part of its home pathway, Iran has 4 primary choices to rebuild its means to develop and produce missiles and drones. First, it might restore and rebuild its present websites, though we’ve seen little proof of this occurring to this point, and Iran is probably going effectively conscious of the danger of renewed strikes on these services if Israel or america detects their resumed operation. Second, Iran can relocate important actions to safe websites. Iranian officers have claimed they moved important bottleneck tools from key services earlier than the battle and moved growth and manufacturing actions underground. Third, Iran can construct new services. Iranian officers have claimed they reconstructed services in safe places and that they have been producing missiles and dronesin websites unknown to Iran’s adversaries. On this level, it’s attainable that Iran had already constructed new websites earlier than 2026 that the open-source group has but to determine. Lastly, Iran might convert the manufacturing traces of protection and non-military industries to provide missile and drone elements, maybe much like how Basic Motors will reportedly make elements for Patriot and different missiles for the U.S. missile business. As an example, Iran may more and more faucet into firms situated inside its quite a few industrial cities scattered throughout the nation, lots of which Iran has already used as suppliers. In any case, Iran will probably try a mixture of all 4 choices to extend the resilience and reduce the vulnerabilities of its missile and drone industries shifting ahead.
One necessary distinction must be made: Rebuilding Iran’s industries and provide chains to supply ballistic missiles — and to a lesser extent, cruise missiles — will probably be a extra complicated and harmful enterprise than for drones. The services, applied sciences, and processes concerned in producing ballistic missiles are extra complicated, harmful, and have a footprint that’s more durable to cover — and to maneuver underground — than these required to supply drones. The manufacture and testing of liquid rocket engines and stable rocket motors present an necessary instance. Furthermore, Iran can rely to a better extent on industrial and dual-use elements to supply drones than it might for ballistic missiles.
As a part of its international pathway, Iran might want to procure many forms of elements, supplies, and tools from worldwide suppliers — each to outfit rebuilt or new services and to restart missile and drone manufacturing traces and growth packages. Earlier than the wars in 2025 and 2026, Iran already relied on international elements to a sure extent for its missile and drone packages, however the “demand sign” for international expertise has probably considerably elevated, pushed by the intensive injury to its core organizations and provide chains.
Transferring ahead, Iran is apt to pursue intensive procurement from China, Russia, and presumably North Korea, whereas additionally counting on illicit procurement networks to accumulate industrial and dual-use elements, supplies, and tools from Western and Asian suppliers. Along with buying full weapon techniques as famous above, Iran will most likely search full subsystems, together with engines for cruise missiles and drones; elements corresponding to steerage devices, engine elements, and digital elements; uncooked supplies, together with chemical substances for propellants and explosives, metal and aluminum alloys, and carbon fiber; and manufacturing and take a look at tools wanted to fabricate techniques, subsystems, elements, and uncooked supplies.
To spotlight one necessary side of its rebuilding efforts, Iranian program managers and provide chain managers will probably be compelled to evaluation and recreate the numerous payments of supplies which are important to this work. Every manufacturing line and growth program has its personal distinctive invoice of supplies, which is a grasp record of the tons of of elements required to make a selected missile or drone, and the precise firms (home or international) that offer them. Iranian officers might want to assess every invoice of supplies primarily based on the strike injury: What gadgets did the strikes have an effect on, particularly bottleneck applied sciences? Have been any warehouses with saved elements destroyed? Was inner manufacturing broken? What suppliers sustained injury, and when (if in any respect) can they restart manufacturing? Are different suppliers obligatory? Importantly, the strikes will drive Iranian officers to rethink “make versus purchase” selections for most of the gadgets: What will we try to make internally? What can we buy from home suppliers? What ought to we procure from international suppliers? Because of these opinions — and given extreme useful resource constraints and competing army and civilian reconstruction priorities — Iranian officers could have to make tough selections to prioritize, streamline, or curtail missile and drone manufacturing traces and growth packages. This may require reorganization of Iran’s aerospace industries and attainable merging of some key organizations and packages. For not less than the subsequent few years, officers could also be required to deal with the best‑precedence techniques — and their related applied sciences — moderately than try to revive the handfuls of pre‑battle households of missiles and drones.
