On Aug. 25, on the Folks’s Palace in Damascus, Mazloum Abdi introduced the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces, which he had commanded for a decade. Talking first in Arabic after which in Kurdish, he mentioned the drive had joined the Syrian military and would not function independently. 15 days earlier, Turkey’s parliament had handed a framework regulation for the disarmament of the Kurdistan Employees’ Celebration. The group has lengthy been designated as a terrorist group by the USA, the European Union, the UK, and Turkey, which have waged a brutal marketing campaign towards it for many years. Two armed organizations that Ankara had lengthy handled as a part of the identical safety downside stood down inside a fortnight.
This isn’t only a safety victory for Turkey. Additionally it is a home political victory for its president. Beneath the prevailing interpretation of Turkey’s structure, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan can run for re-election provided that the structure modifications or parliament votes to resume each presidential and parliamentary elections throughout his present time period. Article 116 requires 360 of parliament’s 600 members to help renewal. The governing events fall wanting that threshold. And the liberal Kurdish-aligned Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Celebration’s 56 deputies may provide the lacking votes.
We opened our December 2024 Struggle on the Rocks article with this Turkish saying, as Bashar al Assad’s fall appeared to present Ankara a lot of what it wished in Syria, although not with out new dangers. Above all, Assad’s fall appeared to take away the Kurdish risk to Turkey’s place in Syria. Turkey is now stronger: Ties with the brand new al Sharaa authorities in Damascus are nearer, and its regional place has improved. But the forces that produced this benefit stay fragile.
In 2024, we appropriately noticed the rising interconnection amongst worldwide, regional, and home elements. We didn’t predict, nonetheless, how rapidly these pressures would align or how decisively they’d change the steadiness. Between spring 2025 and August 2026, they strengthened each other as a result of Ankara handled the Turkish and Syrian Kurdish recordsdata as a single safety downside. That convergence produced no treaty, impartial guarantor, or constitutional safety. What emerged is a settlement of arms, not but a settlement of the Kurdish query, and it stays weak to the political and strategic volatility that made it potential.
The Arithmetic of a Third Time period
The crackdown on Turkey’s opposition and the opening to Kurdish politics belong to the identical technique. In Could, an appeals court docket annulled the management contest of the Republican Folks’s Celebration — Turkey’s storied however long-troubled predominant opposition occasion — and restored a former chief towards the needs of occasion voters. Ekrem İmamoğlu, Istanbul’s widespread and politically proficient mayor, has been imprisoned and on trial since March. In July, the occasion cut up, with 91 deputies leaving. These blows weakened the principle companion with which the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Celebration might need constructed another majority. Repression made outreach extra helpful to Erdoğan and refusal extra pricey for Kurdish politicians.
The Kurdish query has lengthy been the opposition’s “kryptonite.” The Republican Folks’s Celebration dangers accusations of negotiating with terrorists when it courts Kurdish help, nevertheless it can not assemble a governing coalition when it retreats from Kurdish calls for. The stress of 2026 turned that dilemma into dependence by weakening the occasion and narrowing the opposition’s path to energy.
Earlier makes an attempt at peace raised the recognition of the pro-Kurdish occasion whereas costing the federal government nationalist help, simply as Erdoğan wanted a parliamentary majority to create an government presidency. Negotiations threatened the constitutional undertaking they have been speculated to advance, so the federal government selected the poll field. Erdoğan as soon as once more wants Kurdish votes for a constitutional aim, however a weaker and divided opposition has reversed the motivation. The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Celebration can now assist his undertaking with out turning into the middle of a rival coalition.
Nonetheless, Erdoğan has saved his distance. Kurdish votes might assist him, however proudly owning the method may expose him to nationalist anger. This issues as a result of Erdoğan nonetheless is determined by the Nationalist Motion Celebration: Its chairman, Devlet Bahçeli, can open the political house for negotiations, however Erdoğan’s private possession of Kurdish concessions may pressure the coalition and alienate the nationalist voters sustaining it. Laws provides the concessions state authority with out making the president their private guarantor, leaving him room to retreat if the political value rises. That distance additionally hides a coverage divide. June polling confirmed that 68 p.c of Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Celebration voters opposed a continued Turkish navy presence in Syria, in contrast with 38.2 p.c nationally. However they might nonetheless come to an settlement — not one based mostly on a shared imaginative and prescient for the nation and its folks, however on fast political pursuits.
