To maintain future maritime operations, the usmilitary might want to run provides by means of an atmosphere that spans 1000’s of miles of open ocean, denied ports, contested straits, and archipelagic chokepoints in opposition to adversaries which have spent many years learning easy methods to goal American logistics. That drawback doesn’t require one equivalent vessel for each mission. It does require a extra widespread household of watercraft for the manned ships that carry cargo and automobiles inside a theater, constructed for scale, interoperability, and wartime alternative. Getting this proper is arguably a very powerful acquisition drawback the joint power faces within the subsequent decade.
To date, the Military’s response has been separate intra-theater sustainment vessel efforts within the Pacific and the Atlantic, neither coordinated with one another nor with the Maritime Coaching Division at Fort Eustis, nor nested inside a coherent doctrine for sustaining a excessive attrition battle. Earlier than the Military proceeds additional with its present watercraft procurement, Congress ought to require a proper evaluation of whether or not a bigger variant of the industrial touchdown ship design already chosen by the Navy and Marine Corps can fulfill sufficient of the Military’s necessities to justify a typical hull. If that’s the case, the joint power ought to consolidate round that household.
The Proliferation Downside
The Military is growing the Maneuver Help Vessel (Mild) to switch its 9 Touchdown Craft Mechanized-8 “Mike Boats,” which first noticed service in Vietnam. The Mike Boat can carry 60 tons of cargo, sufficient for an M60 Patton tank, however not sufficient for an Abrams. The brand new watercraft will price $63.1 million apiece, with a complete program price of $1 billion. There are solely 13 hulls deliberate — reduce from the unique plan of 36, every able to hauling 82 tons. That is sufficient for a single M1 Abrams tank — though the 73.6-ton M1A2 SEPv3 doesn’t depart a lot room for anything, like gas, ammunition, or troopers, or 4 Mild Medium Tactical Autos, or 45 personnel.
The Military is concurrently growing the Maneuver Help Vessel (Heavy) to switch its 4,199-ton Gen. Frank S. Besson-class Logistics Help Vessels as they age out between 2028 and 2038, with no agency manufacturing numbers, no design chosen, and no fielding timeline but. The Navy and Marine Corps spent years and appreciable cash trying to design a bespoke medium touchdown ship from scratch. They deserted that effort in late 2024 when business bids far overran funds. In December 2025, they chose the Damen Touchdown Ship Transport-100 design. The ensuing program has since been designated the McClung-class, with an preliminary plan to construct 18–35 hulls.
The Navy/Marine Corps-selected Damen design is similar industrial off-the-shelf design the Australians chosen for their very own eight-ship Touchdown Craft Heavy program, in addition to the Nigerian Navy. In its 100-meter (328-foot) kind, the Damen ship is reported to hold over 500 tons of cargo in 1020 sq. meters of roll-on-roll-off area at 15 knots. The design could be transformed into a bigger 120-meter (393-foot) variant by including a 20-meter (65-foot) modular block throughout building, which makes it extremely related to the Military’s heavy carry requirement.
On the identical time, the Navy is pursuing drone floor vessels, first framed below Challenge Replicator as strike and intelligence platforms and now being tailored partially for logistics. The Military can be exploring an Autonomous Resupply Car supposed to maneuver at the very least two 20-foot containers over a 1,600-nautical-mile spherical journey in sea states 4 by means of six. These drone techniques matter to the broader sustainment image, however they don’t match the widespread hull query as neatly because the manned touchdown ships do. They’re higher understood as a associated standardization and assist drawback than as a part of the identical hull household resolution.
The result’s a rising set of ships with totally different manning ideas, upkeep calls for, and assist chains.
Throughout the identical interval, the Military watercraft fleet’s mission-capable charge fell from about 75 % in 2020 to 35 % in 2024. The Logistics Help Vessels and Utility Touchdown Craft are, on common, greater than three many years outdated. As of Might 2024, one vessel had been out of service for greater than 5 years.
These ships don’t all carry out the identical mission, however the distinctions are narrower than the Military might counsel. The clearest overlap is within the manned vessels designed to maneuver cargo and automobiles in theater to austere shore websites. The Military’s deliberate Maneuver Help Vessel (Heavy) and the Navy/Marine Corps McClung-class touchdown ship each function in that area. The industrial Damen design might fulfill sufficient of the Military’s necessities in carry, velocity, and shore entry to justify a typical hull, however that case has but to be formally examined.
