Operation Vivaldi, a Ukrainian navy effort to repel Russian forces within the Donbas, has executed rather more than push again Moscow’s offensive within the area. The operation is credited with the liberation of dozens of sq. miles of as soon as Russian held territory due to its mastermind use of drones and robotics on the battlefield. The operation has additionally ignited a firestorm of debate over the way forward for warfare and the human function. What follows is unbiased evaluation of Operation Vivaldi by two Cipher Temporary contributors who’re actively engaged within the area.
INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS – Some Western commentators have steered that Ukraine’s profitable restricted counteroffensive, Operation Vivaldi, by the third Military Corps (3AC) has demonstrated the continued relevance of human maneuver within the face of drone expertise, downplaying the ascendancy of drone warfare. The truth is, Operation Vivaldi demonstrates simply the other: the inexorable erosion of the usefulness of people in direct contact with the enemy.
Whereas remoted movies on social media could also be discovered of direct fires exchanged between small parts of people through the ongoing counteroffensive, the majority of OSINT footage, in addition to feedback from Ukrainian commanders and troopers, signifies {that a} new, systematic doctrine for using UGVs (unmanned floor automobiles) has been important to operational success, and that people typically advance solely into lower-risk areas within the wake of waves of ground-drone advances.
The important thing to this doctrine is a fusion of traditional American warfighting rules (taught to Ukrainians) with new techniques, strategies, and procedures (TTPs), along with a recognition of the altering spatial dimensions of contemporary warfare. In Operation Vivaldi, the aforementioned TTPs notably included using air-dropped UGVs to strike Russian positions, sow chaos behind enemy traces, take and maintain floor, and clear lanes by means of minefields forward of human advances.
In accordance to “Darwin,” commander of the 2nd Mechanized Battalion of the 3AC, Russian troopers and drones have been suppressed by artillery, strike drones, and digital warfare to be able to forestall them from noticing evening flights of repurposed heavy bomber drones carrying UGVs as much as 19 kilometers deep into Russian traces. Some air-dropped UGVs with bombs struck Russian positions, whereas different UGVs with small arms would take and maintain floor, typically killing and typically capturing the enemy within the course of. Solely then would people incrementally advance: “We go ahead, making a protection line, then ready till artillery, flying drones and robots do their work, after which go in once more.”
His males nonetheless solely did this in small teams, with no restoration of enormous simultaneous human maneuver: “If earlier than we moved with massive battalion teams with mechanized forces, now we should always use solely small teams due to drones.” Whereas this new sample is presently solely reported in use by 3AC, Darwin “mentioned his corps was already educating it to different brigades,” however famous that it required “a command construction ‘certified sufficient as we’re’ to run an operation with that many shifting components.”
However Ukraine nonetheless wanted to degrade Russian operations earlier than making an attempt to advance. Moreover using kinetic strikes, Ukrainian forces additionally deployed an digital warfare “curtain” over components of the battlefield, masking some Ukrainian actions and stopping Russian reconnaissance drones from working. Based on the Third Military Corps, its complete “Defensive Dome” eradicated round 20,000 Russian drones through the operation, together with by way of using interceptor drones, releasing Ukrainian armor to conduct mechanized assaults.
“Makar,” commander of the UGV unit “NG13” of the third Separate Assault Brigade of the 3AC, says that air-dropped UGVs have been used for months by his unit as “a part of a scientific strategy to sabotage operations, as such missions are geared toward eliminating the enemy deep behind their traces and in hideouts, capturing enemy pilots, disrupting logistics, and so forth.” Whereas the air-dropping approach itself could also be a brief novelty, the systematic large-scale use of UGVs forward of people could result in a scenario that he says “modifications the foundations of warfare.”
Makar continues: “We’re growing a world doctrine for using UGVs… by the top of 2026, we’ll perform plenty of loopy operations the world… can’t even think about are doable.” Concerning the navy construction required, he mentions “robust coordination between the items we work with on these missions” and “the work of the workshop, planning group, command employees, and operators on obligation.” He additionally notes the actual usefulness of UGVs–typically geared up with Starlink, exhausting to note by the enemy, and never restricted by station time like unmanned aerial automobiles (UAVs)–in enemy-held areas “the place now we have restricted commentary, restricted FPV vary, restricted working distances, or the place the enemy has robust air protection groups.”