A Partnership That Ended on Schedule
Washington started working with Kurdish-led forces in northeastern Syria in 2014, and the Syrian Democratic Forces turned its principal native companion after its formation in 2015. This partnership had one said goal: defeating the Islamic State. However on account of its connection to the Kurdistan Employees’ Celebration, Turkey was deeply against the partnership and launched successive navy campaigns towards Kurdish forces in northern Syria. Nonetheless, a decade of cooperation between Syria’s Kurds and Washington gave it a wider political that means. The Syrian Democratic Forces’ battlefield report made the Kurdish-led system in northeastern Syria, which they name Rojava, a world trigger. European supporters embraced its claims to native democracy and girls’s participation, and the European Parliament was nonetheless urgent for Kurdish rights in February 2026. That help raised hopes about what the partnership may protect, nevertheless it by no means turned a safety assure. When Washington judged the mission full, American forces left Syria in April. On Aug. 24, the USA rescinded Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, marking an extra flip towards the brand new central authorities in Damascus.
Abdi had understood the bounds of the partnership for years. In a January 2022 interview, he objected to Washington tying its dedication to the navy defeat of the Islamic State and argued that American forces ought to stay till a political settlement was reached. His grievance revealed the issue: He wished a counter-terrorism partnership to turn into a political assure. Abdullah Öcalan’s February 2025 enchantment for disarmament then provided a path away from armed wrestle that Abdi used to hunt phrases with Damascus. When preventing threatened northeastern Syria in January 2026, Öcalan urged Kurdish leaders to mix resistance with diplomacy and maintain the combination settlement alive.
Many Kurds skilled the American withdrawal as abandonment, and for good purpose. However Washington’s departure narrowed their selections with out making these selections for them. With Öcalan pushing a political course, Abdi exchanged an uncovered navy place for an unsure function inside Syrian establishments. Kurdish politics in Syria moved from defending territory beneath an American umbrella to bargaining over native authority, constitutional rights, and illustration in Damascus. America had by no means promised to protect Kurdish autonomy, however its presence had allowed the Syrian Democratic Forces to barter as if such a promise existed. Nothing comparable remained after the troops left.
Syria strengthened the distinction. From 2013 to 2015, Syrian Kurdish forces gained standing in Washington and European capitals via their combat towards the Islamic State. Kurdish actors in Turkey believed that success strengthened their hand, whereas the siege of Kobani in September 2014 introduced the Syrian warfare into Turkish politics and deepened distrust. Syria then expanded Kurdish choices. The American withdrawal and dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces have now narrowed them.
A Window That Closed
In December 2024, we anticipated regional dysfunction to lift the strategic worth of Kurdish actors. The warfare with Iran partly confirmed that judgment. After American and Israeli strikes started in early 2026, Iranian Kurdish armed teams based mostly in Iraq provided Washington one thing Iran’s exiled opposition lacked: organized networks spanning Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The teams attracted American curiosity as a potential floor element towards Tehran, however that curiosity by no means turned the sustained backing wanted to supply political leverage.
The Trump administration mentioned operations in western Iran with Iranian Kurdish teams and requested Iraqi Kurdish leaders to assist them cross the border. Kurdish leaders in Iraq resisted. They feared Iranian retaliation and didn’t wish to enter a floor warfare. Turkish officers additionally contacted Kurdish leaders and reportedly pressured U.S. officers to discourage an intervention. By March 7, Trump was telling Kurdish forces to remain out, and Iran’s overseas minister later credited Ankara with serving to stop a brand new entrance. The episode confirmed that Kurdish strategic worth had risen. It additionally confirmed how rapidly Kurdish warning and Turkish diplomacy may restrict it.
Army change narrowed the chance additional. Guerrilla forces as soon as used terrain, concealment, and time to outlast stronger states. Drones, surveillance, and precision weapons have weakened that mannequin. Turkey spent a decade utilizing these instruments towards the Kurdistan Employees’ Celebration in Iraq and Syria, limiting its skill to cover and regroup. Ankara additionally acted to stop overseas curiosity in Kurdish forces from turning into a long-lasting relationship or fostering a Rojava-like entity in Iranian Kurdistan. Its engagement with Öcalan and its stress on the Syrian file narrowed that risk earlier than one other disaster may widen it.
Seen in hindsight, Öcalan and Erdoğan’s coalition companion, Devlet Bahçeli, had already acknowledged that the identical shift was occurring. Öcalan declared that armed wrestle had run its course, whereas Bahçeli provided an olive department to Kurds in Turkey and past. Their initiatives got here from completely different positions however collectively opened a political channel at a second of strategic stress.