An unclassified October 2023 government abstract reported that Military Futures Command analyzed whether or not the Military ought to proceed improvement of its personal heavy watercraft or pursue joint improvement of the Navy’s bespoke medium vessels. This evaluation said that the Navy’s design was not an appropriate alternative for the Military’s design resulting from its smaller dimension and slower velocity compared to the Military’s deliberate heavy watercraft. This choice was made two years earlier than the Navy and Marines switched to the industrial Damen Touchdown Ship Transport-100 and evaluated a special vessel.
The 120-meter Damen variant just isn’t the 100-meter ship the Navy chosen. It’s a bigger member of the identical industrial household, and one which has not but been formally evaluated in opposition to the Military’s said requirement.
The said necessities for the Military’s heavy watercraft are for a size of 400 toes and a velocity of 18 knots whereas carrying as much as 175 troopers and their tools to shore. The 120-meter Damen variant is reported to hold 1,500 sq. meters of roll-on-roll-off cargo, sufficient for 80 mild/medium automobiles and 400 troops, at a laden velocity of 14.5 knots.
No printed unit price exists for the Military’s heavy watercraft. The Navy/Marine Corps program’s failure to fulfill funds targets earlier than switching to a industrial design means that bespoke army shipbuilding carries important price danger.
Value estimates for the Damen-based medium touchdown ship additionally differ broadly. Navy figures have put the determine close to $155 million per hull as soon as manufacturing efficiencies set in, whereas the Congressional Finances Workplace has estimated a spread of $350–$430 million per hull. 25 ships at these figures would price about $3.9 billion on the low finish and roughly $8.5–10.7 billion on the larger finish.
This case rests on the comparative declare that even on the larger estimate, a commercial-derived widespread hull should show extra reasonably priced and extra sensible than a separate Military design. Because the Military has not but printed a price estimate, this must be examined fairly than assumed.
It is very important observe that in Military watercraft doctrine, said vessel speeds serve primarily as theoretical planning components for Time-Phased Pressure Deployment Information fairly than arduous operational ensures. A slower craft could be merely compensated for by including extra hulls to the equation. However, whether or not the velocity shortfall is operationally disqualifying is precisely the query {that a} formal hull household evaluation ought to reply.
Modification of the 100-meter hull into the 120-meter variant additionally carries danger. The case for a typical hull is strongest when it depends on a minimally modified industrial design. The extra the Military’s heavy watercraft requirement pushes the Damen household towards a bigger, sooner, or in any other case extra specialised configuration, the extra this system begins to recreate the spiraling price and divergence that has doomed joint packages previously. Including a 20-meter modular block could also be a comparatively easy adaptation, or it could additionally show to be the purpose at which a typical hull stops being widespread. That’s another excuse why a hull household evaluation needs to be directed.
The Forces Command watercraft fall below U.S. Military Western Hemisphere Command as of December 2025. 25 Damen touchdown ships might change the growing old 120-meter Logistics Help Vessels and 100-meter Touchdown Craft Utilities for all Military instructions.
The Sherman Lesson
The US constructed 49,234 Sherman tanks between 1942 and 1945. Throughout that very same time, Germany constructed roughly 6,000 Panthers. The Panther was technically superior in a number of measurable classes —acknowledging, with out endorsing, the corpus of vigorously researched scholarship produced by the Struggle Thunder group on this exact query — and it didn’t matter. Germany couldn’t produce, crew, preserve, or change Panthers on the charge the battle consumed them. America’s benefit lay in scale and standardization.
For a maritime sustainment analogy, think about the common-or-garden Liberty ship. Between 1941 and 1945, 2,710 hulls had been constructed throughout 18 shipyards — a mean of three each two days — utilizing a industrial design primarily based on the Ocean-class freighter. This isn’t to say that the U.S. shipbuilding base can reproduce that feat on command, however that leveraging such pre-existing designs permits industrial capability to be surged into wartime output.