Russian infantry has seen some success with infiltration techniques, in a position to slip by means of gaps within the skinny Ukrainian traces singly or in pairs, because of the Russian tolerance for horrific casualties amongst such drone fodder.
Ukrainian UGVs, which needn’t be conserved like people, at the moment are performing comparable infiltration missions towards the Russians, however at even higher depth and sowing even higher disruption. “A UGV armed with a machine gun might be extra intimidating than an infantryman in lots of conditions,” Obi, a soldier from Ukraine’s third Particular Operations Regiment, instructed the authors.
Makar described how in a single episode, a single UGV triggered disproportionate chaos: “They have been freaking out over the radio, ‘A toy automobile flew in, then drove round, after which exploded…’ Properly, their command doesn’t imagine them, all hell breaks free, and motion alongside that logistics route is straight away banned. All positions have been positioned on full fight alert… There have been many occasions once they mentioned, ‘No, we gained’t go there as a result of it’s unclear what’s occurring there,’ and so forth.” In one other episode, “a single small UGV, airdropped a long way away, eradicated one enemy soldier and consequently, a full-scale enemy assault they’d been planning for days, if not weeks, was known as off.”
Lastly, Makar particularly refers to UGVs as a form of alternative for infantry, saying: “Paratroopers used to drop from planes. Now UGVs are dropped from heavy bombers… I want to tackle all of the commanders… Emphasize floor robotic complexes… as a result of robots don’t bleed, and human life is priceless.” Nonetheless, though they aren’t priceless like people, drones want safety too: throughout Operation Vivaldi, comparatively expendable UAVs have been used to scout forward of and escort UGVs.
Dmytro, a soldier with Ukraine’s Third Separate Assault Brigade, instructed the authors that drones and floor robots play a key function in supporting the infantry and in addition take away people from a few of the most harmful duties. “There are additionally many strike floor robots that drive in and destroy enemy shelters, killing the personnel inside,” he mentioned. Some robots are supposed to interact in assault operations, whereas others are despatched behind enemy traces to conduct ambushes.
Moreover, as Ukrainian infantry and drone operators transfer ahead, floor robots deal with a lot of the logistics. “Floor robots make all types of deliveries to positions, together with provides for drone crews,” mentioned Dmytro. “They ship ammunition to artillery positions and provides to the entrance line, and so they perform many evacuations.” The truth is, 80% of tactical logistics and 90% of casualty evacuations throughout Operation Vivaldi have been executed by UGVs.
Former American soldier “Jackie,” who volunteered to serve with and advise 3AC, emphasizes that the American fashion of warfighting and command tradition is important to the mixing of the rising doctrine and new applied sciences seen in Operation Vivaldi.
“That’s been my job primarily is putting in Western mission command belief and initiative.” Such ideas are embraced by 3AC, however don’t work in any respect for Russians: “It wouldn’t matter if I gave [them] an ideal lecture on Western Mission Command as a result of they’re asking their guys to go die for nothing consistently… you possibly can’t have initiative and belief in that setting… they misreport and so they lie on a regular basis.”
The efficient navy tradition along with scaled drone use has resulted in three Russian subject armies being pushed again by the a lot smaller 3AC, which persistently achieves an astonishingly favorable alternate ratio of 20:1 towards the Russians (a declare backed up by OSINT in addition to Ukraine’s battle “factors” awarded in keeping with provable kills, wherein 3AC is normally main when in comparison with different Ukrainian items).
Jackie factors out, nonetheless, that Ukrainians have superior previous legacy doctrine and that Western commanders and planners want a suggestions loop with folks on the bottom to maintain up with what’s taking place: “We’ve all been doing this for 4 and a half years. We’re tremendous skilled now. The operational planners who did this are elite. Typically you get a graduate of some warfare school someplace with two pumps within the Center East that claims ‘I do know all the pieces about warfare and the Ukrainians ought to do that and that’… if you wish to study one thing by the best way you truly should take part on this struggle. And I’m making an attempt to consistently give out calls to Western forces… to return over right here and do some work with us.”
