On Feb. 28, 2026, President Donald Trump introduced the graduation of Operation Epic Fury, a joint U.S.-Israeli army operation in opposition to Iran. Among the many mission’s targets was the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. “After we are completed,” Trump advised the Iranian folks, “take over your authorities. Will probably be yours to take.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu echoed Trump’s message, saying: “Our joint motion will create the situations for the courageous Iranian folks to take their future into their very own fingers.” To make sure, Washington and Jerusalem had different goals — above all, stopping the Islamic Republic from buying nuclear weapons — however reporting means that regime change was, notably for Netanyahu, a core objective.
As of this writing, the U.S.-Israeli operation has didn’t topple the Islamic Republic. Whereas Israel succeeded on the primary day of the battle in killing Supreme Chief Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the regime has weathered the assaults. Nor has the marketing campaign resulted in main Iranian concessions on its nuclear program.
Analysts have argued that this consequence is attributable to a number of errors in decision-making. Some writers assert that neither the USA nor Israel had any plan for how you can set up a brand new authorities in Tehran after the preliminary decapitation strikes. Given the resilience of the Islamic Republic’s system, different students anticipate that undermining the regime might be difficult. Consequently, a number of authors have concluded that Washington and Jerusalem conflated the achievement of tactical success with the success of long-term political goals.
What’s one to make of those claims? One strategy to consider such arguments is to study them within the gentle of the historic proof, which, on steadiness, lends strong help to those crucial analyses. 5 circumstances are related: the 1956 to 1957 Suez disaster, Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, U.S. efforts to overthrow Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the Obama administration’s determination to take away Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi, and the 1953 U.S.-sponsored coup in Iran. Whereas different examples exist — for instance, Iraq’s disastrous determination to invade Iran in 1980 was motivated partly by regime change ambitions — these 5 operations are particularly helpful as a result of they spotlight key misjudgments that performed a job in shaping the pondering of the principal U.S. and Israeli architects of the battle.
To make sure, there are important variations between these circumstances and the 2026 U.S.-Israeli operation. Not like Operation Epic Fury, the Suez disaster, Israel’s intervention in Lebanon, and, in the end, American efforts to take away Saddam from energy all concerned full-fledged floor invasions, and the geopolitical context surrounding every of those examples differed meaningfully from February 2026. Likewise, the 2011 U.S. mission in Libya started as a humanitarian intervention and subsequently morphed right into a regime change operation in opposition to a frontrunner who had been cooperating with the USA on vital safety issues for the higher a part of a decade. Lastly, the case of what occurred in Iran in 1953 differs in important methods, because it concerned covert motion — versus a significant army operation — and arguably succeeded, insofar because it put in a regime pleasant to the USA, at the very least till it was changed by a revolutionary authorities inimical to U.S. pursuits roughly 1 / 4 of a century later.
Nonetheless, two widespread misjudgments that contributed to the long-term failure of those 5 regime change efforts seem to have additionally been current within the minds of the architects of the 2026 battle, and particularly Trump and Netanyahu, as critics of the battle have identified. First, the 2 males — who each seem to have felt that the mission stood a great probability of succeeding due to their mutual perception that the string of defeats Iran and its proxies had suffered because the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas assault in opposition to Israel had left the regime in Tehran extremely uncovered — conflated American and Israeli materials capabilities with the capability to attain primary political outcomes, a basic strategic error. Certainly, the circumstances examined right here counsel that leaders continuously overestimate their means to translate army energy, coercive diplomacy, and/or covert motion into fascinating strategic outcomes and political transformation within the Center East.
Second, and relatedly, U.S. and Israeli policymakers succumbed to the tempting perception that decapitation may function a magic bullet, by both resulting in the substitute of the regime in Tehran with a extra average management, or triggering some form of collapse of state capability that would depart Iran significantly weakened. What the historic proof suggests, nevertheless, is that such operations usually set off a nationalist backlash, ignore the absence of a viable different political pressure that may type a steady authorities, and/or underestimate the resilience of the present political order — all of which may in the end outcome within the institution of an much more adversarial or unstable regime than the one which preceded it. A key lesson that emerges from an examination of those circumstances, then, is that there are actual limits to what even nice powers can accomplish once they try to make use of pressure, coercive diplomacy, and/or covert motion to attain regime change within the Center East.