As Lt. Gen. Karl Gingrich said whereas serving because the Military’s deputy chief of workers for packages, the joint power should look to industrial options. That commentary shapes our advice right here. A standard hull household won’t recreate the economic circumstances of 1943, and it’ll not by itself resolve the scarcity of shipyard capability or expert employees. Its benefit is that it will increase manufacturing effectivity by decreasing the variety of designs that present yards should assist. Business designs can also develop the pool of yards in a position to contribute exterior the yards in Wisconsin and Mississippi presently contracted to construct the Navy/Marine Corps design, however the stronger case is interchangeability, not a miraculous surge in output.
In a protracted excessive attrition peer battle, manufacturing and interoperability are extra decisive than exquisiteness. The deployment of the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system to Gaza and the wars in Ukraine and Iran have additional pushed the purpose residence: The joint power doesn’t have sufficient sustainment capability.
Transformation in Contact
There’s a cultural drawback right here. The U.S. Military presently equates seen transformation with lethality. A plethora of recent packages alerts institutional seriousness. Stuffing autonomy into logistics nodes, rebranding command architectures, pursuing drone vessel ideas, and standing up new instructions with new patches all sign that the establishment is taking the Chinese language risk severely. In apply, this outlook favors novel platforms over much less glamorous transport ships. It has not but produced combat-ready hulls for the Military on the quantity that it wants for steady-state operations, not to mention supported distributed fires within the South China Sea. Sustainment, because it so typically is within the American army, is an afterthought.
Within the late 2000s, the Military and Navy codeveloped a catamaran-hulled watercraft dubbed the Joint Excessive Pace Car to switch their Mike Boats. In 2010, the Military reasoned that it didn’t want watercraft and gave its share of boats over to the Navy, which dubbed them the Spearhead-class Expeditionary Quick Transport.
The Military’s newest mild maneuver assist vessel prototype broke down en route to Camp Pendleton in early 2024 and needed to be towed again to Newport Information. It then spent practically a 12 months in restore — together with a $200,000 cooling system repair — as a result of the Military nonetheless lacks international upkeep assist for its watercraft. After exercising the 82-ton craft round Hawaii, the choice was made to proceed improvement. The joint power is including new hull varieties sooner than it’s constructing the upkeep and assist structure to maintain them working.
The Navy’s shift to a commercial-derived touchdown ship reveals extra flexibility. Naval Sea Methods Command chosen an off-the-shelf hull already being purchased and operated by allied international locations, and assessed it as coming very near the unique functionality requirement. The Navy and Marine Corps additionally intend to make use of a typical manufacturing commonplace set of upkeep and manufacturing tools, geared in direction of assembly upkeep and readiness targets.
The Silo Downside
Every combatant command and repair recognized an actual requirement and pursued it by means of its personal acquisition lane. U.S. Pacific Command necessities drove Military watercraft modernization by means of the Program Govt Workplace for Fight Help and Fight Service Help. Pressure Design 2030 drove the Marine Corps’ demand for a littoral connector. The Navy’s drone strike and reconnaissance packages are actually being retrofitted for sustainment. Western Hemisphere Command’s maritime sustainment necessities for the Caribbean and Arctic areas should not built-in into any of the above.
Secretary Hegseth has referred to as for a extra joint-qualified power within the pursuits of warfighting readiness. The watercraft proliferation drawback is a case examine in how siloed acquisition damages that readiness. Left alone, every service buys to its personal idea of operations. The Marine Corps’ touchdown ship helps Expeditionary Superior Base Operations. The Military’s watercraft helps theater sustainment and Massive-Scale Fight Operations. The Navy drone floor vessels assist Distributed Maritime Operations. In a contingency, all of them will compete for a similar sea lanes, restore capability, port entry, and manpower.
After all, joint packages which have promised to serve everybody have traditionally delivered platforms optimized for nobody. The poor Marines have painful institutional causes to mistrust joint acquisition — the Joint Mild Tactical Car being solely the newest instance.
That danger is actual, however it’s not a motive to disregard apparent alternatives for locating efficiencies. The manned touchdown ships used for intra-theater cargo and automobile motion are the clearest case. Drone resupply craft belong within the broader sustainment dialogue, however they need to be handled primarily as a requirements and management problem fairly than as a part of the identical common-hull advice.