Dysfunction raised Kurdish strategic worth, however Turkey helped stop that worth from turning into sturdy leverage. By the point Bahçeli opened a political channel at dwelling, Ankara had diminished the regional alternate options accessible to Kurdish actors. The regional stress and the home arithmetic have been starting to strengthen each other.
The Final Authority of Abdullah Öcalan
Turkey’s restricted amnesty turned this alignment into an end result by tying the Turkish and Syrian tracks collectively. It takes impact solely after the Kurdistan Employees’ Celebration and all affiliated organizations finish their actions, dissolve, and give up their weapons. Turkish safety establishments should confirm compliance earlier than the Nationwide Safety Council prompts the regulation. By together with affiliated organizations, parliament tied the destiny of the Syrian Democratic Forces to the return of fighters from Turkey. The hyperlink entered regulation on Aug. 10, 15 days earlier than Abdi introduced the dissolution in Damascus.
The regulation outlined compliance, however Öcalan’s intervention made that compressed schedule potential. His authority over commanders who had served with him in Syria earlier than his expulsion in 1998 allowed him to transfer Kurdish leaders towards a standard course after many years in jail. The political opening in Turkey and navy integration in Syria may then transfer collectively. But that is additionally a weak spot: His authority is private, finite, and can’t go robotically to a successor or an establishment.
The regulation nonetheless excludes Öcalan from the association he helped make potential. Folks serving life sentences for offenses dedicated earlier than 2005 stay outdoors its scope, so his launch stays a requirement of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Celebration moderately than a time period of the settlement. His February 2025 enchantment had already renounced separate nation-states, federations, administrative autonomy, and “culturalist options.” He narrowed the Kurdistan Employees’ Celebration’s goals earlier than the regulation gave him a private or institutional stake within the end result.
Öcalan additionally operated inside limits set by Turkey’s affect over Damascus. Ankara formed what President Ahmed al Sharaa would concede. Kurdish leaders gained positions contained in the Syrian state and cultural rights, however they didn’t protect the establishments via which that they had ruled. The settlement changed a parallel Kurdish-led order with a wrestle for affect inside a centralized state. Turkish energy set its outer limits.
But neither Öcalan nor Abdi speaks for a single Kurdish constituency. The Kurdish Nationwide Council joined the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Democratic Union Celebration on a frequent platform solely in April 2025, however the settlement didn’t place the council beneath Abdi’s command. Nor did dissolution erase divisions throughout the Syrian Democratic Forces: Arab tribal defections contributed to the January collapse, whereas the Ladies’s Safety Items resisted shedding their separate standing. The combined response within the northeast confirmed that Abdi may dissolve a command with out settling how these constituencies could be represented.
Northern Iraq additionally stays a part of the method. A lot of the Kurdistan Employees’ Celebration’s armed presence lies there, and the first symbolic disarmament close to Sulaymaniyah introduced collectively Turkish intelligence, the Kurdistan Regional Authorities, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Celebration. Nechirvan Barzani additionally mediated between Abdi and Damascus. Verification subsequently is determined by cooperation from each Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. If both withdraws, Öcalan’s name and Ankara’s regulation might not set up whether or not disarmament has occurred.
These divisions don’t change the principle Kurdish demand. After withdrawing fighters in late 2013, the Kurdistan Employees’ Celebration sought constitutional rights that no authorities may reverse. In August 2026, it once more referred to as the framework solely a primary step towards constitutional safety. Ankara has additionally saved its previous body. Earlier laws was referred to as the Regulation to Finish Terror and Strengthen Social Integration. At present’s measure is the Regulation on Strengthening Nationwide Solidarity and Social Integration. Each legal guidelines combine an armed motion with out settling the constitutional standing of Kurdish rights.
The comparability with 2015 exhibits why ripeness doesn’t final. Home and exterior pressures can carry actors collectively after which pull them aside when the steadiness shifts. The current convergence is actual, nevertheless it stays a positive second moderately than an achievement that may survive the situations that created it.
What the Settlements Nonetheless Lack
Turkey’s association stays conditional. The regulation suspends sentences for probationary durations of 5–10 years and locations investigations in abeyance, however solely after the Nationwide Safety Council publishes a verification discovering, anticipated following its October assembly. Turkish safety establishments determine whether or not disarmament has occurred, and the council decides when the advantages start. The state is each a celebration to the method and its choose.
Syria made extra seen concessions. Damascus granted citizenship to Kurds left stateless by the Baath regime, allowed Kurdish-language educating, and promised senior state roles to Kurdish leaders, together with Ilham Ahmed. These good points matter, particularly when January might need resulted in a wider warfare. But in addition they present the phrases of the compromise: Damascus changed collective autonomy with particular person workplaces and rights granted from the middle. No structure but makes these rights binding.