With that in thoughts, Washington ought to pursue a special coverage towards Iran. For the USA — and for Israel — a very powerful intention is stopping Tehran from buying a nuclear functionality. Thus, the Trump administration ought to abandon its objective of overthrowing the Islamic Republic and as a substitute search to barter a brand new nuclear settlement with Tehran, one which resembles — and, if potential, is extra advantageous to the USA than — the 2015 Joint Complete Plan of Motion. Whereas accepting one other related association would in no way be a great consequence, the options — resuming army operations and doubling down on a coverage that has traditionally failed — can be a mistake.
The Suez Disaster
In October 1956, Britain, France, and Israel launched a coordinated army effort in opposition to Egypt. The Suez disaster was motivated partly by their need to deliver in regards to the collapse of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s authorities. The assault had different goals — London and Paris wished to reverse Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal — however all felt that the Egyptian chief’s elimination would profit their respective pursuits. “The elimination of Nasser, and the set up in Egypt of a regime much less hostile to the West,” British Prime Minister Anthony Eden wrote to President Dwight Eisenhower, “should … additionally rank excessive amongst our goals.” London and Paris, he added, “couldn’t presumably acquiesce” to Egypt’s management of the canal, for such a scenario would imply “that the entire place within the Center East would thereby be misplaced past recall.”
The joint British-French-Israeli effort, although militarily profitable, failed politically. Though Israel emerged from the battle in a salvageable place, the results for Britain and France had been extreme. Eisenhower — who was livid not solely as a result of the USA had been saved at the hours of darkness in regards to the operation, but additionally as a result of it diverted consideration from the Soviet Union’s ongoing crackdown in Hungary and got here simply previous to the U.S. presidential election — in the end put huge stress on London and Paris to desert their strategic goals. Consequently, the Suez disaster is nonetheless regarded as a second when Britain and France misplaced their standing as nice powers. As President Richard Nixon, who on the time was serving as Eisenhower’s vp, later wrote, the battle “had a devastating impact on the British and French. From that point on, they ceased to be main powers on the earth.” As for Nasser, he emerged in a strengthened political place.
Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon
In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. Protection Minister Ariel Sharon, who Avi Shlaim claims was “the true driving pressure behind” the battle, had three formidable and interrelated goals: the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Group’s army forces from Southern Lebanon, the elimination of Syria’s army belongings from the nation, and the set up of Bashir Gemayel — the chief of the Maronite Christians — as president, which might hopefully end in a Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty. Hopefully, Shlaim contends, Sharon believed that the destruction of the Palestine Liberation Group’s place in Lebanon would rework the Center East by forcing the Palestinians to return to Jordan. There, he hoped, they might overthrow Jordan’s Hashemite monarchy and exchange it with a Palestinian state. That outcome would facilitate Israel’s annexation of the West Financial institution and Gaza Strip and, in flip, the signing of peace treaties with Jordan and Syria.
Regardless of fast army advances, Israel’s battle in Lebanon failed to attain its targets. To make sure, the Palestine Liberation Group — together with its chief, Yasser Arafat — was expelled to Tunis. However the battle did nothing to include Palestinian nationalism, which exploded simply 5 years later with the outbreak of the First Intifada, an rebellion that witnessed the emergence of Hamas. For his or her half, the Syrians didn’t withdraw from Lebanon till 2005. Nor did Israel’s regime change effort succeed: In September 1982, Gemayel was assassinated by Syrian-aligned operatives. Though Lebanon did signal a peace settlement with Israel, it had no credibility and shortly turned a useless letter. Given the character of Lebanon’s political system and inside divisions, that consequence is unsurprising.
The battle, furthermore, proved strategically counterproductive. The battle tarnished Israel’s picture internationally, together with — for a time — in the USA, notably after particulars emerged that the nation had been complicit within the bloodbath of Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatila. Moreover, the battle witnessed the rise of Hizballah, a Shiite militant group — one which the U.S. authorities designates a terrorist group — which Iran helped arrange and now represents Tehran’s strongest proxy within the Center East. Israeli forces didn’t withdraw from Lebanon till Could 2000 and, once they did, it was thought of a major victory for Hizballah. As of June 2026, Israeli troops had been once more conducting main army operations in Lebanon, with the objective of weakening the group. It stays unclear how Israel can eradicate it, notably since Iran has proven itself extra keen than it was prior to now to return to Hizballah’s assist.