There isn’t a joint acquisition integrator for intra-theater watercraft, and nobody owns the issue throughout service traces. U.S. Transportation Command, the logical doctrinal integrator for intra-theater watercraft throughout the joint power, has no such authority or resourcing regardless of points arising with joint logistics over the shore since 2013. The Military’s Maritime Coaching Division schoolhouse at Ft. Eustis is compelled to coach to the packages it receives fairly than shaping the packages it must maintain.
This isn’t how america gained World Struggle II. Manufacturing standardization got here first and the coaching pipeline and upkeep ecosystem adopted. The joint power has inverted the sequence. Congress has already taken observe of this, saying in June 2026 that “the Military might not present resourcing in keeping with a practical technique to assist the watercraft wanted for operations within the Pacific.”
Construct the Liberty Ship
This argument doesn’t require canceling each present watercraft program or forcing each service into one vessel. The US doesn’t have the posh to construct distinct ships with our current industrial constraints. We want consolidation, joint structure, and congressional compulsion — as a result of the providers won’t do it voluntarily.
The Damen touchdown ship household is the obvious candidate for a typical hull. Naval Sea Methods Command has already ordered it to be in-built American shipyards. Australia has already procured it. Allied navies function it from Europe to the Pacific, which implies ahead restore amenities and logistics assist exist within the theaters the place will probably be wanted. If the 120-meter variant is judged materially quick in payload, velocity, or seashore entry, the Military may have a stronger case for a separate heavy watercraft. If it closes the hole at decrease price and with a shared upkeep and coaching base, then a separate hull household turns into a lot tougher to justify.
Writing this fashion of a modular joint acquisition program will essentially increase the specter of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, an analogy price confronting instantly. That program produced three distinct variants — most remarkably the Marines’ vertical takeoff and touchdown F-35B — at monumental price as a result of the providers’ operational necessities had been incompatible with the essential airframe. One lesson that critics draw from it’s that joint packages produce compromised platforms. However a touchdown ship may be very totally different from a fifth-generation fighter jet. Military and Marine sealift are intently associated sufficient missions that one shared household of watercraft can cowl them. The F-35B exists as we speak as a result of vertical touchdown is a bodily constraint no modular airframe can engineer round. There isn’t a equal constraint in naval structure that requires the Military to construct a ship the Navy and Marines won’t ever preserve or crew.
Congress ought to direct 4 issues:
First, it ought to designate U.S. Transportation Command because the lead integrating authority for joint intra-theater watercraft, homeported at Fort Eustis. Transportation Command just isn’t an acquisition government and can’t unilaterally rewrite service necessities or program goal memoranda. That authority rests with the providers below Title 10. However Congress can shut that hole by conditioning watercraft program funding on Transportation Command concurrence through the necessities validation part. This is able to give the command leverage with out reorganizing the acquisition system. Concurrence at validation, not at program execution or funding launch, means Transportation Command might form necessities earlier than cash flows fairly than slowing packages already in movement. This is similar stage at which concurrence from the Joint Necessities Oversight Council already governs different joint functionality areas.
Second, situation additional funding for the Military’s Maneuver Help Vessel (Heavy) on completion of a proper hull household evaluation evaluating Military necessities in opposition to the 100- and 120-meter Damen variants.
Third, require a joint-qualified crewing and coaching pipeline at Fort Eustis for Military-manned intra-theater watercraft. The Navy and Marine Corps are already shifting towards widespread upkeep requirements for his or her chosen touchdown ship. The Military needs to be introduced into that effort, fairly than constructing a parallel pipeline.
Fourth, mandate a single enterprise readiness reporting system masking all joint watercraft packages earlier than the following program evaluation. The Authorities Accountability Workplace recognized the fleet as vital however poorly tracked in 2024. That deficiency can’t carry right into a contingency.
A standard hull household constructed from a industrial basis and sustained by means of a shared upkeep and coaching pipeline is probably the most sensible path to a watercraft fleet the power can area when the capturing begins.
Peter Mitchell is an Military officer. He’s at present a strategist at Futures and Ideas Command.
John “T.J.” Curl is an Military officer. He’s at present the brigade intelligence officer for seventh Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA.
The views expressed are these of the authors and don’t replicate the official place of the Division of the Military or Division of Protection.
Picture: Marinha do Brasil by way of Wikimedia Commons
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