Steep Challenges to Rebuilding
Iran faces important challenges to rebuilding. First, Iran will proceed to face Western commerce controls, sanctions, and interdictions designed to hinder procurement, alongside a reported Israeli covert marketing campaign concentrating on its efforts to accumulate applied sciences to revive broken manufacturing traces. It could additionally confront a renewed Israeli “marketing campaign between wars,” together with sabotage and assassinations, directed towards its aerospace business. Second, Iran might want to keep away from international detection and identification of latest services — each these concerned in growth and manufacturing in addition to suppliers of key applied sciences. Third, Iran will face critical logistical challenges and dangers of shifting important actions underground. Constructing digital and mechanical elements underground poses restricted dangers, but when Iran makes an attempt to maneuver extra hazardous actions underground — corresponding to these related to producing stable rocket motors and warheads — the hazards will probably be important. Fourth, as famous above, Iran will enhance its reliance on international suppliers, not less than for the close to time period. This will increase its vulnerability to interdicted shipments and disrupted provide chains, and intensifies the necessity to shield towards the danger of sabotaged elements. Lastly, Iran’s rebuilding efforts face the prospect of renewed Israeli or U.S. army assaults, whether or not within the type of restricted strikes to “mow the garden” or conduct “spot hits” towards important bottleneck websites, or within the type of bigger army operations. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that the menace posed by Iran’s missiles has been “distanced” however not eradicated, and that Israel would obtain its targets both by settlement or army drive. Consequently, Iran’s efforts to rebuild its missile and drone industries within the coming months and years will confront important technological, industrial, financial, logistical, intelligence, and army challenges.
Alternatives for Nonproliferation?
Within the close to time period, Iran probably has a restricted means to replenish its missile and drone arsenal, though it might additionally purchase new techniques from Russia and China. Nevertheless, in the long term, Iran faces important challenges to reestablish one thing near its prewar functionality to develop and produce missiles and drones.
These challenges to Tehran provide alternatives for the improved effectiveness of nonproliferation instruments. First, the possible, important uptick in Iran’s want for international elements, supplies, and tools — which can probably embrace many gadgets managed by multilateral and nationwide export controls — provides the chance to extend the effectiveness and “chew” of those controls to disrupt Iran’s rebuilding efforts. International locations can coordinate through the Missile Know-how Management Regime and Wassenaar Association to boost their detection and disruption of Iranian illicit procurement efforts of important gadgets. This could embrace issuing up to date and expanded watchlists of applied sciences and Iranian entities, in addition to elevated outreach to governments and corporations around the globe. Second, the alternatives for interdictions of sea shipments, particularly from China, will most likely enhance as a result of sheer amount of things, corresponding to propellant components, that Iran will presumably search from China. Third, the growth of Iranian procurement will create alternatives for elevated engagement and cooperation by diplomatic and intelligence channels with nations involved with Iran’s rebuilding, in addition to for “strategic disclosures” and sanctions that publicly expose necessary Iranian procurement efforts and actors. Iran has expanded its missile and drone industries because the Nineteen Eighties within the face of export controls, sanctions, interdictions, and different nonproliferation actions. However Tehran’s urgency, plus the sheer scope and quantity of what Iran will now probably search from international suppliers — together with delicate, managed gadgets — will increase the possibilities of these instruments being more practical at detecting and disrupting Iran’s procurement efforts now than they have been previously.
However undermining Iran’s rebuilding efforts is not going to be straightforward. Iran can conceivably depend on home firms to provide some key gadgets, in addition to its many years of expertise in conducting illicit international procurement, which it can make use of to the utmost extent within the coming months and years. Importantly, efforts to disrupt help from China, Russia, and North Korea will probably be tough. Iran has longstanding army and protection relationships with these nations, which is probably not keen to restrict or halt their cooperation with Iran. The choices to disrupt their shipments to Iran — together with these by air, rail, and through the Caspian Sea — will even face limitations.
Though assessing the timeline for Iran’s rebuilding efforts is tough, it can plausibly require a number of months to re-establish essentially the most important bottleneck parts, and not less than two to 3 years to revive its wider industrial capabilities and home provide chains to one thing resembling their prewar standing. However it is a low-confidence evaluation as a result of complexity of things concerned, such because the technical and industrial challenges Iran faces, the scope and nature of help from China, Russia, and different international suppliers, and particularly the potential nonproliferation and army actions by international actors that might undermine Iran’s efforts.
Wanting ahead, Iran will virtually actually work to revive some semblance of its prewar means to supply and enhance missiles and drones, as this is a vital pillar of deterrence and resistance towards Israel and america. Its capabilities to take action are clearly degraded, however its intentions to take action seem firmly intact; it stays to be seen whether or not Iran can overcome the numerous challenges it faces to get better and restore its earlier standing.
Jim Lamson is a senior analysis affiliate on the James Martin Heart for Nonproliferation Research and a visiting analysis fellow with the Division of Warfare Research at King’s Faculty London. Previous to that, he labored for 23 years as an analyst with the CIA. This text is predicated partly on his current report, “Israeli and US Strikes on Iran’s Aerospace Business, 2024–2026: An Preliminary Affect Evaluation and Future Outlook.”
Picture: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Pressure through Wikimedia Commons