The US and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
Following Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, regime change shortly turned U.S. coverage. To make sure, President George H.W. Bush opted neither to pursue Iraqi forces again to Baghdad nor to help the uprisings that erupted within the nation in March — regardless that Bush had inspired “the Iraqi army and the Iraqi folks to take issues into their very own fingers and pressure Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step apart” — as a result of doing so would have undermined key U.S. pursuits. However there was little doubt, even when Bush deserves credit score for not exacerbating issues by pursuing regime change by way of army means, that the intention of American coverage was to result in Saddam’s elimination. “He’s bought to go,” the president wrote on Feb. 28, the day Kuwait was liberated.
President Invoice Clinton’s administration pursued the identical objective. In October 1998, Clinton signed into legislation the Iraq Liberation Act, which stipulated that U.S. coverage was “to help efforts to take away the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from energy in Iraq.” “We don’t agree,” Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared in March 1997, “with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations regarding weapons of mass destruction, sanctions must be lifted.” “Clearly,” she added, “a change in Iraq’s authorities may result in a change in U.S. coverage.” That primary method, analysts have famous, gave the Iraqi chief no incentive to cooperate. “We are able to,” Saddam repeatedly advised his advisers, “have sanctions with inspectors or sanctions with out inspectors; which would you like?” Washington, F. Gregory Gause III concludes, had been “pressured right into a clear hypocrisy” by insisting on regime change.
Maybe it might have been unattainable to work with Saddam in any case, however by taking the road that it did, the USA left itself few good choices. And there may be proof to counsel that Baghdad could have been excited by reaching some form of lodging, with sure Iraqi officers suggesting that Clinton’s victory over Bush in 1992 could possibly be a possibility to “flip a brand new web page.” In the end, the administration’s coverage was a failure: Over time, it steadily misplaced worldwide help, such that the containment regime had roughly damaged down by the point Clinton left workplace.
The outcome was that Clinton’s successor, President George W. Bush, determined that Saddam needed to be eliminated by way of an American invasion in March 2003. That battle, virtually universally, is thought to be a strategic blunder. Even leaving apart Iraq’s lack of weapons of mass destruction — the principal justification for the battle — and the administration’s incompetent conduct of the battle, the adverse results on U.S. pursuits had been far-reaching. The battle lacked worldwide help and was expensive when it comes to blood and treasure, contributing to the squandering of the “unipolar second,” and it created the situations that led to the rise of the Islamic State. The battle additionally enhanced Iran’s strategic place by empowering its pure political allies in Iraq. The US, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah complained, had offered Iraq to Iran as a “present on a golden platter.”
Operation Odyssey Daybreak
In March 2011, Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi threatened the residents of Benghazi — the town on the coronary heart of the revolt that had damaged out within the nation a month earlier — that authorities forces would “march with the intention to cleanse Libya inch by inch, home by home, residence by residence, alley by alley, individual by individual, till the nation is cleansed of dust and scum.” President Barack Obama determined to intervene militarily to stop a humanitarian disaster, saying that the USA had “a duty to behave.”
But it surely quickly turned clear that the administration felt {that a} profitable long-term consequence would require Gadhafi’s elimination. Obama started calling for Gadhafi to step down as early as Feb. 26, and the president reiterated a month later that the Libyan chief’s overthrow was a objective he “embraced.” “By the summer season,” David Sanger later wrote, “it doesn’t matter what the U.N. decision mentioned, it was fairly clear that the mission was all about regime change.” “We got here, we noticed, he died!” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exclaimed when she realized of Gadhafi’s dying.
Nevertheless well-meaning, the outcomes of the mission had been decidedly disastrous for Libya, in addition to damaging to U.S. pursuits. Even Samantha Energy, an advocate of the intervention, acknowledged that utilizing American army pressure in opposition to Gadhafi “would possibly in the end harm the reason for nuclear nonproliferation” as a result of the Libyan chief had deserted his nuclear program in 2003. By 2016, furthermore, Libya had turn into, within the phrases of two New York Occasions reporters, “a failed state and a terrorist haven,” whereas Gadhafi had beforehand been cooperating with the USA on counterterrorism efforts. Thus, Secretary of Protection Robert Gates, who opposed the intervention, recalled saying that Gadhafi “was not a risk to us wherever. He was a risk to his personal folks, and that was about it.”