That hole issues as a result of the Syrian state has not proven that it will possibly defend minorities. Mob assaults and reprisals proceed, perpetrators seldom face fees, and the brand new safety providers stay largely Sunni. Minority recruits usually fill administrative or unarmed roles. A authorities that can’t but defend Alawites, Druze, and Christians can not safe Kurdish rights via decrees alone.
The absence of an out of doors guarantor leaves each tracks weak. Kurdish representatives sought third-party involvement in the course of the earlier Turkish peace talks, however Ankara rejected even the monitoring fee mentioned at Dolmabahçe in 2015. At present, a vp chairs the Turkish board, 4 working teams handle implementation, safety our bodies confirm compliance, and a council chaired by the president makes the ultimate choice. Damascus likewise controls its constitutional course of and the implementation of its personal decrees. Each settlements, subsequently, ask the occasion granting rights to certify that it has honored them.
Syria’s constitutional course of will determine whether or not the settlement lasts. It could possibly flip appointments and decrees into rights that survive the pursuits behind them. American stress for such protections will create friction with Ankara, which opposes a separate Kurdish armed command and territorial autonomy in Syria. But equal citizenship, Kurdish-language schooling, political participation, and elected native administration can match throughout the unitary Syrian state that each Washington and Ankara help. The disagreement is actual, however narrower than a dispute over autonomy.
Washington ought to outline enforceable protections in institutional phrases. Syria’s structure ought to defend equal citizenship, Kurdish-language schooling, political participation, and elected native administration. Implementing legal guidelines ought to set deadlines, budgets, and avenues for enchantment. Most broad American leverage has already been spent: Complete sanctions ended in July 2025, Congress repealed the Caesar Act in December 2025, and Washington rescinded Syria’s terrorism designation in August 2026. Waiver authorities tied to that designation have additionally misplaced a lot of their worth. What stays consists of focused sanctions, licenses for managed exports, and American affect over the World Financial institution and donor financing. Initiatives that strengthen central ministries, the safety sector, or state monetary establishments ought to proceed in levels tied to public implementation benchmarks.
Reporting needn’t rely on Damascus. The Fiscal 12 months 2026 protection regulation already requires an unclassified presidential report each 180 days for 4 years on minority rights and implementation of the March 2025 settlement. The State Division ought to draw on U.N. human rights our bodies, Syrian civil society, the Kurdish Nationwide Council, and Arab and Kurdish native representatives, and publish the proof in an annex. Damascus might contribute, nevertheless it shouldn’t certify its personal compliance.
The Turkish monitor gives outsiders much less leverage. Washington can not situation a home amnesty regulation, and visual American sponsorship may reinforce Ankara’s declare that Kurdish politics are directed from overseas. The safeguards should subsequently be created inside Turkey: Parliament ought to publish verification standards earlier than advantages start, present judicial overview, add cross-party and civil-society participation to monitoring, and concern common implementation studies. Verification in northern Iraq ought to embrace authorities in each Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. America and European governments can press for these measures privately and help impartial documentation, however they can not substitute for a guarantor that Ankara refuses to just accept.
One other Turkish saying holds that “with persistence, the bitter grape turns into candy halva.” Persistence helped produce the agreements now taking form on either side of the border, however political selections haven’t but been secured via regulation. Home, regional, and worldwide pursuits now level in the identical path. They’ve modified Turkey and Syria. Nonetheless, they haven’t but produced peace. Till regulation and establishments can maintain the settlement collectively when these pursuits shift, ripeness will stay a situation moderately than an achievement.
Riccardo Gasco is a overseas coverage program coordinator on the IstanPol Institute in Istanbul and a Ph.D. researcher on the College of Bologna. He has greater than 9 years of analysis and fieldwork expertise in Turkey. His analysis focuses on Turkey’s overseas coverage and its strategic relations with Europe. He has revealed on Turkish overseas coverage, home politics, the Kurdish concern, Turkish-E.U. relations, the Center East, and trans-Atlantic relations.
Samuele C. A. Abrami, Ph.D., is a researcher on the Barcelona Centre for Worldwide Affairs. He was a Mercator-Istanbul Coverage Heart fellow. He holds a Ph.D. from the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan, the place he lectures within the ASERI grasp’s program in Center Japanese Research. Moreover Turkey’s insurance policies, his analysis focuses on the Kurdish query and broader points connecting European and larger Mediterranean (geo)political dynamics.
Picture: kremlin.ru through Wikimedia Commons