“The idea of battle for the Ukrainians is absolutely good. In order that they have a strategic deep strike marketing campaign that’s punishing the Russian financial system. On the operational degree now we have the midstrike marketing campaign” concentrating on Russian logistics, “forcing them to should vacate” their ahead positions because of the extension of the grey zone. He provides: “The bottom sport is absolutely vital. If we lose the fortress belt, there won’t be time for the midstrike marketing campaign to tug Russians again. There won’t be time to proceed to do harm on the deep strike marketing campaign and make the political actors in Russia pay.”
One new aspect of Ukrainian doctrine Jackie mentions is the necessity for standoff. 3AC maintains “management of floor house that permits us to proceed to intercept Russian drones overhead. Russians aren’t in a position to get rocket artillery and different mass fires in vary of town of Izium.”
He says, “There is no such thing as a contact line. There’s like a contact zone and that zone is 30 km throughout.” He emphasizes that this contact zone or “grey zone” will not be a confused or messy jumble on the bottom; Ukrainian commanders know the place their males are positioned. However on this zone, human maneuver and logistics are severely constrained.
Dmytro mentioned that Ukrainian forces tried to bypass wooded areas and reduce off Russian logistics, as an alternative of sending infantry first. Ukrainian forces additionally continued capturing down the bigger drones the Russians have been utilizing for resupply, which had a crippling impact on morale. “The enemy infantry begins to really feel that nobody wants them and that no assist or help is coming,” he mentioned. “Their morale turns into very low, and we make progress. Then they give up or begin fleeing.”
The precept behind the aforementioned infiltration techniques applies additionally to the enemy’s protection, as Jackie explains: “The place there’s simply Russians far and wide that no person cares about, and clearing them out is a ache… Driving a column throughout the grey zone will not be an choice to make an assault. That’s undoubtedly not what we did for Vivaldi. So we had the bottom drones on logistics, but in addition assault floor drones that have been being air dropped behind the Russian line after which isolating and both fixing or destroying in lots of circumstances these remoted pockets of Russians on protection.”
UGVs are additionally simpler on this function than UAVs as a result of “The Russians are going to should struggle that drone for a time period. They’re going to should useful resource Russian effectors to help the Russian struggle towards that drone. So in that native space that is creating … large chaos for no matter firm’s space that drone received dropped into… they’re going to completely miss the infantry assault that’s truly approaching and being formed in the direction of them… a few of these floor drop drones have been technically like aims for assault items to go and help… It provides all people a variety of confidence on the assault to know that we have already got a pleasant power within the native space and so all people will get shifting sooner as effectively.”
Jackie says that the soldier’s major weapon is turning into the drone, and his pistol (secondary weapon) is being changed by the shotgun for defensive use towards drones. But he concedes that “there’s just one job within the navy and that’s infantry. Nothing has modified about that. For all of the drones… [What matters is] the bottom sport proper in entrance of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk with these squaddies.” However clearly, from all the opposite quotes above, we are able to collect that the character of the infantryman’s work is quickly reworking into one thing totally completely different from closing with and destroying different infantry with rifle fireplace and grenades.Subsequently Jackie’s level is taken to be that people and the bottom they occupy stay the last word tactical goal of the drones that more and more occupy the buffer zone between them and the enemy’s ahead line of people.
Making use of this notion again to the bigger operational idea, we are able to say that mixed unmanned-systems warfare, along with superior mission command and a correct navy tradition primarily based on initiative and belief, can enable unmanned techniques to maneuver by means of the enemy’s tactical depth earlier than human forces ever advance into the resultant pre-cleared areas.
Take it from the third Military Corps: “Infantry wins wars, however we shield our infantry, which is why the robots go to the enemy first.”
For deeper dives from Xen, you possibly can comply with him on X, Substack, or his private web site.
David Kirichenko is a Ukrainian-American freelance journalist who has been overlaying Russia’s full-scale warfare towards Ukraine since 2022, and is an affiliate analysis fellow on the Henry Jackson Society. He might be discovered on X: @DVKirichenko.
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