And it had been abundantly clear that Operation Odyssey Daybreak, the mission’s codename, concerned an actual threat of sowing chaos. Clinton had identified “how tough it is going to be in a rustic like Libya” to handle the post-Gadhafi political transition, on condition that the Libyan dictator had spent 42 years “destroying all establishments.” Libya in the end fell right into a state of civil battle, one by which quite a lot of international powers performed an energetic position, in what turned a multisided proxy battle. To this present day, the nation stays divided between two rival governments.
The U.S. Coup in Iran
The U.S.-Israeli assault on Iran is just not the primary time that the USA has sought to overthrow the nation’s political management. That distinction goes to Operation TPAJAX, the August 1953 CIA-backed mission to take away Muhammad Mosaddegh, Iran’s elected prime minister, and restore Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi to energy. In that case, the Eisenhower administration had turn into more and more nervous that Iran’s economic system was liable to collapsing, an consequence the White Home nervous would possibly result in expanded Communist and Soviet affect in Tehran. Even when one accepts revisionist accounts — although there are good causes one mustn’t — Mosaddegh’s overthrow nonetheless casts a shadow over American-Iranian relations. In any case, the shah’s reign ended with the 1979 revolution and his substitute by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s virulently anti-American Islamic Republic.
Conclusion
Thus, it’s reasonably unsurprising that the U.S.-Israeli army marketing campaign has failed to attain its key goals. On the contrary, the battle has elevated Iran’s hardliners, notably conservative leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, has been chosen to succeed his father — thereby fixing the Islamic Republic’s succession dilemma — a major setback if one accepts the view that the regime was weak previous to the battle. Tehran, furthermore, has gained new leverage by showcasing its means to shut the Strait of Hormuz. Even when the June ceasefire settlement stays in impact — and there may be motive to imagine it could not — Iran can at all times threaten credibly to take action once more. In grand strategic phrases, China and Russia stand to learn from the battle’s continuation, not least as a result of U.S. operations have depleted weapons stockpiles which can be wanted within the Indo-Pacific, an more and more crucial theater.
What, then, is the suitable path ahead for Washington? The prospect that Iran will capitulate is unlikely, and, given the outcomes so far, it might be a mistake for the Trump administration to renew army operations, because the president has threatened to do. To restrict the injury to American pursuits, the White Home ought to as a substitute attempt to stabilize the ceasefire and obtain its key goals by way of negotiations. Particularly, the USA ought to formally abjure regime change as a coverage goal and search to reinstate an enhanced model of the Joint Complete Plan of Motion. Such a course would assist obtain the Trump administration’s most vital objective: stopping Tehran from buying nuclear weapons. Nevertheless emboldened Tehran could really feel because of the outcomes of the battle to this point, the truth that the Iranian economic system — which was weak even earlier than the battle started — has sustained as a lot as $270 billion in injury and left many Iranians determined, would possibly give the nation’s new leaders an incentive to deal.
Regrettably, the broader problem that the USA and Israel confront in Iran over the long run, even when one leaves the nuclear problem apart, has no simple reply. Given how unpopular the regime had turn into on the eve of the battle, there was at the very least a risk {that a} extra average and pragmatic group of Iranian leaders would possibly finally emerge, as occurred, as an example, within the case of Egypt. In the end, the perceived risk that Nasser posed to Western and Israeli pursuits resolved itself when he died in September 1970 and was changed by President Anwar Sadat. The latter was excited by working with the USA and taking political dangers to achieve a peace settlement with Israel, which he did in March 1979. Such a state of affairs, nevertheless, now seems distant in Iran: By failing to study the teachings of previous failed regime change efforts within the Center East, U.S. and Israeli policymakers have seemingly ensured that the Islamic Republic will stay an adversary for the foreseeable future.
Galen Jackson, Ph.D., is an affiliate professor of political science at Williams School, the place he teaches programs on nuclear weapons, American international coverage, worldwide relations, the Center East, the Arab-Israeli battle, and worldwide cybersecurity research. He’s the writer of A Misplaced Peace: Nice Energy Politics and the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1979 (Cornell College Press, 2023), and editor of The 1973 Arab-Israeli Warfare (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023).
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